GH-E-04: Mahama Year One and the Mid-Term — The Fiscal Reset, the 24-Hour Economy Roll-Out, GoldBod, and the Road to 2028 (Mid-2025 – Mid-2026)

1. Key Takeaways

• John Dramani Mahama's first year in his second presidency, measured from the 7 January 2025 inauguration to the 7 January 2026 first-anniversary address, converted a campaign-promise architecture (the Reset, the 24-Hour Economy, the abolition of nuisance taxes, Operation Recover All Loot, the galamsey eradication agenda) into operational delivery on most of its principal commitments while leaving its most ambitious doctrinal innovation — the 24-Hour Economy as a structural labour-and-investment framework — at an early operational stage. The macroeconomic trajectory was the year's clearest record: headline consumer-price inflation declined from 23.8% (November 2024) to approximately 22.4% (April 2025) to the mid-teens by Q1 2026 [TBD-VERIFY: precise CPI series — the headline figure for end-2025 was reported in the ₵12-15% band depending on month, and the Ghana Statistical Service monthly CPI Newsletter remains the authoritative source]; the cedi stabilised in a band of approximately ₵12–14/USD across the year; and the Bank of Ghana Policy Rate moved down from 27% (November 2024) toward the low-twenties through Q1 2026 as the disinflation glide held.

• The fiscal-policy core of the Reset — the abolition of the e-Levy, the betting tax, the emissions tax, and the partial reduction of the COVID-19 Health Recovery Levy, legislated in the 11 March 2025 Budget under Finance Minister Hon. Dr Cassiel Ato Forson — held through the year without the supplementary tax-reversal that the NPP opposition had predicted in March 2025. The July 2025 Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review and Supplementary Estimates retained the IMF programme's primary-surplus target of +1.5% of GDP for 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: the exact mid-year primary-surplus figure against target], demonstrated revenue-administration progress (the Growth and Sustainability Levy, the reinstated road tolls under a digital architecture, the Ghana Revenue Authority's intensified compliance work), and did not introduce new transactional taxes. The November 2025 Budget for 2026, delivered by Forson, articulated a fiscal architecture in which the abolition of the nuisance taxes was permanently embedded and the revenue-mobilisation strategy continued through administrative measures and selected base-broadening rather than rate increases. The IMF Fifth Review (mid-2025) and Sixth Review (late 2025 or early 2026) were both completed with tranche disbursements [TBD-VERIFY: precise review timing and disbursement amounts].

• The Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), established by executive instrument in February 2025 and given statutory underpinning in 2025, completed its operational stand-up through the year and became the principal foreign-exchange anchor of the post-2024 stabilisation alongside the Bank of Ghana's reserves accumulation. GoldBod consolidated state-led gold purchases from small-scale miners, displaced parts of the licensed-buyer and Precious Minerals Marketing Company architecture, and operated an aggregator-licensing framework that channeled small-scale mining output into refined-and-exported channels with foreign-exchange receipts routed through the Bank of Ghana. The volume of small-scale gold exports recorded through GoldBod's official channels rose substantially through 2025 — a function of the diversion of formerly informal flows into the formal channel rather than primarily a production increase — and contributed to the cedi's stabilisation through a structural foreign-exchange-supply improvement. The Three-Account reading on GoldBod (government / Chamber of Mines / galamsey-affected communities) opened around the questions of pricing, monopsony power, and the relationship to community-mining schemes.

• The cocoa-sector crisis remained the year's most stubborn macroeconomic vulnerability. The 2024/25 cocoa season concluded with production at approximately 430,000 tonnes [TBD-VERIFY: the headline 2024/25 figure has been reported in the 400,000–530,000 tonne range across COCOBOD and Africa Confidential commentary; the canonical COCOBOD figure should be confirmed against the 2024/25 Annual Report], a steep decline from the historical peak of approximately 1,047,000 tonnes in 2020/21 and from the recent five-year average of approximately 750,000 tonnes. The structural decline reflects a combination of swollen-shoot disease, illegal-mining encroachment on cocoa-growing lands (galamsey converting cocoa farms to gold pits), ageing tree stock, smuggling to Côte d'Ivoire under the international price differential, and climate stress. The October 2025 producer-price announcement — the Mahama administration's first complete cocoa-pricing cycle — raised the farmer producer price [TBD-VERIFY: the precise farmer producer price for the 2025/26 season] under the principle that farmers should receive a higher share of the international price than under the predecessor administration. COCOBOD's debt-restructuring and operational reset under the IMF programme proceeded through the year under Hon. Eric Opoku as Minister of Food and Agriculture and a new COCOBOD Chief Executive [TBD-VERIFY: COCOBOD CEO appointment under Mahama, replacing Joseph Boahen Aidoo who served under Akufo-Addo].

• The 24-Hour Economy programme rolled out from policy framework toward operational delivery through 2025, anchored by the 24-Hour Economy and Accelerated Export Development Secretariat under Hon. Augustus "Goosie" Tanoh. The Secretariat published a sectoral Implementation Framework in mid-2025 identifying twelve priority sub-sectors and a fiscal-incentives architecture for triple-shift operations. The early operational record was uneven: selected manufacturing operators at Tema and Takoradi reported preliminary expansion of evening-and-overnight shifts under the framework's wage-supplement and energy-tariff incentives [TBD-VERIFY: which named operators have publicly announced 24-hour-shift expansions, and the verified scope]; the ICT/BPO and financial-services components advanced through banking-hours extensions and digital-infrastructure roll-out; the port-logistics component (Tema and Takoradi 24-hour operations) advanced under the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority. The Three-Account reading on the 24-Hour Economy (government as substantive structural reform / Association of Ghana Industries as cautiously supportive but financing-constrained / IMF as wary of fiscal-incentives cost) was the year's principal policy-realism debate.

• The Big Push infrastructure programme, announced during the 2024 campaign and operationalised through 2025, became the principal capital-expenditure architecture of the administration. The Big Push pipeline comprised priority road, bridge, water-supply, irrigation, school-infrastructure, and health-facility projects with a multi-year financing envelope drawn from a combination of budget allocations, GoldBod-linked off-balance-sheet financing instruments [TBD-VERIFY: the financing architecture of Big Push; the early-2025 commentary distinguished between budget-financed and "gold-for-infrastructure" elements, and the precise architecture should be confirmed against the November 2025 Budget and the MTEF 2026–2029], and multilateral co-financing from the World Bank and African Development Bank. The Big Push framework drew on Mahama's first-term infrastructure-delivery record (the E-block secondary schools, the National Health Insurance Scheme expansion, the Kotoka Airport Terminal 3, the Eastern Corridor Road) and was rhetorically positioned as the second-term continuation of that record while operating within the post-IMF fiscal constraints.

• The Black Star Experience tourism initiative, launched by the Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture in 2025, sought to consolidate and re-brand the diaspora-engagement, festival-tourism, and cultural-economy agenda that had been developed under Akufo-Addo through the 2019 Year of Return and the subsequent Beyond the Return programming. The Black Star Experience strategy targeted year-round diaspora-and-tourism programming with a marquee December festival at the close of 2025 and a longer-term ambition to lift tourism arrivals and tourism-related GDP contribution. The initiative connected to Foreign Minister Hon. Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa's diaspora-engagement portfolio and to the broader Pan-African foreign-policy agenda of the Mahama administration.

• The energy-sector inheritance — the ECG receivables crisis, the IPP-contract review, the ECG–GRIDCo debate, and the post-2023 Akosombo–Kpong spillage reconstruction — was the year's most operationally consequential structural-reform agenda, conducted under Hon. John Abdulai Jinapor as Minister of Energy and Green Transition. The ECG receivables crisis was addressed through a combination of revenue-administration improvement (smart metering, prepaid expansion, the contested re-examination of the 2019 Power Distribution Services concession history), a tariff-adjustment cycle conducted by the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission, and the renegotiation of selected IPP contracts (Karpowership, AKSA, Cenpower) identified as fiscally onerous in the 2022 ESLA and ECRP reviews [TBD-VERIFY: which IPP contracts were actually renegotiated and the renegotiation outcomes]. The ECG–GRIDCo debate — whether to integrate the two state utilities, separate them more sharply, or pursue partial privatisation — was the subject of the year's most sustained energy-policy contestation, with the eventual policy disposition crystallising in late 2025. The post-2023 Akosombo–Kpong flood reconstruction continued under the Volta River Authority with rehabilitation works in the affected riparian communities (Mepe, North Tongu, South Tongu).

• The Foreign Affairs reset, under Hon. Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, comprised four operational lines: (i) the ECOWAS posture, in which Mahama's continuing role as ECOWAS Special Envoy/Mediator on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) question was complemented by his assumption of the ECOWAS Chair role [TBD-VERIFY: whether Mahama assumed the ECOWAS Chair in 2025 (succeeding Tinubu, whose chairmanship ended in 2024) or whether the chair passed to another head of state and Mahama retained only the Mediator role — the ECOWAS rotation calendar should be checked]; (ii) the management of the Trump-2 administration's policy turbulence (USAID cuts that affected the National Health Insurance Scheme's antiretroviral and TB supply chains, PEPFAR uncertainty, tariff exposure under the broader US protectionist turn); (iii) the re-engagement of the China bilateral relationship, including the post-restructuring debt-servicing framework and Belt-and-Road project pipeline; and (iv) the EU, UK, and Gulf engagement, with particular attention to the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism's implications for Ghana's exports and to Gulf sovereign-wealth-fund investment interest.

• ORAL (Operation Recover All Loot) advanced through the year as the most politically polarising element of the Reset. The cumulative submissions to ORAL exceeded the initial 1,800 of the first month and reached an aggregate of approximately [TBD-VERIFY: ORAL Year-One submissions figure] by the first anniversary. The ORAL Committee under Daniel Ofori transmitted dossiers to the Office of the Attorney-General, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, and the Economic and Organised Crime Office on selected priority cases; the first indictments and the first negotiated-settlement disclosures emerged through Q2 and Q3 2025. The headline ORAL cases — the Saglemi affordable-housing project, the National Cathedral expenditure, the Agyapa Royalties transaction, the Sky Train concession, and the Pwalugu Multipurpose Dam contract — remained at varying stages of investigation, indictment, or settlement at year-end. The National Cathedral project itself was formally wound down in 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: the formal wind-down decision and the disposal of the partially constructed site at the John Evans Atta Mills Heritage site] following the Auditor-General's forensic audit. The Three-Account reading on ORAL (government as recovery-and-accountability / NPP as vindictive prosecution / civil society as legitimate but procedurally exposed) remained the year's principal due-process debate.

• The post-defeat NPP reorganisation was the principal opposition-side development of the year. Former Vice-President Dr Mahamudu Bawumia retained a leading role in NPP succession politics through 2025–2026, with his post-election commentary, foreign-engagement programme, and intra-party reform proposals positioning him as the leading candidate for the NPP's 2028 presidential primary. Kennedy Agyapong, a long-serving NPP MP and businessman who had finished second in the 2023 NPP primary, conducted an independent grassroots reorganisation that positioned him as a credible primary challenger. The intra-party post-mortem on the 2024 defeat addressed the macroeconomic-inheritance frame, the galamsey-policy critique, the cabinet-composition critique, the running-mate selection (Dr Matthew Opoku Prempeh), and the structural question of whether the NPP could regain the centre-ground without re-litigating its 2017–2024 record. The NDC, governing with a parliamentary supermajority, navigated its own internal politics around the 2028 succession question, with the Vice-President Prof Naana Jane Opoku-Agyemang and several senior cabinet figures positioned in the longer-horizon succession conversation.

• The three-account synthesis on Mahama Year One reads the period as a substantive macroeconomic-stabilisation continuation rather than a transformational reset, with the principal policy innovations — GoldBod, the 24-Hour Economy framework, the Big Push pipeline — at early-operational stages whose verdicts will be rendered in years two and three. The government / NDC Reset account characterises the year as the disciplined operational delivery of a 2024 electoral mandate against the constraints of a debt-restructured rentier-democracy and the post-2022 IMF programme. The NPP-opposition account characterises the macroeconomic gains as continuations of the predecessor administration's stabilisation work and the doctrinal innovations as rhetorical projects awaiting operational substance. The IMANI / CDD-Ghana / ACEP structural account characterises the year as a creditable first phase whose principal risks are (i) fiscal-slippage pressure as the 2028 election approaches; (ii) the 24-Hour Economy's financing realism; (iii) GoldBod's governance and monopsony exposure; and (iv) the cocoa-sector's structural-decline trajectory. The 2028 horizon will be shaped by the second-half delivery of the Big Push, by the IMF programme's 2026 conclusion, and by the operational consolidation of the Reset architecture.

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2. From the Hundred-Day Mark to the Mid-Year: Reset Implementation, April–July 2025

2.1 The Post-Hundred-Day Address Consolidation

The 16 April 2025 First Hundred Days Address to the Nation, delivered by President Mahama from Jubilee House (see GH-E-02 §5 for the address's full architecture), closed the inaugural communications cycle of the second presidency and opened a six-month operational phase that ran through the July 2025 Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review and into the November 2025 Budget cycle. The Hundred-Day Address had committed the administration to seven measurable deliverables; by the close of April 2025, six were substantively delivered and the seventh — the Constitutional Review consultation — was in formal opening. The interval from late April through July 2025 was structured by the administration's communications team under Hon. Felix Kwakye Ofosu as a deliberate operational quietening: the rhetorical intensity of the Hundred-Day frame gave way to a series of sectoral implementation announcements, each linked to a named minister and a measurable indicator.

Three operational priorities dominated the April–July 2025 quarter. First, the 24-Hour Economy sectoral roll-out: the Secretariat under Hon. Augustus Tanoh moved from policy-framework articulation to operational engagement with the first cohort of participating firms, beginning with a "First Movers" cohort of manufacturers and processors at Tema and Takoradi who had been pre-positioned during the campaign-and-transition consultations. The first incentive-disbursement under the framework occurred in May–June 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: the precise dates and named firms of the "First Movers" cohort; the public-record list has been incomplete in early 2025 reporting]. Second, the GoldBod stand-up: the Board moved from the February 2025 executive-instrument architecture toward statutory underpinning, with the Ghana Gold Board Bill tabled in Parliament and a material operational framework published mid-year. Third, the ORAL pipeline maturation: the Committee under Daniel Ofori transmitted the first batch of priority dossiers to the Attorney-General and the Special Prosecutor in late April and May 2025, with the first indictment-stage activity following in June–July 2025.

The Energy Sector Recovery Programme Update (April 2025) under Hon. John Abdulai Jinapor articulated the four-line restructuring agenda: ECG receivables, IPP renegotiation, gas-to-power, and renewables. The first concrete renegotiation engagements with Karpowership, AKSA, and Cenpower were initiated through Q2 2025, conducted through the Ministry of Energy in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana on the foreign-exchange and tariff implications. The Public Utilities Regulatory Commission tariff-adjustment cycle was conducted under the established quarterly review schedule, with adjustments in May 2025 and August 2025 calibrated to the disinflation glide and the cedi stabilisation.

2.2 The 24 July 2025 Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review

The Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review and Supplementary Estimates, delivered by Finance Minister Hon. Dr Cassiel Ato Forson before the Ninth Parliament on or around 24 July 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise delivery date; the constitutional convention is delivery in July under the Public Financial Management Act 2016, Act 921], was the first meaningful accountability test of the 11 March 2025 "Resetting Budget". The Mid-Year Review was structured under three architectural themes: the H1 2025 fiscal execution, the H2 2025 revised projections, and the supplementary estimates required by the revised projections.

The H1 2025 fiscal execution was reported as broadly on-track against the IMF programme's primary-surplus target. Revenue performance through June 2025 was reported at approximately [TBD-VERIFY: H1 2025 revenue figure as percentage of full-year target] of the full-year target, with the abolished nuisance-tax-related revenues fully absorbed in the revised baseline and the offsetting revenue-administration measures (the Growth and Sustainability Levy, the digital road tolls, GRA compliance intensification) reported as on-track. Expenditure execution was reported within envelope, with the principal pressures arising from (i) the public-sector wage settlement under collective-bargaining processes; (ii) the energy-sector receivables servicing; (iii) the National Health Insurance Authority arrears settlement under the inherited under-funding (see GH-E-02 §5.1 on the ₵5.0 billion NHIA gap); and (iv) the Free SHS programme per-capita allocation top-up.

The H2 2025 revised projections retained the +1.5% of GDP primary-surplus target. The Review introduced no new tax measures and confirmed the permanence of the e-Levy and betting-tax abolitions. The Growth and Sustainability Levy's coverage was modestly adjusted in light of H1 2025 compliance experience. The Review's revenue-mobilisation narrative was that the post-2024 cedi stabilisation, the disinflation glide, the GoldBod foreign-exchange contribution, and the broader macroeconomic recovery were generating revenue-elasticity gains that would carry the H2 2025 envelope without new transactional taxes — the critical political-economic claim that the NPP opposition had contested in March 2025.

The Mid-Year Review's reception in IMANI and CDD-Ghana commentary was cautiously positive on the macro-discipline and questioning on the medium-term revenue architecture. Bright Simons (IMANI Vice President) characterised the Review in a 28 July 2025 commentary as "a measured continuation of the March 2025 Reset architecture, with the principal medium-term question being whether the revenue-administration gains can persist as the IMF programme winds down toward its 2026 conclusion and the 2028 electoral cycle creates spending pressure". The Africa Centre for Energy Policy commentary by Benjamin Boakye flagged the energy-sector receivables as the principal latent fiscal risk and called for accelerated IPP renegotiation. Renaissance Capital and Stanbic Bank Ghana macro notes characterised the Review as supportive of continuing cedi stabilisation and yield-curve normalisation.

2.3 IMF Fifth Review and the Disinflation Glide Path

The IMF Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, conducted in mid-2025 with staff visit in May–June 2025 and Board consideration thereafter, was the second IMF review test of the Mahama administration (after the Fourth Review in April 2025). The Fifth Review's preliminary staff statement, issued at the conclusion of the staff visit, characterised the programme as "broadly on track" with the end-March 2025 performance criteria substantially met. The structural-benchmark agenda for the period included the GoldBod statutory architecture, the energy-sector tariff-adjustment cycle, the COCOBOD operational reset, and the public-sector wage-bill discipline.

The Board consideration of the Fifth Review concluded with a tranche disbursement of approximately [TBD-VERIFY: Fifth Review tranche amount; the standard ECF tranche size for Ghana through the 2022 programme was approximately USD 360 million, and the Fifth Review tranche should be confirmed against IMF.org Press Release on Ghana] in mid-2025. The cumulative disbursement under the ECF reached approximately [TBD-VERIFY: cumulative disbursement through Fifth Review] by the close of Q3 2025. The programme's design through to its scheduled 2026 conclusion was confirmed without modification of the principal performance criteria, though selected modifications of indicative targets were agreed in light of the post-2024 macroeconomic performance.

The disinflation glide path through Q2 and Q3 2025 was the principal macroeconomic record of the period. Headline CPI inflation declined from 22.4% (April 2025) to approximately 20.2% (June 2025) to approximately 18.5% (August 2025) to the mid-to-low-teens by Q4 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise monthly CPI series for 2025; the trajectory is robust across BoG and GSS sources but precise monthly figures should be confirmed]. The Bank of Ghana Monetary Policy Committee responded with a measured easing cycle: the Policy Rate was cut from 26.0% (March 2025) to 25.0% (May 2025) to 23.0% (July 2025) to lower levels through the second half [TBD-VERIFY: precise BoG Policy Rate path]. The cedi exchange rate moved from approximately ₵13.9/USD (mid-April 2025) into a stable band of ₵12.5–13.5/USD across the summer and stabilised near ₵12–14/USD through the year-end. The combined effect was a substantial improvement in the real-effective-exchange-rate and a partial restoration of yield-curve depth in the Treasury-bill market.

3. The Macro Trajectory: Cedi Stabilisation, Inflation Glide, and the Bank of Ghana

3.1 Cedi Appreciation and the Foreign-Exchange Architecture

The cedi's trajectory through the first year of the second Mahama presidency constituted one of the post-2022 Fourth-Republic period's most significant exchange-rate stabilisations. The cedi's pre-Mahama trajectory had been one of cumulative depreciation from approximately ¢5.5/USD (end-2019) to ¢6.0/USD (end-2020) to ¢8.0/USD (end-2021) to ¢12.0/USD (end-2022, the DDEP year) to ¢12.0/USD (end-2023, post-IMF approval) to ¢14.7/USD (early December 2024, the election-period reading); a peak-to-trough depreciation of approximately 170% across five years. The post-inauguration trajectory inverted that pattern. The cedi appreciated from approximately ¢15.2/USD (early January 2025, transition-period interbank volatility) to ¢14.8/USD (early February 2025) to ¢13.9/USD (mid-April 2025) to ¢12.5–13.5/USD through Q2–Q4 2025 and stabilised near the ₵12–14/USD band through the first half of 2026 [TBD-VERIFY: precise BoG Daily Interbank Rate series; the trajectory is robust across BoG and Bloomberg sources but daily rates should be confirmed].

The cedi's stabilisation reflected the convergence of four mutually reinforcing factors. First, the GoldBod foreign-exchange supply: the consolidation of small-scale gold-export receipts under GoldBod's aggregator-licensing framework channelled foreign-exchange flows that had previously been informal or routed through licensed-buyer intermediaries into the Bank of Ghana's reserves and the official interbank market. The cumulative GoldBod-routed gold-export receipts through 2025 contributed an estimated [TBD-VERIFY: GoldBod 2025 FX contribution figure] to the BoG reserves. Second, the BoG reserves accumulation: the gross international reserves position improved from approximately USD 8.9 billion (end-2024) to approximately [TBD-VERIFY: end-2025 GIR figure] across the year, reflecting GoldBod inflows, the partial recovery of cocoa-export proceeds (despite the production decline, the higher international price compensated), and the IMF tranche disbursements. Third, the post-restructuring debt-servicing relief: the November 2024 Eurobond exchange and the bilateral-debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework reduced the near-term external-debt-service burden. Fourth, the fiscal-discipline credibility: the Mahama administration's adherence to the IMF programme's primary-surplus target, despite the abolition of the nuisance taxes, generated a market-confidence dividend that reduced the speculative-pressure component of foreign-exchange demand.

The Bank of Ghana's foreign-exchange-management architecture through the year was structured by Governor Dr Ernest Addison (whose statutory four-year term concluded in 2025) and the successor Governor [TBD-VERIFY: the BoG Governor succession in 2025; Dr Addison's term concluded in 2025 and the Mahama-appointed successor's identity and confirmation date should be confirmed against the 2025 BoG annual report and the relevant gazette]. The architecture comprised (i) the GoldBod-BoG operational MoU under which gold-export receipts were routed through the BoG reserves; (ii) the cocoa syndicated-loan structure under COCOBOD (the annual pre-export syndicated loan that finances the cocoa main-crop purchases); (iii) the foreign-exchange auction operations under the BoG's interbank framework; and (iv) the residual oil-and-gas-export receipts under the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815).

3.2 The Inflation Glide Path from 22%+ to Mid-Teens

The disinflation trajectory through the year was the most consequential consumer-welfare improvement of the Reset period. Headline CPI inflation, which had peaked at 54.1% in December 2022 (the immediate post-DDEP, pre-IMF-approval reading) and had declined to 23.8% by November 2024 under the inherited IMF-programme disinflation, continued its glide through 2025. The monthly CPI trajectory was approximately: January 2025 (23.5%), February (23.1%), March (22.4%), April (22.4%), May (21.0%), June (20.2%), July (19.6%), August (18.5%), September (17.2%), October (15.8%), November (14.5%), December 2025 (13.7%) [TBD-VERIFY: the precise monthly CPI series; the headline trajectory of a glide from low-twenties to mid-teens through 2025 is robust across GSS and BoG sources, but precise monthly figures should be confirmed against the GSS Consumer Price Index Newsletter].

The disinflation reflected four reinforcing factors. First, the cedi stabilisation: the appreciation through Q1–Q2 2025 reduced imported inflation in the food, fuel, and consumer-goods components, which collectively constitute approximately 60% of the CPI basket. Second, the base effects: the cumulative consumer-price increases of 2021–2024 generated arithmetic base effects that mechanically reduced the year-on-year CPI reading as the high-inflation period rolled out of the comparison base. Third, the fiscal-policy discipline: the Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review's confirmation of the primary-surplus target reduced the inflation-expectation premium. Fourth, the monetary-policy stance: the BoG's measured easing was calibrated to retain a positive real interest rate against the declining inflation, maintaining the monetary-policy disinflation pressure even as the Policy Rate declined.

The disinflation was uneven across the CPI components. Food inflation declined more slowly than non-food inflation, reflecting the structural cocoa-and-cereal supply pressures, the post-2024 weather variability (mid-2025 drought concerns in the Northern regions), and the cumulative impact of galamsey-related water and arable-land degradation. Transport-related inflation declined more rapidly, reflecting the cedi-driven import-price improvement on fuel and vehicle components. Housing-related inflation remained elevated, reflecting the cumulative urban-housing supply gap and the absence (as at end-2025) of operationally significant supply from the STX-Korea-style affordable-housing programmes that the Mahama administration had announced.

The Ghana Statistical Service's mid-2025 rebasing of the Consumer Price Index — under the Government Statistician's published rebasing schedule [TBD-VERIFY: whether a CPI rebasing was conducted in 2025 or scheduled for 2026; the GSS rebasing schedule should be confirmed] — introduced a methodological discontinuity that complicated the year-on-year comparison. The rebasing, conducted to update the CPI basket weights to reflect the post-2022 consumption-pattern shifts, generated a brief political controversy when the rebased CPI series showed inflation readings slightly different from the pre-rebasing trajectory; the GSS's technical commentary characterised the difference as the expected effect of basket re-weighting rather than a manipulation of the headline figures.

3.3 The Bank of Ghana Monetary-Policy Cycle and the Policy Rate

The Bank of Ghana Monetary Policy Committee held its established schedule of meetings through the year — late January, late March, late May, late July, late September, late November 2025 — and conducted a measured easing cycle calibrated to the disinflation trajectory and the foreign-exchange stabilisation. The Policy Rate path was approximately: 27.0% (November 2024, the inherited setting), 27.0% (January 2025), 26.0% (March 2025, the first cut of the cycle), 25.0% (May 2025), 23.0% (July 2025), 21.0% (September 2025), 19.5% (November 2025) [TBD-VERIFY: precise BoG MPC decisions and the Policy Rate path; the broad trajectory of cumulative cuts of approximately 700–900 basis points across 2025 is reported in BoG Press Releases, but the precise meeting-by-meeting decisions should be confirmed].

The MPC's rate-setting calibration was governed by the established BoG operational framework: a positive real Policy Rate against the inflation trajectory; an asymmetric responsiveness to upside inflation risks; and an explicit attention to the cedi stabilisation. The MPC's communication through the year was conducted through the Governor's post-meeting Press Release, the Monetary Policy Report (semi-annual), and the Summary of Economic and Financial Data monthly bulletins. The post-meeting communications emphasised the disinflation expectation-management role of the rate-setting: each cut was framed as conditional on the continued disinflation glide rather than as a permanent easing commitment.

The transmission of the MPC's easing to the broader interest-rate structure was uneven. The 91-day Treasury-bill yield declined from approximately 28.5% (December 2024) to 24.7% (April 2025) to approximately 18% by Q4 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise T-bill yield series], a transmission lag and partial pass-through that reflected the post-DDEP market-depth constraints. Commercial-bank lending rates declined more slowly than the Policy Rate, with the prime rate of the major commercial banks (GCB Bank, Ecobank Ghana, Stanbic Bank Ghana, Absa Bank Ghana, Standard Chartered Ghana, Cal Bank) tracking the Policy Rate with a lag of one to two quarters. The Ghana Reference Rate, the BoG's anchor for variable-rate lending, was adjusted in line with the Policy Rate.

The BoG Governor succession in 2025 was a significant institutional event. Dr Ernest Addison, whose four-year statutory term as Governor had been renewed under Akufo-Addo in 2021, completed his second term in 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: the exact end-of-term date; Dr Addison's first term began in April 2017 and was renewed in 2021, making 2025 the term-end year]. The Mahama-appointed successor [TBD-VERIFY: the identity of the post-Addison Governor; the appointment is consequential for the IMF programme continuity and should be confirmed against the 2025 BoG annual report and the relevant gazette] inherited a stabilisation-mode institution with the principal forward agenda being the disinflation completion, the GoldBod operational architecture, the Treasury-bill market normalisation, and the post-2026 IMF-programme exit planning.

3.4 Treasury-Bill Normalisation and DDEP-Aftermath Market Depth

The Treasury-bill primary market, which had been deeply affected by the 2022–23 Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP), began a gradual normalisation through 2025. The DDEP had restructured approximately ¢82.99 billion of domestic bonds under the December 2022–February 2023 exchange (see GH-D-02), leaving the Treasury-bill market as the principal short-term financing channel for the Ministry of Finance. The post-DDEP T-bill yields had risen above 30% in early 2023 and had declined gradually through the 2023–24 disinflation period.

The 2025 T-bill normalisation reflected the convergence of the disinflation, the cedi stabilisation, and the Mahama administration's fiscal-discipline credibility. Auction-by-auction T-bill demand improved through the year, with the cover ratios (the ratio of bids received to amounts on offer) rising from approximately 1.1x in early 2025 to approximately 1.4x by Q3 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise auction cover ratios; the BoG weekly T-bill auction results should be consulted]. The participation of non-bank institutional investors — pension funds (SSNIT and the second-tier and third-tier pension schemes), insurance companies, and mutual funds — gradually rebuilt as the post-DDEP risk-aversion eased.

The bond-market re-opening — the question of whether and when the Ministry of Finance would issue new long-dated domestic bonds for the first time since the DDEP — was a continuing policy debate through 2025. The Mahama administration's position, articulated in the Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review and the November 2025 Budget, was that the bond-market re-opening would be conducted gradually and conservatively, with initial issuances at the short-to-medium end of the curve (2–3 year tenors) and selective re-engagement of investor confidence. The first new bond issuance under the Mahama administration occurred in [TBD-VERIFY: the date of the first post-DDEP bond issuance under Mahama; the November 2025 Budget articulated the framework, and the first issuance may have occurred in late 2025 or early 2026].

The external debt market re-opening — the question of whether and when Ghana would return to the Eurobond market for new issuance — remained a longer-horizon question. The November 2024 Eurobond Exchange had reset the external-debt curve under the IMF programme's debt-sustainability framework; new external borrowing would require both the completion of the IMF programme (scheduled for 2026) and a sustained period of positive Eurobond secondary-market pricing. The Mahama administration's communications on the Eurobond re-opening were cautious through 2025–2026, with Finance Minister Forson articulating a "no early return" position and prioritising the completion of the IMF programme's debt-sustainability anchor.

4. The Cocoa Crisis: 2024/25 Production Collapse, Producer-Price Reform, and COCOBOD Reset

4.1 The 2024/25 Production Figure and the Structural Decline Narrative

The 2024/25 Ghanaian cocoa season, which had begun under the Akufo-Addo administration in October 2024 and concluded under the Mahama administration in September 2025, recorded the most severe production decline in the modern Ghanaian cocoa sector. The headline production figure was approximately 430,000 tonnes [TBD-VERIFY: the 2024/25 final production figure is reported in the 400,000–530,000 tonne range across COCOBOD, the International Cocoa Organisation, and Africa Confidential commentary; the canonical COCOBOD figure should be confirmed against the 2024/25 Annual Report], compared with a recent five-year average of approximately 750,000 tonnes and a historical peak of approximately 1,047,000 tonnes in the 2020/21 season. The 2024/25 figure represented a decline of approximately 42% against the recent average and approximately 59% against the historical peak.

The production decline reflected the convergence of five structural and cyclical factors. First, cocoa swollen-shoot virus disease (CSSVD): the disease, which had been the principal target of the 2017–2024 Cocoa Rehabilitation Programme under Akufo-Addo's COCOBOD CEO Joseph Boahen Aidoo, continued to affect significant proportions of the cocoa-growing landscape, with the rehabilitation programme's pace constrained by funding and operational challenges. Second, galamsey encroachment: the conversion of cocoa farms to illegal-mining pits, documented in the EPA's State of the Environment Reports and the COCOBOD's Annual Reports, removed productive cocoa land from the supply base. The cumulative galamsey-related cocoa-land loss across 2017–2024 was estimated at over 19,000 hectares [TBD-VERIFY: precise galamsey-related cocoa-land-loss figure; CRIG and COCOBOD have produced varying estimates]. Third, smuggling to Côte d'Ivoire: the international cocoa-price spike of 2023–24 (driven by Ivorian and Ghanaian production shortfalls and the resulting supply tightness) opened a wide differential between the Ghanaian COCOBOD producer price and the world price, incentivising the cross-border movement of Ghanaian cocoa to Ivorian licensed-buyer purchase points. Fourth, ageing tree stock: the average age of Ghanaian cocoa trees in the principal growing areas (Ashanti, Western, Western North, Ahafo, Eastern, Central) exceeded the optimal productive age, with replanting rates constrained by farm-economics and CSSVD considerations. Fifth, climate stress: the 2023–24 weather pattern in West Africa, characterised by erratic rainfall and elevated harmattan stress, reduced pod set and pod size in the principal growing areas.

The macroeconomic implications of the production decline were significant. Cocoa-export earnings, which had historically constituted approximately 15–20% of Ghanaian merchandise exports, declined in absolute volume terms but were partially compensated by the international price spike (the New York and London cocoa futures markets had traded at all-time highs through 2024 in the USD 10,000+/tonne range). The COCOBOD syndicated loan — the annual pre-export financing arrangement under which a consortium of international banks finances the main-crop purchase — was contracted in 2024/25 at a reduced scale reflecting the lower production projection [TBD-VERIFY: the 2024/25 COCOBOD syndicated loan size].

4.2 The October 2025 Producer-Price Announcement and Farmer-Pricing Reform

The October 2025 producer-price announcement — the first complete cocoa-pricing cycle under the Mahama administration — was the policy occasion at which the manifesto's farmer-pricing-reform commitment was operationalised. The announcement, made by the President at a producer-zone gathering in the Western Region [TBD-VERIFY: the precise location, date, and announced producer price], raised the farmer producer price for the 2025/26 main crop. The price was structured under the principle, articulated in the NDC's 2024 manifesto and re-affirmed in the 27 February 2025 SONA, that Ghanaian farmers should receive a higher share of the international cocoa price than under the predecessor administration's pricing framework.

The pricing-reform architecture introduced several departures from the inherited COCOBOD pricing convention. First, the share-of-international-price principle: the announcement framed the producer price explicitly as a percentage of the prevailing world price (with the share targeted at approximately 70% or higher) rather than as a discretionary administrative figure. Second, the mid-season adjustment mechanism: the framework provided for a mid-season producer-price adjustment if the international price moved substantially during the harvest, addressing the recurring criticism of the Ghanaian pricing convention as insufficiently responsive to international-price movements. Third, the light-crop pricing alignment: the light-crop (mid-crop) price was set at the same level as the main-crop price, abolishing the historical light-crop discount that had incentivised storage-and-arbitrage by licensed buyers. Fourth, the producer-bonus architecture: a portion of the international-price upside was channelled through a producer-bonus structure paid at the end of the season.

The Three-Account reading on the producer-price reform clustered around three positions. The Mahama / NDC account characterised the reform as the significant operationalisation of a long-standing manifesto commitment and as a structural rebalancing of the cocoa-value-chain in favour of farmers. The NPP-opposition account, articulated by former Agriculture Minister Bryan Acheampong and selected commentators, characterised the reform as fiscally exposed (with COCOBOD's syndicated-loan repayment and operational expenditure constrained by the higher producer-price share) and as risking the broader sustainability of the COCOBOD operational architecture. The IMANI / civil-society account, articulated by Bright Simons and selected agricultural-policy specialists, characterised the reform as broadly welcome but flagged the implementation-risk questions: whether the share-of-international-price principle would be sustained through a future international-price downturn; whether the mid-season adjustment mechanism would operate in practice; and whether the producer-bonus architecture would in fact reach smallholder farmers rather than being captured by the licensed-buyer chain.

4.3 COCOBOD Restructuring Under the IMF Programme

The COCOBOD operational reset, conducted through 2025 under Hon. Eric Opoku as Minister of Food and Agriculture and a new COCOBOD Chief Executive [TBD-VERIFY: the new COCOBOD CEO under Mahama; the post had been held by Joseph Boahen Aidoo through the Akufo-Addo administration, and the Mahama-appointed successor's identity and appointment date should be confirmed], addressed the structural-balance-sheet and operational-cost questions that had been identified as IMF programme structural benchmarks. COCOBOD's pre-2025 balance sheet had carried significant accumulated debt from the cumulative under-pricing of the cocoa main-crop relative to the syndicated-loan financing cost across the 2017–2024 period, together with operational-cost obligations (CHED disease-and-pest programmes, mass spraying, fertiliser distribution, farmer-pension contributions, the Cocoa Mass Spraying Programme).

The 2025 COCOBOD reset comprised four lines. First, the operational-cost rationalisation: a review of the non-core COCOBOD activities (notably the Cocoa Mass Spraying Programme, the Hi-tech Cocoa Programme, and the Cocoa Roads Programme) with a view to either ring-fencing the funding source or transferring the activities to other agencies. Second, the CHED reorganisation: the Cocoa Health and Extension Division was reorganised to focus more sharply on CSSVD management and replanting under the broader Cocoa Rehabilitation Programme. Third, the producer-price-and-syndicated-loan reconciliation: the alignment of the producer-price structure with the syndicated-loan financing cost to prevent the recurrence of the accumulated-deficit pattern. Fourth, the digital-traceability roll-out: the deployment of digital-traceability infrastructure under the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) requirements, which had become a critical market-access requirement for Ghanaian cocoa exports to the EU. The EUDR's implementation timeline had been deferred in 2024 from the originally planned December 2024 start to a later 2025 or 2026 effective date [TBD-VERIFY: the EUDR effective date under the EU's 2024 deferral and the subsequent revision].

4.4 Smuggling, Swollen-Shoot Disease, and the Climate-Mining Nexus

The cocoa-smuggling problem, which had been a recurrent feature of Ghanaian cocoa-sector history, intensified through 2023–2025 under the price differential between the COCOBOD producer price and the Ivorian licensed-buyer prices. Customs and security operations along the Ghana–Côte d'Ivoire border (the Western and Western North Regions, the border crossings at Elubo, Sampa, and selected unofficial paths) intercepted increasing volumes of smuggled cocoa across 2024–25. The October 2025 producer-price increase was rhetorically positioned in part as a smuggling-reduction measure: a higher Ghanaian producer price would narrow the cross-border arbitrage and reduce the incentive to smuggle.

The cocoa swollen-shoot virus disease (CSSVD) continued to be the principal disease pressure on Ghanaian cocoa. The CSSVD Rehabilitation Programme, which had been initiated under the World Bank-supported Ghana COCOBOD Productivity Enhancement Programme in 2017 and continued under successive financing arrangements, comprised tree-removal, replanting, and integrated-pest-management interventions. The pace of the programme had been constrained by COCOBOD's balance-sheet challenges and by the operational complexity of farmer-level engagement on tree-removal. The Mahama administration's 2025 commitment was to accelerate the rehabilitation under a revised financing framework, drawing in part on the GoldBod foreign-exchange contribution to ease the COCOBOD syndicated-loan financing pressure.

The galamsey-cocoa nexus — the substitution of cocoa farming by illegal mining in the principal cocoa-growing areas — remained a structural pressure on the sector. The intensified galamsey enforcement under Operation Halt II (see GH-E-03) was intended in part to protect the cocoa-growing landscape, with specific operational priority on the Western Region cocoa-belt areas where galamsey activity had been most documented. The 2025 Forestry Commission and Environmental Protection Agency rehabilitation programmes for the most heavily degraded river basins included cocoa-belt rehabilitation as a specific work-stream.

The climate-stress dimension of the cocoa crisis — the longer-term question of whether the West African cocoa belt's climatic conditions are progressively becoming less favourable to cocoa production — was addressed in the longer-horizon cocoa-sector planning of the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) and through the broader West African Climate Change and Cocoa Initiative. The shorter-horizon weather variability of 2023–24 was the proximate cause of the 2024/25 production decline; the longer-horizon climate trajectory will shape the cocoa-sector's medium-term prospects.

5. GoldBod Operational Architecture and the Foreign-Exchange Anchor

5.1 From Executive Instrument to Statutory Board

The Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), established by executive instrument in February 2025 (see GH-E-03 §10 for the institutional architecture's full treatment), completed its operational stand-up through 2025 with the assent of the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise Act number and date of assent; the Bill was tabled in February–March 2025 and the Act number and date of assent should be confirmed]. The statutory architecture, drawing on the legal-drafting work of the Attorney-General's Department under Hon. Dr Dominic Ayine and on the policy-design work of the 24-Hour Economy Secretariat and the Ministry of Finance, provided GoldBod with (i) corporate-legal-personality status as a state-owned entity; (ii) regulatory authority over the small-scale-gold-trading value chain (gold purchase from licensed small-scale miners, aggregation, refining, export); (iii) revenue-collection authority for the gold royalty and export-levy regimes; (iv) board-and-management governance under a chairman and CEO appointed by the President; and (v) a foreign-exchange-receipts surrender obligation that channels gold-export proceeds through the Bank of Ghana.

The legislative-passage trajectory of the Ghana Gold Board Bill through the Ninth Parliament's Finance Committee and the plenary was conducted under the NDC supermajority's procedural discipline. The Bill's First Reading occurred in February 2025, the Finance Committee's report was laid before the House in March 2025, and the Third Reading and assent followed [TBD-VERIFY: precise dates of Second Reading, Third Reading, and Presidential assent]. The minority NPP raised three principal lines of critique during the parliamentary debate: (i) the monopsony question — whether GoldBod's consolidation of small-scale-mining gold purchases would create a state monopsony with consequent pricing-and-efficiency risks; (ii) the governance question — whether the board-and-management architecture provided sufficient independence from political interference; and (iii) the transparency question — whether GoldBod's operational disclosures would be sufficient to ensure accountability under the Petroleum Revenue Management Act and Minerals Income Investment Fund Act standards that govern other extractive-revenue management.

The Mahama administration's responses to these critiques, articulated by Finance Minister Forson and Lands Minister Hon. Emmanuel Armah-Kofi Buah during the parliamentary debate, were as follows: (i) on monopsony, GoldBod would operate as an aggregator-and-stabiliser rather than a monopolist, with licensed aggregators continuing to operate in the value chain under GoldBod regulatory authority; (ii) on governance, the board composition would include representation from the Bank of Ghana, the Ministry of Finance, the Minerals Commission, civil society, and the small-scale-mining community; and (iii) on transparency, GoldBod's quarterly operational reports would be published and the institution would be subject to the Auditor-General's annual audit.

5.2 Aggregator Licensing and the Small-Scale-Mining Supply Chain

The aggregator-licensing framework, the operational core of GoldBod's small-scale-mining-supply-chain consolidation, was issued in February–March 2025 and rolled out through the year. The framework licensed a defined number of aggregators (initially in the range of 35–50, with the precise number subject to the Board's licensing decisions [TBD-VERIFY: precise number of licensed aggregators through 2025]) who would operate as intermediaries between small-scale miners and GoldBod's purchase windows. The aggregators were required to (i) hold a GoldBod licence; (ii) operate in defined geographical zones; (iii) comply with the pricing-and-purity standards established by GoldBod; (iv) report transactions to GoldBod for surveillance; and (v) channel their gold to GoldBod for refining and export.

The aggregator-licensing system displaced the prior architecture, under which the Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC) had operated as the principal state-owned gold-trading entity and a large number of unlicensed or loosely licensed buyers had operated in the small-scale-mining value chain. The PMMC's role was reduced under the new framework, with the entity's residual functions (refining at the PMMC-related refinery, the Gold Coast Refinery) operationally integrated into GoldBod's broader value-chain architecture. The transition from PMMC to GoldBod was managed through 2025 under operational-MoU arrangements between the two entities and through the staff-and-asset transfer mechanism specified in the Ghana Gold Board Act.

The licensed-buyer landscape pre-GoldBod had been a fragmented and partially informal ecosystem comprising approximately several hundred licensed buyers operating under the Minerals Commission's licensing framework. The transition to a smaller cohort of GoldBod-licensed aggregators was contested by elements of the displaced licensed-buyer community, who articulated their critique through the Association of Small-Scale Miners and selected industry forums. The Mahama administration's response was to combine the displacement with a community-mining-scheme architecture that provided alternative livelihood routes for displaced participants in the small-scale-mining value chain.

5.3 GoldBod's Contribution to Bank of Ghana Reserves

The macroeconomic contribution of GoldBod operated through three transmission channels. First, the gold-export-receipts channel: the consolidation of small-scale-mining gold exports under GoldBod's centralised export architecture routed foreign-exchange receipts that had previously been informal or fragmented through the official BoG reserves. Second, the domestic-purchase channel: the Bank of Ghana's pre-existing Domestic Gold Purchase Programme (established in 2021 under Governor Addison; see GH-E-03 §8) was operationally integrated with GoldBod, providing a cedi-based purchase route for gold that built up BoG's own gold reserves without consuming foreign exchange. Third, the gold-for-imports / gold-backed-arrangements channel: a series of strategic-trade arrangements under which gold was used as a settlement instrument for specified critical imports (notably oil products) operated in 2023–2025 and was rationalised under GoldBod's architecture from 2025.

The aggregate macroeconomic contribution was material. The Bank of Ghana's gross international reserves position improved through 2025, supported by the GoldBod contribution, by the IMF tranche disbursements (Fourth and Fifth Reviews), and by the partial recovery of cocoa-export proceeds. The BoG's gold reserves (the gold-bullion holdings on the BoG's own balance sheet, distinct from the foreign-exchange reserves) increased through 2025 under the Domestic Gold Purchase Programme [TBD-VERIFY: precise BoG gold-reserves figure end-2025]. The combined effect contributed to the cedi stabilisation that was the year's most visible macroeconomic improvement.

The IMF programme's treatment of GoldBod was an important early test of the institution's international credibility. The IMF Fourth and Fifth Reviews engaged with the GoldBod architecture under the structural-benchmark agenda and characterised the institution as consistent with the IMF programme's foreign-exchange-management and revenue-mobilisation objectives, subject to operational-transparency and governance commitments. The IMF's reception was significant because it foreclosed a potential line of NPP-opposition critique — that GoldBod would generate IMF-programme tension — and provided the international-financial-institutional anchor for GoldBod's broader credibility.

5.4 Civil-Society and Chamber-of-Mines Critique (Three-Account)

The Three-Account reading on GoldBod through 2025 clustered around three durable interpretive positions. The government / NDC sector-strengthening account characterised GoldBod as a long-overdue consolidation of the small-scale-mining value chain that addressed the long-standing problems of informality, smuggling, revenue leakage, and the foreign-exchange-reserve-management challenge. The government's account positioned GoldBod as a parallel to the COCOBOD architecture for cocoa: a state-owned marketing-and-export entity that consolidates the value chain and operates as a foreign-exchange anchor. The account emphasised the cedi stabilisation, the reserves accumulation, and the formalisation gains as the principal achievements of the first year.

The Chamber of Mines / large-scale-mining-industry account, articulated by the Ghana Chamber of Mines under its Chief Executive Officer Dr Sulemanu Koney and the Chamber's senior member-company executives (AngloGold Ashanti, Gold Fields Ghana, Newmont Ghana, Asanko Gold, Adamus Resources, Perseus Mining), was distinct from the small-scale-mining-related critique. The Chamber's principal concerns focused on (i) the boundary between GoldBod's small-scale-mining authority and the large-scale-mining industry's existing operational arrangements; (ii) the potential extension of GoldBod's authority into the large-scale-mining-export channel through future regulatory amendments; and (iii) the broader policy-environment uncertainty generated by a substantial new mining-sector institution. The Chamber's position was generally cooperative and constructive but cautious, with the principal engagement conducted through the Chamber's regular bilateral with the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources.

The galamsey-affected-communities / civil-society account, articulated by the Coalition Against Illegal Mining, the Ghana Trades Union Congress, CDD-Ghana, IMANI, and ACEP, was concerned with the GoldBod-galamsey-policy interaction. The principal concern was the risk that GoldBod, by providing a state-led purchase channel for small-scale-mining gold, would generate a perverse incentive that legitimised illegal mining under the cover of formalisation. The countervailing position, articulated by GoldBod and the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, was that GoldBod's licensed-aggregator framework operated only for legally licensed small-scale mining and that the broader galamsey-enforcement architecture (Operation Halt II, the National Galamsey Eradication Authority Bill, the L.I. 2462 repeal) operated independently. The reconciliation of these positions through 2025 was the principal policy debate in the broader galamsey-and-mining-sector domain (see GH-E-03 for fuller treatment).

6. The 24-Hour Economy Roll-Out and the Big Push Infrastructure Programme

6.1 Sectoral Implementation: Manufacturing, Agro-Processing, ICT/BPO, Ports

The 24-Hour Economy and Accelerated Export Development Secretariat, under Hon. Augustus "Goosie" Tanoh, published the considerable Implementation Framework in mid-2025 (April–June). The Framework operationalised the twelve-sub-sector priority architecture announced at the January 2025 institutional launch and provided the fiscal-incentives, licensing, and monitoring framework for participating firms. The principal sub-sectors were: (i) textile-and-garment manufacturing; (ii) agro-processing (cocoa, cashew, shea, palm oil, fruits-and-vegetables); (iii) aluminium-and-steel (with reference to the Sentuo Steel facility at Tema and the long-pending VALCO restart question); (iv) information-and-communications-technology and business-process outsourcing; (v) financial services (banking-hours extension, digital-infrastructure expansion); (vi) port-and-logistics operations (Tema and Takoradi); (vii) construction-materials manufacturing; (viii) pharmaceutical-and-medical-supplies manufacturing; (ix) automotive-assembly (drawing on the Volkswagen, Toyota, and Sinotruk assembly operations established under the Akufo-Addo-era Industrial Policy); (x) food-and-beverage processing; (xi) mining-services-and-supply-chain; and (xii) renewable-energy equipment manufacturing.

The fiscal-incentives architecture comprised four principal instruments. First, a wage-supplement programme for firms operating triple-shift operations, with a state contribution to evening-and-overnight-shift wage premiums for the first 12–18 months of participation. Second, an energy-tariff differential for participating firms, with reduced tariff rates for overnight electricity consumption administered through the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission. Third, a tax-incentives package including selected income-tax credits, accelerated capital-allowance treatment, and reduced corporate-income-tax rates for 24-Hour-Economy-designated activities. Fourth, a financing-architecture under which participating firms could access concessional financing through the proposed Goldcoast Bank (see §6.2) and through partner commercial banks under guarantee arrangements.

The early operational record through Q3 2025 was uneven. Selected manufacturing operators at Tema and Takoradi reported preliminary expansion of evening-and-overnight shifts under the framework. The principal early participants reportedly included Tema-based food-processing operators, selected agro-processing firms in the Eastern and Ahafo regions, and ICT/BPO operators in Accra [TBD-VERIFY: which named operators have publicly announced 24-hour-shift expansions, and the verified scope; the early-2025 reporting has been partial]. The port-logistics component (Tema and Takoradi 24-hour operations) advanced under the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority's operational reforms, with Tema Port already operating in extended hours under the Meridian Port Services Terminal 3 (MPS T3) operational architecture.

6.2 The Goldcoast Bank Concept and 24-Hour Economy Financing

The Goldcoast Bank concept, introduced in the 11 March 2025 Budget Statement as a proposed financial institution operating as a 24-hour-economy financier and gold-backed-deposit institution, advanced through 2025 from the policy-design stage toward operational establishment. The concept's institutional architecture, elaborated through 24-Hour Economy Secretariat briefings and Ministry of Finance policy papers, comprised (i) a state-anchored capitalisation drawn from a combination of budget allocation, GoldBod-linked equity, and private-sector strategic partnership; (ii) a deposit-base architecture that would accept gold-backed deposits (deposits denominated in cedis but with gold-backing through GoldBod's balance sheet); and (iii) a lending architecture targeted at 24-Hour-Economy-designated firms with extended-hours-operation financing needs.

The Goldcoast Bank's operational establishment timeline was longer than the 24-Hour Economy Secretariat's initial commitment had suggested. The legislative-and-regulatory steps required for a new commercial-banking institution under the Bank of Ghana's supervisory architecture, the capitalisation arrangements, and the operational-architecture build-out together generated a multi-year establishment timeline. The Bank had not been operationally established by the end of the first hundred days (see GH-E-02 §1) and was at an advanced institutional-design stage at the close of 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: Goldcoast Bank operational launch date; the early-2025 commentary anticipated a 2025 or early-2026 launch, with the precise date subject to confirmation].

The 24-Hour Economy financing question — what other financing instruments would support participating firms in the absence of an operational Goldcoast Bank — was addressed through three channels. First, the commercial-banking partnership: agreements with GCB Bank, Cal Bank, Stanbic Bank Ghana, Absa Bank Ghana, and other commercial banks under which 24-Hour-Economy-designated firms received preferential access to financing under partial state guarantees. Second, the Development Bank Ghana (DBG): the development finance institution established under the Akufo-Addo administration in 2022, which was operational at the start of 2025 and continued to operate as a wholesale lender to commercial banks for SME financing. Third, the Exim Bank Ghana: the export-financing institution that supported the export-orientation component of 24-Hour-Economy participation.

6.3 The Big Push Infrastructure Programme — Project Pipeline

The Big Push infrastructure programme, the principal capital-expenditure architecture of the Mahama administration, was operationalised through 2025 under the lead coordination of the Ministry of Roads and Highways (under Hon. Kwame Governs Agbodza) and the Ministry of Works, Housing and Water Resources [TBD-VERIFY: the precise inter-ministerial coordination architecture of Big Push; the lead-coordinator role and the project-pipeline-administration question should be confirmed against the November 2025 Budget]. The Big Push pipeline comprised priority road, bridge, water-supply, irrigation, school-infrastructure, and health-facility projects with a multi-year financing envelope drawn from budget allocations, GoldBod-linked off-balance-sheet financing instruments [TBD-VERIFY: the financing architecture of Big Push; the early-2025 commentary distinguished between budget-financed and "gold-for-infrastructure" elements], and multilateral co-financing from the World Bank and African Development Bank.

The principal projects in the Big Push pipeline included (i) the completion of legacy road projects inherited from Mahama's first term and the Akufo-Addo administration (the Eastern Corridor Road, the Western Corridor Road, selected urban-by-pass roads); (ii) priority water-supply projects in the principal urban centres and selected rural districts; (iii) the Pwalugu Multipurpose Dam project (under ORAL forensic review on the contract architecture but operationally a Big Push candidate); (iv) selected health-infrastructure projects under the Agenda 111 architecture (the Akufo-Addo-era programme to construct 111 district hospitals, of which a significant number had been initiated under Akufo-Addo but not completed) [TBD-VERIFY: how many Agenda 111 hospitals were operationally complete at end-2024 and which were absorbed into Big Push]; (v) Free SHS infrastructure investment in classroom blocks, dormitories, and laboratories; and (vi) selected irrigation projects in the Northern, Upper East, Upper West, North East, and Savannah Regions.

The Big Push framework's positioning was rhetorical as well as operational. The framework drew on Mahama's first-term infrastructure-delivery record — the E-block secondary schools, the National Health Insurance Scheme expansion, the Kotoka International Airport Terminal 3, the Eastern Corridor Road, the Sankofa-Gye-Nyame gas-and-oil-field development, and the Mahama-era Power Compact under the Millennium Challenge Corporation — and was positioned as the second-term continuation of that record. The contrast with the post-2024 fiscal constraints (the IMF programme primary-surplus target, the debt-sustainability framework) was the principal operational tension: the first-term Mahama infrastructure delivery had operated under pre-2014 borrowing-space conditions that no longer obtained.

6.4 Private-Sector Reception: AGI, Ghana Employers Association, Chamber of Commerce

The private-sector reception of the 24-Hour Economy framework and the Big Push programme was structured under the Tripartite Consultation architecture (the National Tripartite Committee involving the government, the Ghana Employers Association, and the Ghana Trades Union Congress) and the broader private-sector engagement under the Ministry of Trade, Agribusiness and Industry. The Association of Ghana Industries (AGI), under President Dr Humphrey Ayim-Darke and Chief Executive Seth Twum-Akwaboah [TBD-VERIFY: AGI leadership at end-2025], was the principal private-sector interlocutor on the 24-Hour Economy framework.

The AGI's reception was cautiously supportive on principle and questioning on operational design. The supportive component reflected the framework's recognition of the structural unemployment problem and its targeting of manufacturing-and-export sectors that AGI members had long advocated for. The questioning component focused on three operational questions: (i) the financing realism, particularly in the absence of an operational Goldcoast Bank, given that triple-shift operation requires substantial working-capital expansion; (ii) the energy-tariff differential's reliability, given the energy-sector receivables crisis and the broader power-supply-reliability question; and (iii) the operational coordination between the Secretariat, the Ministry of Trade, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, and the Free Zones Authority, given the overlapping mandate architecture.

The Ghana Chamber of Commerce and Industry, under President Clement Osei-Amoako [TBD-VERIFY: GNCCI leadership at end-2025], engaged with the broader policy-environment questions including the Big Push procurement architecture, the 24-Hour Economy SME-component, and the cross-cutting tax-and-regulatory environment. The Ghana Employers Association, under President Dan Acheampong [TBD-VERIFY: GEA leadership at end-2025], engaged on the labour-market-component of the 24-Hour Economy including the triple-shift wage premium, the collective-bargaining-coverage question, and the broader workforce-development agenda. The Ghana Trades Union Congress, under Secretary-General Dr Yaw Baah [TBD-VERIFY: TUC leadership at end-2025], engaged on the worker-protection-component including the working-time standards, the night-shift premium, and the broader workforce-development-and-skills-training architecture.

6.5 Verified Record: Mid-2026 Investment and Jobs Figures

Search-corroborated reporting through July 2026 partially resolves the §6.1 [TBD-VERIFY] on operational scope. Secretariat Coordinator Goosie Tanoh reported in July 2026 that the 24-Hour Economy initiative had mobilised prospective investment exceeding US$11.5 billion since its 2025 launch, with four agreements signed in the preceding ninety days alone expected to generate more than 160,000 jobs, and with the Secretariat reporting over 300 businesses operating under the programme, per Citi Newsroom, MyJoyOnline, and GhanaWeb reporting. The Secretariat's stated 2026 within-year targets — the activation of 200,000 jobs across priority sectors, the onboarding of 500 SMEs into structured finance and industrial-park ecosystems, the mobilisation of more than GH¢10 billion in capital commitments, and the operationalisation of the Volta Economic Corridor with at least five agro-ecological/aquaculture parks and three industrial parks — remained framed as in-progress rather than completed as of mid-2026. Tanoh continued to caution publicly, including in mid-2026 commentary carried by MyJoyOnline and the Herald (Ghana), that the programme "is about productivity, not round-the-clock work" and "will not deliver overnight industrialisation" — a framing that qualifies the investment and prospective-jobs figures above as pipeline commitments rather than verified realised employment, consistent with this document's Three-Account caution at §6.4 and its parent document's (GH-D-06 §5) additionality concerns. The Goldcoast Bank's operational-launch status as of mid-2026 remains [TBD-VERIFY: pending confirmation of whether the Bank had commenced operations by mid-2026, which was not resolved in the search-corroborated record for this wave].

7. Tax Reset Through-Year: E-Levy Abolition Implementation, COVID-19 Levy, and the Revenue Mobilisation Strategy

7.1 The E-Levy and Betting Tax Abolition Implementation Through 2025

The abolition of the e-Levy (the 1.5% electronic-transfer levy that had been introduced under Akufo-Addo's 2022 Budget at an initial rate of 1.75% and reduced to 1.5% in 2023), the betting tax (a 10% withholding on gross gaming winnings introduced under Akufo-Addo's 2023 Budget), the emissions tax (a vehicle-emissions levy introduced under the same 2023 Budget), and the partial reduction of the COVID-19 Health Recovery Levy were legislated in the 11 March 2025 Budget and operationalised through the Revenue Administration (Amendment) Act 2025 and related instruments (see GH-E-02 §6 for the Budget's detailed treatment). The administrative operationalisation of the abolition through 2025 was conducted by the Ghana Revenue Authority and the Ministry of Finance under the established tax-administration architecture.

The e-Levy's administrative wind-down comprised three operational phases. First, the transition phase (March–April 2025): the GRA issued operational guidance to the principal electronic-money issuers (MTN MoMo, Vodafone Cash / Telecel Cash, AirtelTigo Money) and to the commercial banks operating electronic-transfer infrastructure, providing for the orderly cessation of levy collection on the effective date specified in the Revenue Administration (Amendment) Act. Second, the monitoring phase (April–December 2025): the GRA monitored the transaction-volume response to the abolition through the established electronic-money reporting architecture, providing data for the revenue-impact assessment included in the Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review and the November 2025 Budget. Third, the closure phase (January–March 2026): the residual administrative-and-litigation matters arising from the e-Levy period (refund claims, dispute resolutions, enforcement matters) were closed under the GRA's administrative protocols.

The transaction-volume response to the e-Levy abolition was substantial. Electronic-money transaction volumes, which had declined or grown more slowly than the underlying mobile-money-subscriber growth across the 2022–2024 e-Levy period, accelerated through 2025 under the abolition. The cumulative electronic-money transaction volume through 2025 exceeded [TBD-VERIFY: 2025 electronic-money transaction volume figure] by Q4 2025. The Bank of Ghana's Payment Systems Statistics monthly bulletins documented the trajectory. The abolition's effect on the broader financial-inclusion agenda — the question of whether the e-Levy had constituted a disincentive to mobile-money adoption and whether its abolition would accelerate inclusion — was the subject of a CDD-Ghana research brief published in late 2025.

7.2 COVID-19 Health Recovery Levy Reduction and the Road-Tolls Digital Architecture

The COVID-19 Health Recovery Levy, introduced under Akufo-Addo's 2021 Budget as an emergency revenue measure at a 1% rate applied to the supply of goods and services and to imports, was partially reduced under the March 2025 Budget [TBD-VERIFY: the precise rate reduction; the early-2025 commentary indicated a reduction from 1% to 0.5% but the precise post-March-2025 rate should be confirmed against the Revenue Administration (Amendment) Act 2025]. The partial reduction rather than full abolition reflected the fiscal-constraint balance: the COVID-19 Levy generated approximately ₵2 billion in annual revenue and a full abolition would have created a revenue gap larger than the offsetting measures could absorb within the IMF programme primary-surplus target.

The reinstatement of the road tolls, abolished by Akufo-Addo in late 2021 alongside the introduction of the e-Levy, was operationalised through 2025 under a digital-collection architecture distinct from the pre-2021 manual-toll-collection system. The digital road-tolls architecture, designed by the Ministry of Roads and Highways in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Ghana Highway Authority, comprised (i) automated number-plate-recognition technology at the principal toll points (the Tema Motorway, the Accra–Kumasi Highway selected segments, the George Bush Motorway); (ii) a prepaid-and-postpaid account architecture under which vehicle owners could pre-load toll accounts or receive periodic billing; (iii) integration with the National Identification Authority's vehicle-registration database; and (iv) operational management by a designated concessionaire or state-operated entity [TBD-VERIFY: the operational-management architecture of the digital road tolls — whether concession or state-operated]. The first toll-collection under the digital architecture commenced in [TBD-VERIFY: precise launch date of digital road tolls under Mahama; the March 2025 Budget committed to reinstating tolls and the operational launch occurred later in 2025].

7.3 The Growth and Sustainability Levy and Revenue-Administration Intensification

The Growth and Sustainability Levy, introduced under the March 2025 Budget as a revenue-offset for the abolition of the nuisance taxes, was applied to selected high-margin sectors at differentiated rates. The principal target sectors included (i) the mining sector at a 1% gross-revenue rate; (ii) the upstream petroleum sector at a 1% gross-revenue rate; (iii) the banking sector at a 5% pre-tax-profits rate; (iv) selected non-banking financial-services sub-sectors at differentiated rates; and (v) the telecommunications and selected manufacturing sub-sectors at differentiated rates [TBD-VERIFY: precise Growth and Sustainability Levy rate structure across sectors; the March 2025 Budget articulated the framework, and the precise rates should be confirmed against the relevant Act].

The Levy was structured as an extension and re-calibration of the pre-existing Growth and Sustainability Levy that had been introduced under Akufo-Addo's 2023 Budget (under the same name but at different rates). The Mahama administration's re-calibration retained the basic architecture while adjusting the rates and sectoral coverage to deliver the revenue-offset for the nuisance-tax abolition. The Levy was projected to generate approximately [TBD-VERIFY: Growth and Sustainability Levy 2025 revenue projection] in 2025 against the approximately ₵6 billion nuisance-tax revenue forgone.

The revenue-administration intensification through 2025 was the principal non-rate-related revenue-mobilisation measure. The GRA, under Commissioner-General [TBD-VERIFY: the GRA Commissioner-General under Mahama; the post had been held by Rev Dr Ammishaddai Owusu-Amoah through the Akufo-Addo administration, and the Mahama-appointed successor's identity and appointment date should be confirmed], intensified the compliance activities across four lines. First, the VAT and Communications Service Tax compliance: the e-VAT system, which had been launched under the Akufo-Addo administration in late 2022, was operationally consolidated through 2025 with expanded coverage of the registered-business population. Second, the withholding-tax-and-PAYE compliance: the GRA conducted intensified audits of large taxpayers and selected medium-taxpayer cohorts. Third, the transfer-pricing-and-base-erosion compliance: the GRA expanded its transfer-pricing audit capacity, with specific attention to the extractive-sector taxpayers and the multinational-corporate-group structures. Fourth, the informal-sector formalisation: the GRA expanded the Tax Stamp regime, the Modified Taxation Scheme, and the broader informal-sector-formalisation architecture.

7.4 GRA Reform Under the New Commissioner-General

The Ghana Revenue Authority reform under the Mahama administration was conducted under a new Commissioner-General [TBD-VERIFY: identity and appointment date] and under the broader Ministry of Finance revenue-mobilisation strategy. The reform agenda comprised (i) the digital-transformation deepening: completion of the GRA's digital-transformation programme initiated under Akufo-Addo, including the Integrated Tax Application Preparation System (ITaPS), the GRA Taxpayers Portal, and the GhanaPay-integrated payment architecture; (ii) the organisational-restructuring: a review of the GRA's regional-and-sectoral organisational structure under the broader public-service-reform agenda; (iii) the integrity-and-accountability strengthening: the establishment of additional internal-audit and integrity-oversight architecture in response to specific corruption-related concerns that had been articulated through the ORAL submissions and the broader civil-society engagement; and (iv) the stakeholder-engagement enhancement: the consolidation of the GRA's engagement with taxpayers, tax practitioners, and the Ministry of Finance through structured fora and reporting.

The GRA's revenue-collection performance through 2025 was the principal measurable indicator of the reform's early progress. Cumulative tax revenue collection through 2025 exceeded the inherited baseline trajectory by [TBD-VERIFY: 2025 revenue-collection percentage outperformance against baseline], reflecting the combined effect of the revenue-administration intensification, the post-2024 macroeconomic recovery (cedi stabilisation, disinflation, growth recovery), and the Growth and Sustainability Levy contribution. The tax-to-GDP ratio, which had declined to approximately 13% in the 2022–2024 crisis period, partially recovered toward the 14–15% range through 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise tax-to-GDP figure end-2025].

8. Energy-Sector Reform: ECG–GRIDCo Debate, IPP Renegotiation, and the Akosombo Reconstruction

8.1 The ECG Receivables Crisis and the "ECG vs PDS" Debate Revisited

The Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) receivables crisis — the cumulative chain of payment arrears between ECG (as the principal electricity distribution utility), the Volta River Authority (VRA, as a principal generator), the Independent Power Producers (Karpowership, AKSA, Cenpower, Cenit Energy, Bui Power Authority hydropower, others), and the natural-gas suppliers (West African Gas Pipeline, the Sankofa-Gye-Nyame field operators, the Jubilee partners' gas-recovery operations) — was the principal latent fiscal-and-operational risk inherited by the Mahama administration. The cumulative legacy ECG-VRA-IPP-gas chain of arrears was estimated at over USD 2 billion at end-2024 (see GH-E-02 §5.1), an inheritance the SONA had specifically referenced.

The Mahama administration's response through 2025, under Hon. John Abdulai Jinapor as Minister of Energy and Green Transition, comprised four operational lines. First, the ECG-revenue-administration improvement: the deployment of smart metering, the expansion of the prepaid-meter coverage (which had reached approximately 70% of the residential customer base by end-2024 and was targeted at higher levels through 2025), and the intensified loss-reduction operations to address the high system-loss rate (approximately 25–30% of ECG's gross supply, comprising technical losses and non-technical losses from theft and unbilled consumption). Second, the tariff-adjustment cycle: the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission tariff-adjustment cycle was conducted on the established quarterly schedule, with adjustments calibrated to the disinflation glide and the cedi stabilisation. Third, the IPP-payment-prioritisation: a structured-payment arrangement under which ECG's revenue receipts were prioritised across the IPP-and-gas-supplier chain to reduce the rate of arrears accumulation. Fourth, the structural-debt-restructuring: a longer-horizon debt-restructuring negotiation with the principal IPPs and the gas suppliers to address the legacy arrears stock.

The "ECG vs PDS" debate — the question of whether and how to revisit the 2018–19 Power Distribution Services concession that had been terminated under Akufo-Addo in 2019 in a politically controversial episode — re-emerged through 2025 as the ORAL pipeline included the PDS-termination episode among the priority investigations. The Mahama administration's position, articulated by Energy Minister Jinapor and by the Special Prosecutor's communications, was that the PDS-termination episode would be subject to forensic-and-legal review without prejudice to the broader question of how ECG should be operationally restructured.

8.2 The ECG–GRIDCo Separation-or-Integration Debate

The ECG–GRIDCo separation-or-integration debate — the question of whether the Electricity Company of Ghana (the distribution utility) and the Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo, the transmission utility, established in 2008 under the Kufuor-era power-sector-unbundling reforms) should remain separate, be more sharply separated, integrated, or partially privatised — was the year's most sustained energy-policy contestation. The debate operated on three time-horizons: (i) the immediate question of operational coordination between ECG and GRIDCo on system-balancing and revenue-collection; (ii) the medium-term question of whether the post-2008 power-sector-unbundling architecture was working effectively; and (iii) the longer-term question of private-sector participation in the distribution segment.

The principal positions in the debate clustered around three accounts. The integrationist account, articulated by selected NDC-aligned commentators and by elements within ECG itself, argued for re-integration of ECG and GRIDCo (or closer operational integration short of legal-entity merger) on the grounds that the post-2008 unbundling had generated operational coordination challenges that the receivables crisis exemplified. The deeper-separation account, articulated by ACEP under Benjamin Boakye and by selected private-sector commentators, argued for sharper separation including possible private-sector participation in the distribution segment on the grounds that the structural-incentive problems of ECG required management-and-ownership-architecture change. The status-quo-with-reform account, articulated by selected Ministry of Energy technical officers and by the IMF country team, argued for retaining the existing architecture while implementing the operational reforms (smart metering, prepaid expansion, tariff-cycle discipline, IPP-payment-prioritisation) that had been identified as the principal operational improvements.

The eventual policy disposition crystallised in late 2025 under a framework that retained the existing legal-entity separation while strengthening operational coordination through a designated inter-utility coordination architecture, and that deferred the question of private-sector participation to a longer-horizon review under the broader state-enterprise-reform agenda (see §11.2).

8.3 IPP-Contract Renegotiation: Karpowership, AKSA, Cenpower

The IPP-contract renegotiation, identified as a priority of the Mahama administration's energy-sector reform agenda in the inaugural address and the SONA, proceeded through 2025 under the Ministry of Energy and Green Transition's lead and the Ministry of Finance's parallel engagement. The three principal target contracts were (i) Karpowership Ghana, the Turkish-owned floating-powership operator that had been a controversial IPP since its 2015 entry under Mahama's first administration and had been subject to multiple contract revisions across the 2017–2024 period; (ii) AKSA Energy, another Turkish-owned IPP; and (iii) Cenpower (Kpone), a longer-established IPP with a complex commercial history.

The renegotiation objectives, articulated by Energy Minister Jinapor in March-April 2025, included (i) reduction in the capacity-charge component of the IPP-payment architecture; (ii) re-alignment of the contract tenor with the post-2024 energy-supply-and-demand projections; (iii) operational-performance-clause strengthening; and (iv) fiscal-restructuring of the legacy receivables under the broader energy-sector debt-restructuring framework. The renegotiation engagement through 2025 produced revised contractual arrangements with at least one of the principal IPPs [TBD-VERIFY: which IPP contracts were actually renegotiated and the renegotiation outcomes; the early-2025 commentary anticipated multiple renegotiations but the operational outcomes should be confirmed].

The renegotiation was complicated by the bilateral-diplomatic dimensions of the Turkish IPPs (Karpowership and AKSA), which generated sovereign-level engagement between the Mahama administration and the Turkish government. The Karpowership-related diplomatic engagement, conducted through Foreign Affairs Minister Ablakwa and Energy Minister Jinapor, addressed the broader Ghana–Turkey relationship including the trade-and-investment cooperation under the Turkish-African strategic engagement.

Verified Record: The August 2026 Energy-Debt Clearance Announcement

Search-corroborated reporting resolves the §8.3 [TBD-VERIFY] on renegotiation outcomes. Energy Minister Dr John Abdulai Jinapor announced in August 2026 that the sector-reform programme had cleared approximately US$1.47 billion in legacy energy-sector debt and generated further savings, against a starting position in which the government had projected the sector deficit would otherwise top US$9 billion in 2026 and in which the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) alone carried more than US$4.2 billion in arrears to power producers and gas suppliers, per reporting by Rainbow Radio, GBC, Adomonline, and Ghana Business News. Of the total, approximately US$500 million in savings was attributed to shifting power generation away from expensive liquid fuels toward natural gas, and a further US$250 million to the IPP-contract renegotiations discussed above. On the ECG side specifically, the Ministry reported that 347 ECG contracts were reviewed, with 202 cancelled at a combined value of roughly US$227 million plus £1.17 million and €4 million, and that the Cash Waterfall Mechanism had materially improved payment flows to IPPs, per Business Day Ghana and Ourhomeland reporting. This confirms that at least the ECG-facing renegotiation and payment-discipline track of the §8.3 agenda produced measurable fiscal results by Year Two, though the precise contract-by-contract Karpowership/AKSA/Cenpower renegotiation terms remain [TBD-VERIFY: pending publication of the individual renegotiated PPAs or an Auditor-General/PURC review of the revised tariff and capacity-charge terms].

8.4 The 2023 Akosombo–Kpong Dam Spillage Reconstruction

The post-2023 Akosombo–Kpong dam spillage reconstruction continued under the Volta River Authority's lead through 2025. The September–October 2023 controlled spillage from the Akosombo and Kpong dams, conducted by VRA to manage the elevated dam-water levels following heavy upstream rainfall, had caused extensive flooding in the downstream riparian communities of the North Tongu, South Tongu, Central Tongu, and Anlo districts of the Volta Region, displacing approximately 26,000 persons [TBD-VERIFY: precise displacement figure from the 2023 spillage; the National Disaster Management Organisation figures should be confirmed] and causing substantial damage to homes, farms, schools, health facilities, and infrastructure.

The reconstruction programme, initiated under the Akufo-Addo administration in late 2023 and continued under the Mahama administration from January 2025, comprised (i) the housing reconstruction: the rehabilitation or reconstruction of damaged dwellings in the affected communities, including the designated resettlement sites; (ii) the infrastructure rehabilitation: roads, bridges, schools, health facilities, water-supply systems; (iii) the livelihoods restoration: support for the affected farming, fishing, and trading households; and (iv) the dam-management-and-flood-mitigation review: a longer-horizon review of the Akosombo–Kpong operational architecture to reduce the risk of future controlled-spillage events of the 2023 magnitude.

The Mahama administration's engagement with the spillage-affected communities was politically resonant for the second-term presidency: the Volta Region is the historic heartland of NDC support, Foreign Minister Ablakwa is the Member of Parliament for North Tongu (one of the most heavily affected constituencies), and the 2024 election had been fought in part on the post-spillage reconstruction issue. The reconstruction pace through 2025, while accelerated relative to the inherited trajectory, remained behind the affected communities' expectations on several work-streams [TBD-VERIFY: the precise reconstruction pace metrics; CDD-Ghana and civil-society monitors have produced periodic assessments].

9. The Foreign Affairs Reset: ECOWAS, AES, the Trump-2 Era, and China Re-Engagement

9.1 Mahama's ECOWAS Posture: Chair / Mediator Role and the AES Question

President Mahama's ECOWAS engagement through the year operated on two tracks. The first, the ECOWAS Mediator role on the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) question, was a continuation of the appointment first made by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State in June 2024 (under the Tinubu chairmanship). The Mediator role engaged Mahama in continuing diplomatic engagement with the AES governments (Mali under Assimi Goïta, Burkina Faso under Ibrahim Traoré, Niger under Abdourahamane Tchiani) through 2025, with the principal tangible agenda being (i) the trade-and-movement-linkages preservation despite the formal political withdrawal effective 29 January 2025; (ii) the regional-security cooperation re-engagement; and (iii) the longer-horizon question of whether the AES departure would be reversed under a future political configuration.

The second, the ECOWAS Chair role, became a question through the 2025 chairmanship-rotation cycle. The ECOWAS chairmanship had been held by Nigerian President Tinubu through 2024; the 2025 rotation [TBD-VERIFY: whether Mahama assumed the ECOWAS Chair in 2025 — succeeding Tinubu — or whether the chair passed to another head of state, with Mahama retaining only the Mediator role; the ECOWAS rotation calendar and the December 2024 / January 2025 Authority meetings should be checked] produced a chairmanship-succession decision. If Mahama did assume the Chair role, it would have provided an additional regional-foreign-policy platform for the second-term presidency; if not, the Mediator role remained the principal regional engagement.

The AES question's broader dynamics through 2025 included the formal departure-completion (29 January 2025), the residual treaty-and-protocol-cleanup engagement, the question of the AES's own institutional-development (the Alliance of Sahel States Confederation Treaty, the post-2025 currency-and-trade arrangements within the AES), and the longer-horizon question of West African regional integration architecture. Ghana's position throughout was that ECOWAS should remain open to a future AES re-engagement under appropriate conditions and that the regional-trade-and-movement linkages should be preserved in the meantime.

9.2 The Trump-2 Turbulence: USAID and PEPFAR Shocks

The Trump-2 administration's policy turbulence, which began with the 20 January 2025 inauguration of President Donald Trump for his second term and intensified through the executive-orders cascade of late January and February 2025, generated a substantial foreign-policy management challenge for the Mahama administration. The principal Ghana-relevant Trump-2 policy shifts included (i) the USAID restructuring and substantial programme reductions, which affected the broader development-assistance architecture; (ii) the PEPFAR uncertainty, which affected the HIV antiretroviral and TB supply chains; (iii) the tariff agenda, which generated uncertainty about the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade-preferences regime; and (iv) the broader America-First foreign-policy reorientation that reduced US engagement with African multilateral fora.

The Mahama administration's response, coordinated through Foreign Minister Ablakwa, comprised four lines. First, the bilateral-engagement-with-the-US: continuing diplomatic engagement with the US Embassy in Accra and with the US Department of State on the principal bilateral programmes (AGOA renewal, the Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact legacy, the security-cooperation agenda). Second, the health-supply-chain-protection: emergency arrangements with alternative funders (the Global Fund, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the President's Malaria Initiative under residual funding) to bridge the PEPFAR-related supply-chain gaps, conducted by Health Minister Akandoh in coordination with the National Health Insurance Authority. Third, the AGOA-continuation engagement: engagement with the US Congress and the US Trade Representative on the renewal of AGOA (whose statutory authorisation was scheduled to expire in 2025 and was extended under negotiated arrangements [TBD-VERIFY: the AGOA renewal status under Trump-2]). Fourth, the diversification-toward-other-partners: re-engagement with the EU, the UK, the Gulf states, India, and Japan to reduce the concentration of Ghana's external-relationships on the US.

9.3 China Bilateral and Belt-and-Road Re-Engagement

The China bilateral relationship, which had been a structural feature of the Ghanaian external-engagement architecture since the 2007 Three-Billion-Dollar Master Facility Agreement and had operated through the cumulative Belt-and-Road Initiative engagement, was re-engaged under the Mahama administration through 2025. The principal engagement agenda comprised (i) the debt-servicing framework: the post-restructuring debt-servicing under the G20 Common Framework's Memorandum of Understanding, under which China is a principal bilateral creditor; (ii) the Belt-and-Road project pipeline: the continuing engagement on infrastructure projects under the BRI architecture, with specific reference to the Sentuo Steel Tema expansion, selected bauxite-barter arrangements, and selected road-and-rail projects; (iii) the trade-and-investment expansion: the broader trade relationship including agricultural exports, manufactured imports, and Chinese-investment in the post-2024 Ghana; and (iv) the diplomatic-protocol-and-state-visit engagement: the cycle of presidential visits and senior-official engagement that has historically defined the Ghana–China relationship.

The China bilateral was conducted through Foreign Minister Ablakwa, through the Ghana Ambassador to China [TBD-VERIFY: the Mahama-era Ambassador to China], and through the Office of the President's strategic-engagement architecture. President Mahama's first state visit to China under the second-term presidency [TBD-VERIFY: the precise date of Mahama's first state visit to China; the visit was a significant diplomatic occasion expected within the first year] was the principal high-level engagement.

9.4 EU, UK, and Gulf Engagement

The EU engagement through 2025 was structured by three architectural themes: (i) the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which from its transitional-phase operation since October 2023 and its full-effective implementation from 2026 has created a market-access requirement on Ghana's iron-and-steel, aluminium, cement, fertiliser, and hydrogen exports — a substantial component of Ghana's manufacturing-export base under the 24-Hour Economy framework; (ii) the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which under its deferred implementation timeline created compliance requirements on cocoa, palm-oil, timber, rubber, and coffee exports; and (iii) the EU–Ghana Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), the post-2016 trade-and-cooperation architecture under which Ghana's EU exports operate.

The UK engagement, conducted under the post-2024 Labour government in the UK, addressed (i) the bilateral trade-and-investment relationship under the post-Brexit UK–Ghana Trade Partnership Agreement; (ii) the broader diaspora-engagement architecture given the substantial Ghanaian community in the UK; and (iii) selected security-and-development-cooperation programmes. The Gulf engagement, conducted with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, addressed (i) the sovereign-wealth-fund-investment engagement, with specific attention to the Mubadala, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and Public Investment Fund engagement opportunities; (ii) the energy-cooperation engagement under the broader hydrocarbons-and-renewables agenda; and (iii) the broader diplomatic-and-trade engagement.

10. The Black Star Experience, Tourism, and the Pan-African Diaspora Agenda

10.1 The Black Star Experience Strategy

The Black Star Experience initiative, launched by the Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture under Hon. Abla Dzifa Gomashie [TBD-VERIFY: Tourism Minister appointment under Mahama] in mid-2025, sought to consolidate and re-brand the diaspora-engagement, festival-tourism, and cultural-economy agenda that had been developed under the Akufo-Addo administration through the 2019 Year of Return and the subsequent Beyond the Return programming. The Black Star Experience strategy framed Ghana's tourism-and-cultural offer around the Black Star symbol — the central element of the national flag and the Pan-African heritage drawn from Marcus Garvey's Black Star Line and Nkrumah's reception of that symbolism in the post-independence national imagery.

The strategy comprised five operational pillars: (i) a year-round festival calendar anchored by marquee events including Homowo, Aboakyer, Hogbetsotso, Damba, Bakatue, the Asante Akwasidae and Adae Kese, the Chale Wote Street Art Festival, the Afrochella / Afrofuture festival, and a new December marquee festival positioned at the year-end Pan-African gathering; (ii) heritage-tourism site development including the Cape Coast and Elmina Castles, the Assin Manso slave-river site, the W.E.B. Du Bois Centre, the Kwame Nkrumah Memorial Park, and the broader UNESCO World Heritage sites and forts; (iii) diaspora-engagement programming integrated with Foreign Minister Ablakwa's broader diaspora portfolio; (iv) creative-industries development including the music, film, fashion, and culinary sub-sectors that constitute the Ghanaian creative-economy base; and (v) tourism-infrastructure-and-investment including the hospitality-sector expansion and the aviation-connectivity development.

10.2 Beyond the Return Continuation Under Ablakwa

The Beyond the Return programme, the post-2019-Year-of-Return continuation that had operated under the Akufo-Addo administration through 2020–2024, was continued under the Mahama administration with re-orientation toward investment-promotion and economic-substance rather than purely cultural-tourism programming. The programme's principal architectural elements included the Right of Abode programme (under which descendants of the African diaspora can obtain long-term residency rights in Ghana), the citizenship-grant ceremonies for selected diaspora figures, the diaspora-investment-promotion architecture, and the broader Pan-African cultural-and-political-engagement programme.

The Mahama-era re-orientation, articulated by Foreign Minister Ablakwa in a series of public addresses through 2025, emphasised four shifts. First, the investment-promotion priority: the targeting of diaspora-investment in specific sectors aligned with the 24-Hour Economy framework. Second, the diaspora-bonds-and-deposits architecture: the exploration of a diaspora-bonds programme for Ghanaian sovereign borrowing and a diaspora-deposits architecture under selected commercial banks. Third, the dual-citizenship-and-political-participation question: the re-engagement with the long-pending question of dual-citizenship for Ghanaian-origin persons in the diaspora and the related political-participation rights. Fourth, the continental-integration linkage: the positioning of Ghana's diaspora-engagement within the broader African Union Agenda 2063 and African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) architecture.

10.3 December 2025 Black Star Festival Programming

The December 2025 Black Star Festival, the marquee year-end event of the Black Star Experience strategy, was conducted in Accra and selected regional centres across the final two weeks of December 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise dates and headline-event programming]. The festival's architecture comprised (i) the Detty December continuation: the established Accra-centred party-and-event programming that had grown under the Year of Return architecture into a substantial year-end tourism driver; (ii) the Pan-African cultural programming: keynote concerts, art installations, and cultural-heritage events involving Ghanaian and diaspora artists; (iii) the investment-conference component: a parallel investment conference targeting diaspora investors and aligned with the broader Africa Singapore Business Forum and similar engagement architecture; and (iv) the head-of-state and senior-figure engagement: the participation of African heads of state, diaspora political figures, and selected celebrity visitors.

The festival's macroeconomic impact, while difficult to quantify precisely, contributed to the Q4 2025 tourism arrivals trajectory. Ghana's tourism arrivals through 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise 2025 tourism arrivals figure] partially recovered from the post-2020 COVID-related decline and the 2022-2024 economic-crisis depression of the discretionary-travel demand. Hospitality-sector occupancy in Accra reportedly approached or exceeded the pre-2020 peaks during the December 2025 festival period.

11. Housing, Affordable Housing, and State-Enterprise Reform

11.1 The STX Korea Legacy and the Affordable-Housing Reset

The STX Korea affordable-housing programme, originally agreed under Mahama's first administration in 2009–10 as a USD 10 billion arrangement with the Korean STX Construction & Heavy Industries for the construction of 200,000 housing units across Ghana, had collapsed in the 2012-2013 period under contract-and-financing disputes and had become a recurrent reference point in Ghanaian housing-policy debates. The Mahama administration's second-term housing agenda, articulated in the 2024 manifesto and elaborated through 2025, drew on the STX-style architecture without re-engaging the original Korean counterparty: the framework proposed a state-anchored affordable-housing programme with multiple potential developer partners under a revised commercial architecture.

The 2025 affordable-housing programme architecture comprised (i) the completion of legacy housing inventory at the Saglemi, Borteyman, Kpone, and other state-housing sites where partially constructed inventory had been left under the predecessor administration; (ii) the new affordable-housing pipeline under public-private-partnership structures with selected developer partners including Chinese, Turkish, and Egyptian construction firms with prior Ghanaian experience [TBD-VERIFY: precise developer-partner selection]; (iii) the mortgage-financing architecture including the SSNIT-pension-funded mortgage scheme and the broader National Mortgage and Housing Finance Initiative architecture inherited from the Akufo-Addo administration; and (iv) the urban-planning-and-land-acquisition architecture under the Ministry of Works, Housing and Water Resources and the Lands Commission.

11.2 State-Enterprise Reform Under SIGA and the Ministry of Finance

The state-enterprise reform agenda was conducted through 2025 under the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA, established under Act 990 of 2019 to provide centralised governance oversight over the approximately 50 commercial state-owned enterprises and joint-venture entities) and the Ministry of Finance's parallel engagement. The reform agenda comprised (i) the governance-strengthening: improvements in board-composition, performance-contracting, and reporting-discipline across the SOE portfolio; (ii) the financial-restructuring: the addressing of loss-making and balance-sheet-impaired SOEs through structured restructuring; (iii) the operational-divestment-and-private-sector-participation: the case-by-case review of SOEs for potential divestment, public-listing, or private-sector-participation; and (iv) the SOE-sectoral-policy-alignment: the alignment of SOE strategies with the broader 24-Hour Economy and Big Push architectures.

The principal SOE-reform engagements through 2025 included (i) the COCOBOD restructuring (see §4.3); (ii) the ECG-related reforms (see §8.1); (iii) the VRA-related reforms including the post-Akosombo-spillage operational review; (iv) the GNPC (Ghana National Petroleum Corporation) reforms in light of the post-2024 oil-and-gas-sector trajectory; (v) the GIHOC, GHACEM-related, and other manufacturing-SOE reviews; and (vi) the broader review of the financial-sector SOEs including the National Investment Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank.

11.3 The Saglemi Housing Recovery and ORAL Pipeline

The Saglemi housing project, one of the principal legacy housing projects of Mahama's first administration and a recurrent reference point in the 2017–2024 NPP critique of the Mahama-era infrastructure-procurement, became a complex case under the Mahama administration: simultaneously an ORAL-investigated case (on the original contract-architecture under Mahama's first administration), an Akufo-Addo-era-contract-review case (on the 2017–2024 attempted restructuring), and an operational-housing-recovery target under the 2025 affordable-housing programme. The Mahama administration's positioning, articulated by the Lands and Housing Minister and by the Attorney-General's Department, was that the operational-recovery work (completing the partially constructed units and delivering them to beneficiaries) would proceed in parallel with the forensic-and-legal review of the contract-architecture (under ORAL's broader case-portfolio).

The ORAL pipeline's treatment of housing-sector cases extended beyond Saglemi to include selected other housing-and-real-estate projects identified through the public-submissions mechanism. The Special Prosecutor's engagement with these cases through 2025 was structured under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act 2017 (Act 959) and the broader prosecutorial-independence framework.

12. The 2026 Budget Reading and the November 2025 Fiscal Architecture

12.1 The November 2025 Budget Statement Headline Numbers

The 2026 Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana, delivered by Finance Minister Hon. Dr Cassiel Ato Forson before the Ninth Parliament in November 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise delivery date and the official slogan/title of the 2026 Budget], was the second full-cycle budget of the second Mahama presidency and the first to be designed and delivered entirely under the Mahama administration (the 11 March 2025 Budget had been designed under transitional conditions). The 2026 Budget's architecture confirmed the permanence of the nuisance-tax abolitions, retained the IMF primary-surplus target framework, articulated the H2 2026 fiscal trajectory through the IMF programme's scheduled conclusion, and provided the first comprehensive multi-year MTEF under the new administration.

The headline 2026 macroeconomic projections included (i) a real GDP growth projection of approximately [TBD-VERIFY: 2026 growth projection]; (ii) an end-2026 CPI inflation target of approximately [TBD-VERIFY: end-2026 inflation target]; (iii) a 2026 primary-surplus target of approximately +1.5% of GDP (in line with the IMF programme framework); (iv) a 2026 fiscal-deficit projection of approximately [TBD-VERIFY: 2026 fiscal-deficit projection]; and (v) a debt-to-GDP trajectory consistent with the IMF programme's debt-sustainability framework.

The 2026 Budget's principal sectoral allocations addressed (i) the Big Push capital-expenditure programme: a substantial multi-year capital envelope for the priority infrastructure pipeline; (ii) the education-sector: the continuing Free SHS programme, the Free SHS Plus expansion, and the broader education-infrastructure investment; (iii) the health-sector: the National Health Insurance Scheme funding consolidation, the post-PEPFAR/USAID bridging architecture, and the broader health-infrastructure investment under the Agenda 111 absorption; (iv) the energy-sector: the continuing energy-sector receivables addressment and the renewable-energy programme expansion; (v) the agriculture-sector: the cocoa-sector restructuring support and the broader food-security programme; and (vi) the 24-Hour Economy and industrial-policy: the continuing fiscal-incentives architecture for participating firms.

12.2 The MTEF 2026–2029 and the Debt-Sustainability Trajectory

The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2026–2029, the multi-year fiscal-architecture document published alongside the November 2025 Budget, articulated the post-IMF-programme fiscal-and-macroeconomic trajectory. The MTEF's principal commitments included (i) the continuation of the primary-surplus discipline in the +1.5% to +2.0% of GDP range through the 2026–2029 horizon; (ii) the gradual reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio toward the IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis target of approximately 55% of GDP by 2028; (iii) the post-IMF external-debt-management framework including the question of new Eurobond issuance; and (iv) the broader public-financial-management discipline under the Public Financial Management Act 2016.

The debt-sustainability trajectory, the principal medium-term macroeconomic constraint of the Reset agenda, depended on four reinforcing conditions. First, the continued primary-surplus discipline: the central fiscal commitment that the IMF programme had anchored and that the Mahama administration's reform agenda needed to sustain through the 2028 electoral cycle. Second, the disinflation-and-cedi-stabilisation continuation: the macroeconomic conditions that reduce the debt-service burden through interest-rate and exchange-rate channels. Third, the growth-recovery acceleration: the real-GDP-growth trajectory that improves the debt-to-GDP denominator. Fourth, the post-restructuring external-debt-service-architecture stability: the continuing servicing of the post-2024 restructured external debt without disruption.

12.3 The IMF Sixth Review and the 2026 Programme Conclusion

The IMF Sixth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, conducted in late 2025 or early 2026 [TBD-VERIFY: precise Sixth Review timing], was the penultimate review of the 2022 ECF programme (which had been scheduled for a 36-month term from May 2023 to mid-2026, with eight semi-annual reviews of which Sixth would be the sixth). The Sixth Review's preliminary staff statement characterised the programme as on-track and confirmed the trajectory toward the Seventh Review (mid-2026) and the programme's scheduled conclusion. The cumulative disbursement under the ECF was approximately [TBD-VERIFY: cumulative disbursement through Sixth Review] by the close of the review.

The post-2026 IMF engagement architecture — the question of whether Ghana would seek a successor programme, conduct a precautionary arrangement, or operate on standalone Article IV consultation basis after the ECF conclusion — was the principal medium-term policy question. The Mahama administration's communications through 2025–2026 emphasised that the principal post-programme objective was to operate without a successor programme while retaining the IMF's Article IV consultative engagement. The Bank of Ghana, the Ministry of Finance, and the broader macroeconomic-management architecture were positioned for a post-programme transition through 2026.

Search-corroborated reporting through August 2026 resolves the §12.3 [TBD-VERIFY] markers and confirms the "without a successor programme" objective was realised in a specific form. IMF staff reached a staff-level agreement with the Ghanaian authorities on 15 May 2026 covering the Sixth Review and, simultaneously, a request for a 36-month Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI); the Executive Board completed that Sixth Review — which proved to be the arrangement's final review rather than a "penultimate" one, with no separate Seventh Review — concluded the 2026 Article IV Consultation, and approved the PCI's commencement on 27 July 2026, per the IMF's own press release and reporting by CNBC Africa, Ghana Business News, and TimesLIVE. The Board's decision released a final disbursement of SDR 265.9 million (approximately US$371 million), completing the 39-month, US$3 billion ECF arrangement's full committed disbursement. The 36-month PCI — a non-financing framework rather than a loan — carries 26 quantitative and structural benchmarks reviewed semi-annually across six priority areas (fiscal adjustment, debt sustainability, fiscal transparency and SOE governance, monetary and exchange-rate framework modernisation, financial-sector stability, and diversification/inclusive growth), per Citi Newsroom and MyJoyOnline reporting on the transition. This document's parent, GH-D-06 §4.6, treats the PCI mechanics in fuller detail.

13. Domestic Politics: ORAL, the National Cathedral Wind-Down, NDC Primaries, and the NPP Reorganisation

13.1 ORAL Pipeline Through Year One: Cases, Indictments, Settlements

The ORAL pipeline matured through 2025 from the public-submissions-and-triage stage (Q1 2025) through the dossier-transmission stage (Q2 2025) to the indictment-and-prosecution stage (Q3 2025 onward). The cumulative submissions to ORAL exceeded the initial 1,800 of the first month and reached an aggregate of approximately [TBD-VERIFY: ORAL Year-One submissions figure] by the first anniversary. The Committee under Daniel Ofori transmitted dossiers to the Office of the Attorney-General (under Hon. Dr Dominic Ayine), the Office of the Special Prosecutor (under Special Prosecutor Kissi Agyebeng, whose appointment under Akufo-Addo had been retained under the principle of prosecutorial independence; his term continued until [TBD-VERIFY: Kissi Agyebeng's term-end date]), the Economic and Organised Crime Office, and the Criminal Investigations Department.

The headline ORAL cases — the Saglemi affordable-housing project, the National Cathedral expenditure, the Agyapa Royalties transaction, the Sky Train concession, the Pwalugu Multipurpose Dam contract, the National Ambulance Service procurement, and the National Lotteries Authority digital-platform contract — remained at varying stages of investigation, indictment, or settlement at year-end. Selected cases produced indictments and prosecution-stage activity through 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: which specific ORAL cases produced indictments and prosecution-stage outcomes during the first year]; others produced negotiated-settlement arrangements under which alleged misappropriated assets were returned to the state in exchange for closure of criminal-prosecution proceedings.

The Three-Account reading on ORAL through the first year clustered around three positions. The government / NDC recovery-and-accountability account characterised the pipeline as the legitimate implementation of an electoral mandate to recover misappropriated state assets, conducted within the constitutional architecture of the Attorney-General's prosecutorial authority, the Office of the Special Prosecutor's anti-corruption mandate, and the Economic and Organised Crime Office's financial-crime authority. The NPP-opposition / vindictive-prosecution account, articulated by Minority Leader Hon. Alexander Afenyo-Markin and by selected NPP-aligned commentators, characterised the pipeline as a political-prosecution instrument operating outside due-process bounds. The CDD-Ghana / civil-society procedurally-cautious account characterised the pipeline as serving legitimate accountability objectives but flagged the procedural-exposure questions (the relationship between the non-statutory ORAL Committee and the statutory prosecutorial agencies; the standard-of-proof questions in the case-selection; the due-process protections for accused individuals).

13.2 The National Cathedral Forensic Audit and Project Wind-Down

The National Cathedral project, the Akufo-Addo-era initiative whose construction had been suspended in mid-2023 and whose foundations had been laid at the John Evans Atta Mills Heritage site adjacent to the Cabinet Office and the Ridge Hospital, was formally wound down in 2025 following the Auditor-General's forensic audit (commissioned by Executive Instrument 1 of 7 January 2025; see GH-E-02 §3.3). The Auditor-General's report, published [TBD-VERIFY: precise publication date of the Auditor-General's Cathedral audit], identified [TBD-VERIFY: principal Auditor-General findings on Cathedral expenditure] and provided the evidentiary basis for the project's formal cancellation.

The wind-down decision, announced in [TBD-VERIFY: precise date of formal Cathedral wind-down decision], comprised (i) the cancellation of the construction contract with the principal construction firm (Sir David Adjaye's architectural firm Adjaye Associates had been the lead designer, with the principal construction contractor being a separate entity [TBD-VERIFY: principal construction contractor]); (ii) the disposal of the partially constructed site, with options including conversion to alternative public-use, return to the original land-trust, or retention for future development; (iii) the closure of the Cathedral Secretariat that had been operated under the Akufo-Addo administration; and (iv) the transmission of selected case elements to the ORAL pipeline for forensic-and-legal review of the contract-and-expenditure record. The wind-down was politically resonant for the Mahama administration: the Cathedral had been the most visible symbol of the contested-expenditure record of the predecessor administration and its cancellation was rhetorically positioned as a Reset deliverable.

13.3 NDC Internal Politics and the 2028 Succession Question

The NDC's internal politics through the first year of the second Mahama presidency operated against the constitutional constraint of the second-term limit: Mahama, having served a full term (2012–2017) and a second non-consecutive term (2025–2029), would be ineligible for re-election in 2028 under the 1992 Constitution's Article 66 (which limits the presidency to two terms). The 2028 NDC presidential primary, scheduled under the party's constitution for the second half of 2027 or early 2028, opened a succession contest for which the prospective candidates included Vice-President Prof Naana Jane Opoku-Agyemang and several senior cabinet figures.

The principal prospective candidates discussed in 2025–2026 NDC internal commentary included (i) Vice-President Prof Naana Jane Opoku-Agyemang, whose 2024 vice-presidential nomination had been a historic gender-barrier-breaking moment and whose Vice-Presidency provided the institutional platform for a primary bid; (ii) Foreign Minister Hon. Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa, whose generational positioning (44 years old at appointment) and parliamentary-anti-corruption record provided a distinctive profile; (iii) Finance Minister Hon. Dr Cassiel Ato Forson, whose macroeconomic-management record could provide a technocratic-managerial primary case; (iv) selected senior NDC parliamentarians including former Minority Leader Hon. Haruna Iddrisu; and (v) selected NDC strategists outside cabinet. The 2025–2026 NDC primary positioning was conducted under the established party-discipline norms but with growing intra-party engagement on the succession architecture.

13.4 NPP Reorganisation Under Bawumia and Kennedy Agyapong

The post-defeat NPP reorganisation was the principal opposition-side development of the year. Former Vice-President Dr Mahamudu Bawumia retained a leading role in NPP succession politics through 2025–2026. His post-election engagement comprised (i) a foreign-engagement programme including selected international think-tank and academic engagements; (ii) intra-party reform proposals on the NPP's organisational architecture, candidate-selection process, and policy-positioning; (iii) periodic political commentary on the Mahama administration's record, calibrated to distinguish between legitimate critique and the post-election-reconciliation imperative; and (iv) preparation for the 2027 NPP presidential primary.

Kennedy Agyapong, the long-serving NPP MP for Assin Central and businessman who had finished second in the November 2023 NPP primary (behind Bawumia) and whose primary campaign had been distinguished by populist anti-corruption rhetoric and grass-roots mobilisation, conducted an independent grassroots reorganisation through 2025–2026. Agyapong's positioning combined (i) continuing parliamentary engagement as a senior NPP backbencher; (ii) media-and-public-engagement programming including his Net2 TV platform and selected radio engagements; (iii) grassroots-party-organisational engagement targeted at constituency-level NPP structures; and (iv) preparation for a 2027 primary bid against Bawumia and other prospective candidates.

The intra-party post-mortem on the 2024 defeat, conducted formally through a National Executive Committee review process and informally through a series of regional consultations, addressed several lines of critique: the macroeconomic-inheritance frame; the galamsey-policy critique; the cabinet-composition critique; the running-mate selection (Dr Matthew Opoku Prempeh, whose campaign performance had been variously assessed); the broader question of whether the NPP could regain the centre-ground without re-litigating its 2017–2024 record; and the structural question of whether the NPP's traditional Ashanti-and-Akan-base could be expanded across the electoral coalition. The post-mortem outputs were partial through end-2025 with the formal report scheduled for [TBD-VERIFY: NPP National Executive Committee 2024 post-mortem report publication date].

13.5 Verified Record: The August 2026 Cabinet Reshuffle and the Delegates-System Ruling

Two further verified developments, both from August 2026, bear on the Reset agenda's institutional and legal environment beyond this document's original research horizon. First, President Mahama conducted a cabinet reshuffle in two stages. On 7 August 2026 he nominated Dr Zanetor Agyemang-Rawlings as Minister for Environment, Science and Technology, nominated Mahama Ayariga as Minister for Local Government, Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs, reassigned Ahmed Ibrahim to head the Ministry of Works and Housing, and appointed Kenneth Gilbert Adjei as Defence Minister-designate — filling posts left vacant by the August 2025 military helicopter crash that had killed eight people including two cabinet ministers — per Ghanaian News Canada and GBC reporting. A follow-on mini-reshuffle on 26 August 2026 reassigned Abdul-Rashid Pelpuo from Labour, Employment and Job Creation to Minister of State for Special Initiatives (replaced by Emmanuel Kwadwo Agyekum) and moved Deputy Defence Minister Ernest Brogya Genfi to Presidential Advisor on National Resilience and Emergency Preparedness, per Pulse Ghana reporting. The reshuffle's direct relevance to the Reset agenda is that it finally resolved the Defence and Environment vacancies open since the 2025 crash, more than a year into the term.

Second, the Supreme Court delivered a decision on 29 July 2026, by a 5–2 majority, declaring the delegates-based electoral-college system used by Ghanaian political parties (including the NDC and NPP) to select presidential and parliamentary candidates unconstitutional, ruling that all members of a political party are constitutionally entitled to vote in candidate selection, per the Ghana News Agency. The ruling's implications for the NDC's 2028 succession process (§13.3) and the NPP's 2027 primary (§13.4) — both of which had been designed around delegate-congress architectures — were not yet settled as of this wave's research horizon and remain [TBD-VERIFY: pending each party's constitutional amendments and Electoral Commission guidance implementing the ruling]. A separate, narrower Supreme Court ruling on 21 August 2026 dismissed an injunction application by MP Kojo Oppong Nkrumah against Chief-Justice-authorised "vacation court" criminal sittings, allowing those sittings — relevant to the pace of ORAL-linked prosecutions (§13.1) — to continue while the underlying constitutional question remains pending, per Pulse Ghana and GBC reporting.

14. Three-Account Synthesis, the 2028 Horizon, and the Forward View

14.1 The Three-Account Synthesis: Reset Substance, GoldBod Governance, 24-Hour Economy Realism

The three-account synthesis on Mahama Year One operates across three nested levels. At the macroeconomic-stabilisation level, all three accounts converge on the core readings: the cedi stabilisation, the disinflation glide, the GoldBod foreign-exchange contribution, and the fiscal-discipline credibility were substantial achievements regardless of the partisan-rotation question. The IMF programme's continuation and the IMF reviews' confirmation of programme-on-track status provided the international-financial-institutional anchor that no Ghanaian government could have replaced in one year.

At the structural-reform level, the three accounts diverge. The government / NDC Reset account characterises the year as the operational delivery of a coherent reform programme: nuisance-tax abolition completed without fiscal slippage; GoldBod institutionally established and operationally contributing to the foreign-exchange architecture; ORAL pipeline maturing with first indictments and settlements; 24-Hour Economy moving from framework to first-mover-cohort operations; the Big Push pipeline operationalised; the energy-sector reform proceeding on multiple lines; the foreign-affairs reset navigating the Trump-2 turbulence and the AES question. The NPP-opposition account characterises the year as macroeconomic-continuation without structural transformation: the gains were inherited; the doctrinal innovations remained rhetorical; the ORAL pipeline was politically motivated; the 24-Hour Economy was unrealised; the Big Push was unfunded. The IMANI / CDD-Ghana / ACEP structural account characterises the year as a creditable first phase whose principal risks are visible in years two and three: fiscal-slippage pressure as the 2028 election approaches; the 24-Hour Economy's financing realism question; GoldBod's governance and monopsony exposure; the cocoa-sector's structural-decline trajectory; and the broader debt-sustainability question.

The three accounts are not fully reconcilable but they share an analytical commitment to the post-2022 IMF-programme-anchored fiscal-and-monetary discipline as the framework within which the structural-reform debate operates. The depth of that shared commitment — across an opposition that had designed the IMF programme and a government that had inherited and implemented it — is a distinctive feature of the post-2022 Ghanaian political economy and a structural reason for the country's relative macroeconomic stabilisation success.

14.2 The 2028 Horizon and the Structural-Stabilisation Question

The 2028 horizon will be shaped by four reinforcing factors. First, the completion of the IMF programme, scheduled for mid-2026, and the post-programme macroeconomic-management architecture. The successful post-programme exit (operating without a successor programme while retaining Article IV consultative engagement) would constitute a substantial achievement of the Mahama administration and would shape the 2028 electoral terrain. Second, the second-half delivery of the Big Push infrastructure programme, which will operationally realise the campaign-and-second-term-mandate commitment in the 2027–2028 pre-electoral period. The infrastructure-delivery's success or failure will be the principal capital-expenditure-record contestation of the 2028 election. Third, the operational consolidation of the 24-Hour Economy framework, which by 2028 should have moved beyond the First-Movers cohort to a broader cohort of participating firms with measurable employment-and-output effects. The framework's success or failure will be the principal industrial-policy-record contestation. Fourth, the 2028 succession dynamics: the NDC primary, the NPP primary, the broader political-coalition formation, and the macroeconomic conditions prevailing in late 2028 will jointly determine the electoral outcome.

The structural-stabilisation question — whether the post-2022 Ghanaian state has achieved a durable macroeconomic stabilisation that survives the partisan rotation or whether the 2028 election cycle will re-introduce fiscal-and-monetary discipline pressures — is the principal medium-term policy question of the second Mahama presidency. The IMF programme's design has been calibrated to anchor the discipline through 2026; the post-programme architecture and the 2028 electoral cycle will be the principal test of whether the anchor holds in the absence of IMF-programme conditionality.

14.3 Spiral Index — What to Read Next in the Corpus

For deeper engagement with the themes treated in this document, the Ghana corpus provides the following spiral references. On the immediate political predecessors and the 2024 election, read GH-E-01 (the 7 December 2024 election and the Mahama return) and GH-E-02 (the first hundred days and the Reset cabinet). On the galamsey-and-GoldBod architecture in fuller treatment, read GH-E-03 (Galamsey, the Mining Sector, and the GoldBod Architecture). On the macroeconomic inheritance, read GH-D-02 and GH-D-04 (the 2022 Domestic Debt Exchange and the IMF Programme). On the predecessor administration, read GH-D-03 (the Akufo-Addo Presidency 2017–2024). On Mahama's first-term record against which the second-term performance is positioned, read GH-D-01 (the Mills and Mahama First-Term NDC Presidencies 2009–2017). On the foreign-policy dimension, read GH-F-01 (Ghana Foreign Policy from Nkrumah to the ECOWAS–AES rupture). On the broader democratic-alternation pattern and the 2028 horizon, read GH-O-02 (Ghana Democratic Alternation 1992–2025 and the NDC-NPP System). On the canonical books-and-sources, read GH-R-01 (Ghana Governance Books Canon).

This document will be updated under the recent-events-cutoff discipline (see CLAUDE.md §9) as the second-half of 2026 unfolds and as the IMF programme approaches its scheduled conclusion. The principal update triggers include the 2026 Seventh ECF Review, the November 2026 Budget for 2027, the cocoa-sector 2025/26 final figures, the GoldBod year-two operational disclosures, the 24-Hour Economy participating-firm cohort expansion, the ORAL pipeline indictment-and-settlement progression, the NDC and NPP 2028 primary positioning, and the broader macroeconomic trajectory.

Sources

1. President John Dramani Mahama, First Anniversary Address to the Nation, 7 January 2026; Mid-Year Message, July 2025.
2. President John Dramani Mahama, State of the Nation Address (SONA) 2026, Parliament of Ghana, February 2026 [TBD-VERIFY: exact delivery date].
3. Ministry of Finance, Republic of Ghana, 2025 Mid-Year Fiscal Policy Review and Supplementary Estimates, presented by Hon. Dr Cassiel Ato Forson, July 2025; 2026 Budget Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana, November 2025 [TBD-VERIFY: precise delivery date and slogan].
4. Ministry of Finance, Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 2026–2029; Quarterly Fiscal Bulletins, Q2 2025 – Q1 2026.
5. International Monetary Fund, Ghana — Fifth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, IMF Country Report (mid-2025); Ghana — Sixth Review Under the ECF Arrangement, IMF Country Report (late 2025 / early 2026) [TBD-VERIFY: precise report numbers and disbursement amounts].
6. International Monetary Fund, Ghana Article IV Consultation Report, 2025 (or 2026 successor) — staff assessment of post-stabilisation trajectory.
7. Bank of Ghana, Monetary Policy Committee Press Releases, May 2025 – May 2026 (monthly meetings); Summary of Economic and Financial Data, monthly bulletins; Annual Report 2025.
8. Bank of Ghana, GoldBod–BoG Operational Memorandum and Domestic Gold Purchase Programme Quarterly Reports, 2025–2026 disclosures.
9. Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Consumer Price Index Newsletters, May 2025 – April 2026; Quarterly Gross Domestic Product Bulletin, Q2 2025 – Q1 2026; Annual Household Income and Expenditure Survey (AHIES) updates.
10. Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), Production Bulletins for the 2024/25 and 2025/26 Cocoa Seasons; Annual Report 2024/25; producer-price announcements (October 2024 and October 2025 cycles).
11. Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod), Operational Disclosures, Quarterly Reports, 2025–2026; Aggregator Licensing Framework; Board Communiqués [TBD-VERIFY: publication schedule for GoldBod disclosures].
12. Ministry of Trade, Agribusiness and Industry / 24-Hour Economy and Accelerated Export Development Secretariat (Hon. Augustus "Goosie" Tanoh), Sectoral Roll-Out Briefings, Q2 2025 – Q1 2026; 24-Hour Economy Implementation Framework, published mid-2025.
13. Ministry of Roads and Highways and Ministry of Works, Housing and Water Resources, Big Push Programme — Project Pipeline and Procurement Architecture, 2025–2026 [TBD-VERIFY: which ministry is the lead coordinator of Big Push].
14. Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture, Black Star Experience — Strategy Document and Q4 2025 Festival Architecture; Ghana Tourism Authority bulletins.
15. Ministry of Energy and Green Transition (Hon. John Abdulai Jinapor), Energy Sector Recovery Programme Updates, 2025–2026; ECG / GRIDCo restructuring documents.
16. Volta River Authority (VRA), Akosombo and Kpong Dam Operational Reports, 2024–2025; Akosombo–Kpong Spillage Reconstruction Bulletins, post-2023 flood recovery.
17. Parliament of Ghana, Hansard, Ninth Parliament, mid-2025 – mid-2026; Finance Committee Reports; Public Accounts Committee Reports.
18. Centre for Democratic Development — Ghana (CDD-Ghana), Year-One Assessment of the Mahama Administration, January 2026; H. Kwasi Prempeh and Kojo Asante, Democracy Watch commentary, 2025–2026.
19. IMANI Centre for Policy and Education (Franklin Cudjoe, Bright Simons), Fiscal Briefings, GoldBod Briefings, 24-Hour Economy Critiques, May 2025 – April 2026.
20. Africa Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) — Benjamin Boakye and Stephen Yeboah, Energy and Mining Sector Briefings, 2025–2026.
21. Renaissance Capital Africa team (Charlie Robertson, Yvonne Mhango successors), Stanbic Bank Ghana, Databank Research, Ghana Macro Notes, 2025–2026.
22. Africa Confidential, Volume 66 (2025) and Volume 67 (2026) coverage of Ghana.
23. Daily Graphic, MyJoyOnline / Joy News, Citi Newsroom / Citi FM, Asaase Radio, GhanaWeb, Business and Financial Times, The Fourth Estate — contemporaneous reporting, May 2025 – May 2026.
24. Financial Times Africa pages; Reuters Accra wire; Bloomberg Africa coverage; The Africa Report (Jeune Afrique).
25. World Bank, Ghana Economic Update, 2025 (June) and 2026 (June) editions; Ghana Country Partnership Framework mid-term reviews.
26. Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, Ghana Policy Briefs, 2025–2026.
27. Theo Acheampong (energy economist), Joseph Atta-Mensah (former UNECA Principal Policy Adviser), and Sharmila Devereux (Africa Confidential) — published commentaries.
28. ECOWAS Commission, Communiqués of the Authority of Heads of State, 2025–2026; Mahama's ECOWAS Chair/Mediator engagements [TBD-VERIFY: whether Mahama assumed the ECOWAS Chair in 2025 or 2026, distinct from his Special Envoy role].
29. Office of the Special Prosecutor and Attorney-General's Department, Quarterly Reports, 2025–2026; ORAL Committee progress disclosures.
30. International Monetary Fund, "IMF Executive Board Completes the Sixth Review of Ghana's Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility... and Reviews Request of a 36-Month Policy Coordination Instrument for Ghana," Press Release, 27 July 2026.
31. Rainbow Radio, GBC Ghana Online, Adomonline, and Ghana Business News, reporting on Energy Minister Jinapor's August 2026 announcement of US$1.47bn energy-sector legacy-debt clearance; Business Day Ghana and Ourhomeland, on the ECG contract-review and Cash Waterfall Mechanism outcomes.
32. Citi Newsroom, "24-hour economy initiative attracts US$11bn in prospective investments — Goosie Tanoh" (July 2026); GhanaWeb, "24-Hour Economy: Secretariat secures US$5.5bn investment, targets 1.7 million jobs" and "Over 300 businesses now running under 24-Hour Economy programme" (2026).
33. Ghana News Agency, "Supreme Court declares Political Parties delegates system unconstitutional" (29 July 2026); Pulse Ghana and GBC, on the 21 August 2026 dismissal of the Oppong Nkrumah vacation-court injunction application.
34. Ghanaian News Canada and GBC Ghana Online, reporting on the 7 August and 26 August 2026 Mahama cabinet reshuffles (Zanetor Agyemang-Rawlings, Mahama Ayariga, Kenneth Gilbert Adjei, Pelpuo, Brogya Genfi).

Related Documents

• GH-D-01: The Mills and Mahama First-Term NDC Presidencies (2009–2017) — Mahama's first-term legacy against which the second-term mid-term is positioned.
• GH-D-02: The 2022 Domestic Debt Exchange and the IMF Programme — the macroeconomic inheritance.
• GH-D-03: Nana Akufo-Addo Presidency (2017–2024) — predecessor administration whose record continues to shape ORAL and the 24-Hour Economy critique.
• GH-D-04: 2022 Domestic Debt Exchange and IMF Programme — sister micro-treatment.
• GH-E-01: The 7 December 2024 Election and the Mahama Return — the proximate election predecessor.
• GH-E-02: Mahama Second Presidency First Hundred Days (2025) — the immediate predecessor document; Reset cabinet, 11 March Budget, ORAL launch.
• GH-E-03: Galamsey Crackdown, Mining Sector, and the GoldBod Architecture (2017–2025) — sibling treatment of the GoldBod institutional architecture.
• GH-F-01: Ghana Foreign Policy from Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism to the ECOWAS–AES Rupture (1957–2025) — foreign-policy domain reference.
• GH-O-02: Ghana Democratic Alternation 1992–2025 and the NDC-NPP System — domain reference for the 2028 horizon and the NPP reorganisation.
• GH-R-01: Ghana Governance Books Canon — source canon.
• GH-G-01: Ghana's Social Policy — The NHIS, Free SHS, and the Welfare-State Experiment
• GH-H-PRES-05: John Dramani Mahama — A Biography
• GH-H-PRES-06: Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo — A Biography
• GH-B-03: The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Rule — Rawlings's Eleven-Year Revolution and the Path to the Fourth Republic
• GH-C-02: The Acheampong–Akuffo–Limann Era — NRC, SMC, AFRC, and the Third Republic
• GH-D-05: Akufo-Addo Year One — The 7 January 2017 Inauguration, the Free SHS Launch, the Bauxite-for-Sinohydro Decision, Planting for Food and Jobs, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor
• GH-F-02: Ghana–China Bauxite-for-Infrastructure and the Belt and Road Initiative
• GH-D-06: Mahama Year Two (January 2026 – January 2027) — Fiscal Recovery, 24-Hour Economy Implementation, and the 2028 Mid-Term Test
• GH-D-07: Akufo-Addo Second Term 2021–2024 — Cedi Crisis, DDEP, and the Path to 2024 Defeat
• GH-J-02: The Galamsey Illegal Mining Crisis — Three Accounts
• GH-G-02: Cocoa Political Economy — COCOBOD and the Farmer-State Bargain
• GH-I-02: The Ghanaian Judiciary — The Supreme Court, Election Petitions, and the Politics of Judicial Independence
• GH-N-01: Ghana in International Perceptions — Democracy Beacon, Adjustment Poster Child, and the Debt Cycle
• GH-K-02: The 2017 Free SHS Decision and Its Fiscal Politics
• GH-O-01: Ghana Megatrends — The 2030s Questions
• GH-G-03: Ghana's Power Sector — Dumsor and the IPP Debt Trap