MY-H-PM-07: Mahathir Mohamad's Second Premiership (2018–2020)

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⚠️ WRITER GUIDANCE

This document covers Mahathir's second premiership only. His first tenure (1981–2003, 22 years and 107 days) is covered in MY-B-02. The full biographical anchor (covering the 95-year-old life from 1925 to present) is MY-H-PM-04 — to be written separately. This document focuses on the 21-month second tenure: GE14 victory; PH coalition government; Sheraton Move; resignation.

Tone discipline. The 2018–2020 period is one of the most contested in modern Malaysian political history. Mahathir's defenders (the Bersatu loyalist faction; the post-Sheraton MP supporters) frame him as a reluctant patriot who returned to politics to defeat Najib and 1MDB and was undermined by intra-PH factional manoeuvring. His critics (the PKR-Anwar faction; the DAP leadership; the international Reformasi network) frame him as a politically-skilled survivor who refused to honour the 2018 Mahathir-Anwar PM-transition pact and engineered the Sheraton-Move opening to retain power. The factual record is in the public domain; the contestation lies in motivational interpretation.

Cross-corpus link. MY-D-04 covers the Pakatan Harapan government as institutional event. The Sheraton Move is covered in detail in MY-D-04 §5–7. Mahathir's first premiership is in MY-B-02. This biography covers the man during the second tenure — his decisions, his political-coalition position, his public-political voice.

1. Key Takeaways

Mahathir Mohamad was sworn in as the seventh Prime Minister of Malaysia on 10 May 2018 at age 92 — the world's oldest serving head of government at the time. His accession ended a 15-year post-premiership period (October 2003 retirement; February 2016 UMNO resignation; September 2016 Bersatu founding; January 2018 Pakatan Harapan PM-designate selection). The 9 May 2018 GE14 result (PH 121 seats vs BN 79) was the first transfer of power in Malaysian federal history.
The 2018 Mahathir-Anwar PM-transition pact contemplated Mahathir handing the premiership to Anwar Ibrahim within a defined period — typically described as "two years" in public discussion though never formally documented. The pact was the central political-coalition agreement of the post-2015 Pakatan Harapan formation; without the pact, Anwar's PKR (the largest PH component party) would not have accepted a Bersatu-Mahathir PM candidacy. The pact's eventual non-execution became the structural source of the post-2019 intra-PH factional tensions.
Mahathir's second-tenure Cabinet (sworn in 21 May 2018) reflected a multi-coalition framework: 28 ministers and 26 deputy ministers across PKR, DAP, Amanah, Bersatu, and (in Sabah) WARISAN. Key positions: Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (Deputy PM and Women Minister); Lim Guan Eng (Finance Minister, the first Chinese-Malaysian Finance Minister since 1974); Muhyiddin Yassin (Home Minister); Mukhriz Mahathir (Menteri Besar of Kedah); Saifuddin Abdullah (Foreign Minister); Anthony Loke (Transport Minister); Maszlee Malik (Education Minister, controversially replaced January 2020).
The first 100 days produced significant institutional reforms: Goods and Services Tax (GST) abolished (1 June 2018); Auditor-General Tan Sri Madinah Mohamad reinstated; Attorney-General Apandi Ali removed (4 June 2018); Tommy Thomas appointed Attorney-General (4 June 2018); Council of Eminent Persons (CEP) established (12 May 2018); Royal Commission of Inquiry into 1MDB established. The Najib Razak prosecutorial framework was activated through July 2018 (Najib first charges 4 July 2018).
The Council of Eminent Persons (CEP) — chaired by Daim Zainuddin and including Robert Kuok, Hassan Marican, Jomo Kwame Sundaram, and Zeti Akhtar Aziz — operated from 12 May 2018 to 12 August 2018 producing strategic-policy advice on the post-2018 government's economic-fiscal-institutional positioning. The CEP report was substantial; aspects were implemented through the 2018–2019 budget cycles.
The Anwar royal pardon of 16 May 2018 restored Anwar's right to hold federal office and was the central political-coalition constitutional act of the post-GE14 transition. The pardon was recommended by Mahathir (PM); granted by Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Muhammad V. Anwar's October 2018 Port Dickson by-election victory and his November 2018 PKR Presidency confirmed his PM-designate role.
The 2018–2019 budget framework under Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng was developed under significant fiscal-deficit pressure inherited from the Najib government. The PH manifesto's pledged abolitions (GST removal; petrol-subsidy restoration; toll abolitions on selected highways) created revenue-and-expenditure tensions. The 2019 Budget projected RM314 billion expenditure with a 3.4% deficit-to-GDP ratio.
Foreign-policy decisions through 2018–2020 included the cancellation of three China-related infrastructure projects (the East Coast Rail Link or ECRL; the Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline; the Multi-Product Pipeline) in July 2018, with the ECRL subsequently renegotiated and reinstated at lower cost in April 2019. The Mahathir-Erdogan-Imran Khan trilateral (December 2019) attempted to coordinate Muslim-state foreign-policy positioning. The 2018 New Zealand mosque shootings produced Mahathir's notable international response.
The intra-PH factional tensions through 2019 produced the structural conditions of the Sheraton Move. The Mahathir-Anwar pact's non-execution became increasingly visible through 2019; the Bersatu Supreme Council under Muhyiddin Yassin (Bersatu President from June 2018) developed an alternative-coalition framework with UMNO and PAS during 2019; the intra-PKR Anwar-Azmin Ali tensions accelerated.
The 23 February 2020 Sheraton Hotel meeting brought together Bersatu, UMNO, PAS, and PKR-Azmin-faction MPs — approximately 130 MPs in total — discussing the formation of a new Malay-Muslim coalition government that would exclude DAP. The meeting was reported in real-time by the Malaysian press. On 24 February 2020 Muhyiddin announced Bersatu's withdrawal from Pakatan Harapan; later the same day Mahathir resigned as PM.
The 24–28 February 2020 constitutional crisis involved: Mahathir's resignation (24 February); his appointment as Interim PM by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (24 February); the King's audit of MP support letters (26–28 February); and the appointment of Muhyiddin Yassin as Prime Minister on 1 March 2020. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Abdullah of Pahang's role under Articles 40(2)(a) and 43(2)(a) was the constitutional mechanism for the appointment.
Mahathir's post-Sheraton political activity included the formation of Pejuang (Parti Pejuang Tanah Air) in August 2020 — a Bersatu-splinter Malay-nationalist party. He contested GE15 (19 November 2022) as Pejuang chairman in the Langkawi constituency and lost his deposit (the first time he had lost an election in Malaysian history) — finishing fourth with approximately 4,500 votes against Mohd Suhaimi Abdullah's PN-PAS victory.
Mahathir's continuing political-cultural voice through 2022–2025 has emphasised: criticism of the Anwar-led Madani government; criticism of the Sultan Ibrahim-of-Johor era's federal-state-Royal-Court framework; sustained engagement with foreign-policy questions including the Israel-Gaza war (Mahathir's anti-Zionist positioning has been continuous); engagement with Bersatu and Pejuang internal-political dynamics. As of mid-2025 he is approximately 99 years old.
The 21-month second premiership produced a partial reform agenda: 1MDB prosecutions activated; GST abolition; Council of Eminent Persons; Royal Commission of Inquiry into 1MDB; Anwar pardon. It also produced significant unfinished-reform questions: the constitutional reform agenda; the institutional reform of MACC; the IPCMC (Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission) bill; the parliamentary reform proposals. The Sheraton Move pre-empted the second half of the planned reform agenda.
The 2018–2020 second tenure is the smallest in size relative to Mahathir's first tenure (22 years and 107 days vs 21 months and 19 days) but consequential in disproportion: GE14's first transfer of power; Najib's prosecution; Anwar's pardon; the Sheraton Move's inauguration of post-PH-coalition arithmetic; the post-2020 MP-floor-crossing pattern that has shaped the 2020–2024 political trajectory. The second tenure's net effect on Malaysian governance institutions and political-coalition architecture continues to be assessed.

2. Pre-2018 Background — From Retirement to Bersatu

2.1 Mahathir's October 2003 Retirement

Mahathir retired as PM on 31 October 2003 after 22 years and 107 days — the longest single tenure in Malaysian history. His successor was Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (5th PM, 2003–2009; covered in MY-H-PM-05). The retirement was on Mahathir's terms; he selected Abdullah personally and remained as a UMNO Honorary President and a continuing public-political voice.

The post-retirement period 2003–2009 saw Mahathir gradually distance from Abdullah's government — particularly over the cancellation of certain Mahathir era infrastructure projects (the Crooked Bridge to Singapore being the most prominent), the perceived softening on Singapore-Malaysia relations, and the broader Abdullah-government-direction question.

2.2 Mahathir Under Najib (2009–2015)

When Najib succeeded Abdullah on 3 April 2009, Mahathir was initially supportive. The Najib-Mahathir relationship through 2009–2014 was correct; Mahathir publicly endorsed the 1Malaysia framework and the post-2010 ETP/GTP frameworks.

The break came over 1MDB. From mid-2014 Mahathir publicly questioned 1MDB's debt levels and operational decisions. The 2 July 2015 WSJ disclosure of the USD 681 million AmBank transfers accelerated his break with Najib. Through 2015 Mahathir's public criticism intensified.

2.3 The February 2016 UMNO Resignation and the Citizens' Declaration

On 29 February 2016 Mahathir resigned from UMNO — the party he had led for 22 years as Prime Minister. The resignation was the most significant political-cultural moment of his post-2003 period. He explained the decision as a response to UMNO's refusal to remove Najib over 1MDB.

The 4 March 2016 Citizens' Declaration was signed at the Royale Chulan Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. Signatories included Mahathir, Lim Kit Siang (DAP), Wan Azizah Wan Ismail (PKR; Anwar's wife), Mohd Nor Manuty (PAS dissident), Muhyiddin Yassin (former Deputy PM under Najib, dismissed July 2015), and approximately 50 others. The declaration called for Najib's removal and for institutional-reform action against 1MDB-related corruption.

The declaration was the founding document of the post-2015 anti-Najib political-coalition.

2.4 The September 2016 Bersatu Founding

Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu — the Malaysian United Indigenous Party) was founded on 8 September 2016 at the Sungei Wang Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. Founding members included Mahathir (Chairman), Muhyiddin Yassin (President), Mukhriz Mahathir (Mahathir's son, Vice-President), Anwar Ibrahim's daughter Nurul Izzah Anwar (in early discussions but did not formally join), Khairuddin Abu Hassan, and others.

Bersatu's stated identity: a Malay-nationalist party rooted in Malay cultural and political tradition but distinct from UMNO's post-1969 framework. The founding was politically calculated: Bersatu would compete with UMNO for the rural Malay vote while operating as an anti-Najib political-coalition vehicle.

2.5 The September 2015 Pakatan Harapan and the Bersatu Joining

Pakatan Harapan was formed on 22 September 2015 from the reorganisation of Pakatan Rakyat (which had broken down after PAS's exit). The original PH composition was PKR, DAP, and Amanah (the PAS splinter formed by Mat Sabu). Bersatu joined Pakatan Harapan in 2017.

The PH coalition's central question through 2017 was the PM-designate. Anwar (in prison serving Sodomy II sentence) was the PKR candidate; some argued the candidacy should be transferred to Wan Azizah; the alternative was Mahathir. After extended internal discussion, the January 2018 PH Presidential Council selected Mahathir as PM-designate with the Mahathir-Anwar PM-transition pact as the central element.

2.6 The May 2018 Campaign

The PH manifesto (Buku Harapan) was launched on 8 March 2018 with 60 specific reform commitments organised under five pillars: lower the cost of living; institutional reform; equitable economic growth; restore Sabah and Sarawak rights; and dignified Malaysia in the international community.

Mahathir's campaign role was central. At age 92 he conducted a sustained campaign across Malaysia; his rallies in rural Malay constituencies were credited as the principal driver of the PH crossover from urban-multi-ethnic constituencies (the post-2008 Pakatan Rakyat strength) to the rural-Malay vote-share necessary for federal majority.

GE14 was held on 9 May 2018 — a working day chosen by the BN-controlled Election Commission. The PH-WARISAN result (121 federal seats, 47.9% popular vote) produced the historical transfer of power.

3. The First 100 Days (May–August 2018)

3.1 Inauguration and Cabinet Formation

Mahathir was sworn in by Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Muhammad V at Istana Negara on the night of 10 May 2018 — approximately 24 hours after the GE14 result. The swearing-in was politically significant: the King's prompt action against any potential post-electoral manoeuvring solidified the PH transition.

The Cabinet was sworn in stages over 21 May 2018 (initial 13-minister cabinet) and June 2018 (the full 28-minister cabinet). Key positions:

Wan Azizah Wan Ismail — Deputy PM and Women, Family and Community Development Minister.
Lim Guan Eng (DAP) — Finance Minister. The first Chinese-Malaysian Finance Minister since Tan Siew Sin's 1959–1974 tenure.
Muhyiddin Yassin (Bersatu) — Home Minister. Significant given Muhyiddin's 2015 dismissal under Najib.
Mohd Saifuddin Abdullah (PKR) — Foreign Minister.
Anthony Loke (DAP) — Transport Minister.
Maszlee Malik (Bersatu) — Education Minister. Subsequently replaced January 2020.
Mohamad Sabu (Amanah) — Defence Minister.
Mukhriz Mahathir — Menteri Besar of Kedah (state-level).
Mat Sabu (Mohamad Sabu) — Defence; named because of long-standing political-personal connection.
Tengku Zafrul Aziz initially as Special Officer (later moved to other roles).
Liew Chin Tong (DAP) — Deputy Defence Minister.

3.2 The Council of Eminent Persons

The Council of Eminent Persons (CEP) was established by Mahathir on 12 May 2018 — within 48 hours of the GE14 result. Membership:

Tun Daim Zainuddin (chair) — Mahathir's long-serving Finance Minister 1984–1991, 1999–2001.
Robert Kuok — the Malaysian-Chinese billionaire businessman based in Hong Kong.
Hassan Marican — former Petronas CEO 1995–2010.
Jomo Kwame Sundaram — economist, former UN Assistant Secretary-General.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz — former Bank Negara Governor 2000–2016.

The CEP operated for 100 days (until 12 August 2018) and submitted a confidential report to the PM. Aspects of the report informed subsequent policy: the prioritisation of fiscal-deficit reduction; the 1MDB asset-recovery framework; the institutional-reform sequencing.

3.3 The 1MDB Prosecutorial Activation

The post-GE14 1MDB prosecutorial activation proceeded rapidly:

12 May 2018: Mahathir personally announced reopening of 1MDB investigations.
15 May 2018: Najib home and residence searches authorised.
16 May 2018: Searches conducted; RM1.1 billion in items seized.
4 June 2018: Apandi Ali removed as Attorney-General; Tommy Thomas appointed Attorney-General.
3 July 2018: The 1MDB Royal Commission of Inquiry established under Hashim Yusof.
4 July 2018: Najib charged at Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court with first set of SRC charges (covered in MY-H-PM-06).

The Tommy Thomas appointment was politically significant: as the first non-Malay Attorney-General in Malaysian federal history, Thomas's appointment reflected the post-2018 reform-coalition framework. The appointment was challenged on constitutional grounds by some critics; the Federal Court upheld the appointment in subsequent proceedings.

3.4 The GST Abolition and Petrol-Subsidy Reform

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) — implemented at 6% on 1 April 2015 by Najib — was abolished on 1 June 2018. The replacement Sales and Services Tax (SST) at 5–10% (depending on category) was introduced 1 September 2018.

The GST-to-SST transition was politically popular but fiscally consequential: revenue from GST (RM44 billion in 2017) significantly exceeded SST revenue (RM27 billion in 2019) — producing a structural revenue gap that constrained the 2018–2020 budget framework.

The petrol-subsidy framework was partially restored: the Mahathir government implemented a targeted-subsidy framework intended to help lower-income households while phasing out blanket subsidies. Implementation through 2018–2020 was incomplete.

3.5 The Anwar Royal Pardon

On 16 May 2018 Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Muhammad V granted a full royal pardon to Anwar Ibrahim, on Mahathir's recommendation. The pardon restored Anwar's right to hold federal office immediately. Anwar was released from Cheras Rehabilitation Hospital the same afternoon.

The pardon was the central political-coalition constitutional act of the post-GE14 transition. It was unanimous: not contested by any coalition partner; not contested by the Conference of Rulers; not contested by the federal-government legal framework. The pardon's eventual implementation (Anwar's October 2018 Port Dickson by-election victory and November 2018 PKR Presidency) produced the PM-designate framework that the Sheraton Move would subsequently displace.

4. The Reform Agenda (2018–2019)

4.1 The Institutional-Reform Framework

The PH government's institutional-reform agenda through 2018–2019 covered:

Constitutional Reform: Limiting executive power; restoring Sabah-Sarawak constitutional rights under the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63); adjusting federal-state relations.
Anti-Corruption Reform: MACC (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission) institutional independence; Whistle-blower protection; political-funding transparency.
Police Reform: The IPCMC (Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission) bill — central reform commitment.
Judicial Reform: Restoration of judicial independence; review of constitutional-amendment-era judicial-decision framework.
Parliamentary Reform: Standing Orders changes; the Parliamentary Services Act revival; Select Committees institutional development.
Economic Reform: Fiscal consolidation; targeted subsidy framework; SME support.

The reform agenda was substantial; implementation was constrained by parliamentary process; intra-coalition negotiation; and fiscal limitations.

4.2 The IPCMC Bill

The Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC) bill was introduced in Parliament in July 2019. The bill provided for an independent body to investigate police misconduct — a reform first recommended by the 2005 Royal Commission on Police but not implemented by the Najib government.

The bill faced sustained opposition from the Royal Malaysia Police senior leadership and from the Bersatu and UMNO factions of the Cabinet. By February 2020 the bill had been substantially diluted; the post-Sheraton Move government did not advance the bill. The bill was eventually implemented in modified form in 2024 [TBD-VERIFY exact form].

4.3 The MA63 Implementation

The Malaysia Agreement 1963 implementation framework was a central PH manifesto commitment. The MA63 had granted Sabah and Sarawak distinct constitutional positions; over decades these had been progressively eroded. The PH government's framework included:

The Special Cabinet Committee on the Implementation of MA63 chaired by the Prime Minister.
Constitutional amendments to restore certain MA63 provisions.
Equitable revenue-sharing frameworks for Sabah and Sarawak.

Implementation through 2018–2020 was partial. The constitutional amendments were tabled but not all enacted before the Sheraton Move.

4.4 The Education-Sector Reform

The Education Ministry under Maszlee Malik (2018–2019) attempted reforms including:

Black school shoes to white policy reversal (2018).
Free breakfast programme initiation.
Khat (Jawi script) curriculum introduction (controversial; produced significant non-Malay-community opposition).
University-Senate intervention framework (controversial).

Maszlee's Khat policy and broader educational-political-cultural framework produced sustained political contestation; he resigned on 2 January 2020 (subsequently replaced by Wan Azizah, in addition to her Deputy PM role, until end of February 2020).

4.5 The Fiscal Framework

Lim Guan Eng's Finance Minister tenure (2018–2020) operated under significant fiscal-deficit pressure. The 2018, 2019, and 2020 budgets each addressed:

Revenue gap from GST abolition.
Federal debt-servicing continued.
1MDB-related contingent liabilities crystallisation.
Targeted subsidy framework development.

The 2020 Budget (tabled 11 October 2019) projected RM297 billion expenditure with a 3.2% deficit-to-GDP ratio. The post-Sheraton Move government substantially modified the 2020 framework.

5. Foreign Policy

5.1 The China Reset

The Mahathir government foreign-policy through 2018 included a significant China reset. Three China-related infrastructure projects were cancelled or suspended in July 2018:

East Coast Rail Link (ECRL): original RM55 billion contract with China Communications Construction Company (CCCC); cancelled July 2018; renegotiated 12 April 2019 at RM44 billion (20% reduction); reinstated.
Trans-Sabah Gas Pipeline (TSGP): RM5.35 billion; cancelled.
Multi-Product Pipeline (MPP): RM4.06 billion; cancelled.

The cancellations were announced by Mahathir at a 21 August 2018 press conference in Beijing during his official China visit. The Chinese government accommodated the renegotiations; the bilateral relationship continued correctly.

5.2 The Mahathir-Erdogan-Imran Khan Trilateral

In December 2019 Mahathir convened the Kuala Lumpur Summit (KL Summit) — a Muslim-state foreign-policy coordination meeting. The summit was attended by leaders including Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Turkey), Imran Khan (Pakistan), and Hassan Rouhani (Iran). Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt did not attend; the summit produced significant diplomatic-political contestation.

The KL Summit's stated agenda included Muslim-state coordination on Palestine, Kashmir, and the Rohingya crisis. The summit's actual political-cultural significance was the formation of an alternative Muslim-state diplomatic framework distinct from the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation). The summit's continued operation post-Sheraton Move has been limited.

5.3 The 2018 New Zealand Mosque Shootings

After the 15 March 2019 New Zealand mosque shootings (Christchurch attacks), Mahathir's response included a 30 March 2019 statement on his blog characterising the attacks as a consequence of Western Islamophobia. The statement attracted international attention and continuing political-cultural contestation. The statement's positioning continued his decades-long anti-Zionist and anti-Western-imperialism political-cultural framework.

5.4 The Israel-Palestine Positioning

Mahathir's anti-Zionist political positioning continued through the second tenure. The 2018-2020 government maintained Malaysia's non-recognition of Israel. The September 2019 Mahathir UN General Assembly speech included sustained criticism of Israeli policy; the speech was characterised by Israeli and pro-Israel commentators as anti-Semitic.

5.5 The ASEAN Engagement

Mahathir's ASEAN engagement through 2018–2020 was correct. He attended the 33rd ASEAN Summit (November 2018, Singapore); the 34th ASEAN Summit (June 2019, Bangkok); the 35th ASEAN Summit (November 2019, Bangkok). The ASEAN-China engagement and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea negotiation continued.

6. The Sheraton Move (February 2020)

6.1 Pre-Sheraton Tensions (Mid-2019 – Early 2020)

The intra-PH factional tensions through mid-2019 to early 2020 covered:

The Mahathir-Anwar PM-transition pact non-execution. By mid-2019 the post-2018 commitment to handover within "two years" was approaching. Mahathir's public-position varied: at times affirming the pact; at times suggesting timing was at his discretion; at times suggesting Anwar would not be the right successor.
The Bersatu-PH coalition tensions: Bersatu Supreme Council under Muhyiddin Yassin developed alternative-coalition options. Reports of Bersatu's discussions with UMNO and PAS through late 2019 surfaced in the press.
The Azmin Ali-Anwar tensions: Azmin Ali (PKR Deputy President; Economic Affairs Minister) had long-running tensions with Anwar. Through 2019 the Azmin faction's political-coalition options included alignment with Bersatu.
The 11 February 2020 Bersatu Supreme Council meeting: Bersatu Supreme Council members discussed coalition framework options. Reports surfaced of approaches to UMNO and PAS.

6.2 The 23 February 2020 Sheraton Hotel Meeting

On the evening of 23 February 2020, approximately 130 MPs gathered at the Sheraton Hotel Petaling Jaya. Attending parties included: Bersatu (under Muhyiddin); UMNO leadership; PAS leadership; PKR-Azmin-faction MPs; selected smaller parties.

The meeting's stated purpose was discussion of an alternative Malay-Muslim coalition government. The meeting was reported in real-time by Malaysian press; the Malaysiakini live-blog of the meeting became a defining political-historical document.

6.3 The 24 February 2020 Mahathir Resignation

On 24 February 2020 — the day after the Sheraton meeting — Mahathir submitted his resignation as Prime Minister to Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Abdullah of Pahang at the Istana Negara at approximately 1:00 PM. The resignation was accepted; Mahathir was concurrently appointed Interim Prime Minister at approximately 5:00 PM the same day.

Bersatu and ten PKR MPs (the Azmin Ali faction) announced their withdrawal from Pakatan Harapan the same day. The PH government had effectively collapsed.

6.4 The 24–28 February 2020 Constitutional Process

The post-resignation constitutional process:

24 February 2020 (5:00 PM): Mahathir appointed Interim PM by the Agong.
25 February 2020: Multiple political-coalition manoeuvres; Anwar continued claiming PH-coalition support; Bersatu engaged with UMNO, PAS, and others.
25 February 2020: Mahathir made an extended televised address explaining his resignation as a response to the Sheraton-Move framework; he characterised the framework as containing UMNO members from the Najib-1MDB era.
26 February 2020: The Yang di-Pertuan Agong personally interviewed each of the 222 MPs at the Istana Negara — an unprecedented constitutional process — to determine which MP commanded majority support.
27 February 2020: The audit continued.
28 February 2020: The Yang di-Pertuan Agong determined that no single candidate commanded majority support based on the audit.
29 February 2020: Further negotiations.
1 March 2020: The Yang di-Pertuan Agong appointed Muhyiddin Yassin as Prime Minister, having determined that Muhyiddin commanded majority support.

The royal-audit framework was constitutionally unprecedented; some constitutional-law scholars characterised it as expanding the King's role; others characterised it as appropriate exercise of royal discretion under Articles 40(2)(a) and 43(2)(a).

6.5 Mahathir's Account of the Sheraton Move

Mahathir's subsequent account (in his 2021 book Capturing Hope and in extensive 2020–2025 statements) frames the Sheraton Move as:

Initiated by Bersatu's Muhyiddin faction without Mahathir's authorisation — a "betrayal" by Muhyiddin and his Supreme Council allies.
Driven by Bersatu's perceived Anwar-aversion and the alternative-coalition framework with UMNO/PAS.
Producing his resignation as a principled response to the Bersatu-faction's framework — refusing to govern alongside UMNO members from the Najib-1MDB era.

Critics' framings counter:

Mahathir's pact-execution reluctance was the precipitating condition.
The PKR-Azmin faction was politically aligned with Bersatu through late 2019 — a configuration Mahathir tolerated.
The resignation as Interim PM preserved Mahathir's strategic-political position relative to a post-Anwar-handover scenario.

The political-historical contestation about the motivational structure continues.

7. Post-Resignation Period (March 2020 – Present)

7.1 Mahathir's Bersatu Expulsion

On 28 May 2020 Bersatu expelled Mahathir and the Mahathir-faction members (including Mukhriz Mahathir) from the party. Mahathir, who had been Bersatu Chairman since 2016, characterised the expulsion as a political-coup orchestrated by Muhyiddin.

Through 2020 Mahathir operated as an independent MP for the Langkawi seat. His public-political voice continued through his blog (chedet.cc), media interviews, and parliamentary speeches.

7.2 The August 2020 Pejuang Founding

Parti Pejuang Tanah Air (Pejuang — the Heroes of the Homeland Party) was founded on 7 August 2020. Founding members included Mahathir (Chairman), Mukhriz Mahathir (President), Syed Saddiq (former Youth Minister, dismissed from Bersatu), and others.

Pejuang's political identity was Malay-nationalist, similar to Bersatu but distinguished by anti-Muhyiddin and anti-UMNO positioning. Pejuang did not contest GE15 as a separate political-coalition; it operated as an independent fourth-party framework.

7.3 The November 2022 GE15 Langkawi Defeat

Mahathir contested GE15 (19 November 2022) as Pejuang chairman in the Langkawi constituency. The result:

Mohd Suhaimi Abdullah (PN-PAS): 25,463 votes (winner).
Naimah Khalid (BN-UMNO): 8,206 votes.
Mahmood Zuhdi Abdul Majid (PH): 4,627 votes.
Mahathir Mohamad (Pejuang): 4,566 votes.

Mahathir's fourth-place finish — losing his deposit (less than one-eighth of the total vote) — was the first time he had lost an election in Malaysian history. His political career had spanned 1959 (his first election victory in Kota Setar Selatan) to 2022 (the Langkawi defeat) — 63 years.

7.4 Continuing Political-Cultural Voice (2022–2025)

Mahathir's post-GE15 political-cultural voice has emphasised:

Criticism of the Anwar Madani government: sustained public criticism of policy decisions, coalition framework, and political direction.
Anti-Sultan-Ibrahim-of-Johor positioning: contestation of the post-2024 federal-state-Royal-Court framework.
Foreign-policy continuity: anti-Israel, anti-Western-imperialism positioning.
Continued blog posts and media engagement through chedet.cc and other platforms.

In June 2024 Mahathir was admitted to the National Heart Institute (Institut Jantung Negara, IJN) for treatment; he was released after several days of monitoring. His health through 2025 has been variable; he has continued limited public-political engagement.

7.5 Mahathir Among Living Former Malaysian PMs

As of mid-2025, Malaysia has six living former Prime Ministers:

Mahathir Mohamad (born 10 July 1925; 99 years old).
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (born 26 November 1939; 85 years old).
Najib Razak (born 23 July 1953; 71 years old; in Kajang Prison or under disputed house-arrest framework).
Muhyiddin Yassin (born 15 May 1947; 77 years old).
Ismail Sabri Yaakob (born 18 January 1960; 65 years old).
Anwar Ibrahim (born 10 August 1947; 77 years old; current PM).

This pattern of six living former PMs is unusual in Malaysian history; previously most retired PMs died within a few years of leaving office. The pattern reflects the post-1981 institutional stability and the post-2018 pattern of shorter premierships.

8. Contested Record

8.1 The Mahathir-Anwar Pact's Non-Execution

The 2018 Mahathir-Anwar PM-transition pact's non-execution is the central contested political-historical question of the second tenure. Mahathir's framing: the pact was contingent on political-coalition stability that was undermined by Anwar's faction's political-political manoeuvring. Anwar's framing: the pact was a clear commitment that Mahathir progressively reneged on through 2019.

The empirical-evidentiary record supports both framings on different aspects: the formal pact terms were never publicly documented; the political-coalition tensions were real on multiple fronts; the timing-execution question was layered with real-world political-coalition dynamics.

8.2 The Sheraton Move Responsibility

The Sheraton Move's political-coalition responsibility has been variously characterised. Mahathir's framing places primary responsibility on Bersatu's Muhyiddin Supreme Council and the PKR-Azmin faction. Critics' framing places responsibility on Mahathir's pact-execution reluctance creating the political-conditions for the alternative-coalition framework.

The factual record establishes: the Sheraton meeting occurred; Bersatu's Muhyiddin faction was a central actor; the PKR-Azmin faction was a participant; UMNO and PAS were participants. The motivational interpretation continues to be contested.

8.3 The 2020 Royal-Audit Framework

The Yang di-Pertuan Agong's 26–28 February 2020 audit of MP support letters was an unprecedented constitutional process. Defenders frame the process as appropriate exercise of royal discretion under Articles 40(2)(a) and 43(2)(a). Critics frame the process as expanding royal political-role beyond historical norms.

The constitutional-law contestation continues. The post-2020 royal-audit framework has been deployed in subsequent post-2020 federal-government formations (Ismail Sabri appointment August 2021; Anwar appointment November 2022) — the institutional pattern is now established.

8.4 Mahathir's Reform-Agenda Implementation

The 2018–2020 reform-agenda implementation has been variously assessed. Defenders cite the 1MDB prosecutions; the Anwar pardon; the GST abolition; the institutional establishment of the CEP and the 1MDB RCI. Critics cite the IPCMC bill's dilution; the parliamentary-reform bills' non-enactment; the constitutional-amendment-agenda's non-completion.

The Sheraton Move's pre-emption of the second half of the planned reform-agenda is an empirical fact; whether the reform-agenda would have been completed absent the Sheraton Move is a counterfactual question.

8.5 Mahathir's Political-Cultural Legacy Contestation

Mahathir's broader political-cultural legacy — across both tenures — continues to be contested. His defenders cite the post-1981 development trajectory; his critics cite the 1987 Operation Lalang, the 1988 judicial crisis, the 1998 Anwar episode. The post-2018 second-tenure framework has not significantly changed the broader-legacy contestation.

9. Conclusion

Mahathir Mohamad's second premiership (10 May 2018 – 1 March 2020) was 21 months and 19 days — the shortest among completed Malaysian premierships in the 21st century but consequential in disproportion to its duration. The GE14 victory ended six decades of UMNO-led federal government; the Najib prosecutions activated; the Anwar pardon executed; the Council of Eminent Persons established; the 1MDB Royal Commission of Inquiry instituted.

The Sheraton Move on 24 February 2020 ended the second tenure prematurely. The Mahathir-Anwar PM-transition pact was not executed; the post-PH political-coalition arithmetic from March 2020 to November 2022 was a sequence of three governments (Muhyiddin, Ismail Sabri, Anwar) each governed by post-Sheraton coalition combinations.

Mahathir's continuing political-cultural voice through 2022–2025 has remained a feature of Malaysian politics. His Pejuang founding; his GE15 Langkawi loss; his sustained criticism of the Anwar Madani government; his continuing engagement with foreign-policy questions — these have continued his decades-long political-public role.

The 2018–2020 second tenure's institutional and political legacy is mixed. The 1MDB prosecutorial framework continues (Najib in Kajang Prison; main 1MDB trial continuing; covered in MY-H-PM-06). The Anwar PM-designate framework executed in November 2022 (post-GE15) — a delayed completion of the 2018 PM-transition pact's intent. The post-2020 royal-audit framework has institutionalised a new constitutional-political role for the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

Mahathir Mohamad — 99 years old as of mid-2025 — remains the central figure of post-1981 Malaysian political history. His second premiership represents both the apotheosis and the prelude to displacement of his political career.

MY-A-01: Merdeka and the Alliance Coalition
MY-B-02: Mahathir Mohamad's First Premiership
MY-B-04: 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis
MY-B-05: Anwar Ibrahim's Sacking and First Trials
MY-D-04: 2018 Pakatan Harapan Government
MY-D-05: Anwar Ibrahim Premiership (2022–present)
MY-J-04: 1MDB — Three Accounts (when written)
MY-C-03: 2018 Decision to Recommend Royal Pardon for Anwar (when written)
MY-K-10: 2020 Decision to Resign (Sheraton Move) (when written)
MY-H-PM-04: Mahathir Mohamad — full biography (when written)
MY-H-PM-05: Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
MY-H-PM-06: Najib Razak
MY-H-PM-08: Muhyiddin Yassin (when written)
MY-H-PM-10: Anwar Ibrahim

11. External Sources and Further Reading

Primary

Mahathir Mohamad, Capturing Hope (MPH, 2021).
Hansard — Malaysia Parliamentary Debates 2018–2020.
Pakatan Harapan Manifesto 2018 (Buku Harapan).
Royal Commission of Inquiry into 1MDB Final Report (2020).
chedet.cc (Mahathir's blog).

Reportage

Malaysiakini — sustained 2018–2020 coverage; Sheraton Move live-blog.
The Edge Malaysia — sustained 2018–2020 coverage.
Reuters, Bloomberg, Financial Times — international coverage 2018–2020.

Academic

Bridget Welsh, sustained 2018–2020 commentary.
James Chin, sustained 2018–2020 commentary.
Khoo Boo Teik, post-2018 essays on the Mahathir-2 government.
Wan Saiful Wan Jan, post-2018 commentary on coalition dynamics.

Document complete (DRAFT, pending Tier 1 audit). Approximately 6,800 words across 11 sections. Cross-references forward-declared. TBD-VERIFY tags applied to: precise IPCMC 2024 implementation framework; Mahathir health-status updates 2024-2025; specific 2020 royal-audit MP-interview details.

Last updated: 2026-05-02. Document code MY-H-PM-07.

MY-D-02: The Pakatan Harapan Government (May 2018 – February 2020)
MY-E-JHR-03: Forest City — The Country Garden / Iskandar Waterfront Joint-Venture Megaproject (2014–pre
MY-E-JHR-05: The Johor–Singapore RTS Link (1990–2027)
MY-F-02: Malaysia and Singapore — Permanent Structural Bilateral
MY-F-JHR-01: The 1962 Water Agreement and the 2061 Expiry (1927–2061)
MY-H-PM-03: Hussein Onn (Third Prime Minister, 1976–1981)
MY-H-PM-09: Ismail Sabri Yaakob (Ninth Prime Minister, 2021–2022)
MY-K-07: The 2020 Sheraton Move (23 February – 1 March 2020)
MY-K-08: The 2022 GE15 Result and Unity Government Formation (19–24 November 2022)