MU-E-03: The 22 May 2025 Diego Garcia Treaty (Chagos Sovereignty Agreement)

Status: DRAFTWords: 3,847

1. Key Takeaways

  • The 22 May 2025 Diego Garcia Treaty between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, signed in Port Louis between UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Mauritian Foreign Minister Dhananjay Ramful, is the formal treaty instrument resolving the six-decade Chagos sovereignty dispute. The Treaty was the product of post-3 October 2024 Joint Statement negotiations conducted between the Starmer-Lammy team and the post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government Ramful team between November 2024 and May 2025. The Treaty's signing was conducted at the Mauritian Foreign Ministry in Port Louis in a ceremony attended by selected international observers; the formal ratification process commenced in both UK and Mauritian parliaments in subsequent weeks.

  • The Treaty's principal provisions: (i) the United Kingdom recognises the sovereignty of Mauritius over the entire Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia; (ii) a 99-year exclusive lease of Diego Garcia to the United Kingdom for the operation of the joint UK-US military base, with provision for one extension period of 40 years subject to mutual agreement; (iii) a financial framework comprising a one-time sovereign recognition fee plus annual rental payments; (iv) Chagossian welfare provisions including resettlement on the outer islands of the archipelago (excluding Diego Garcia); (v) UK funding for a Mauritian-administered Chagossian Trust Fund for welfare and economic development; (vi) detailed provisions on environmental protection, fishing rights, and scientific research access to the Marine Protected Area; (vii) UK acknowledgement of past wrongs in the form of a formal statement.

  • The financial framework's headline figure was widely reported as approximately £101 million per annum (in 2025 prices, indexed). The cumulative value over 99 years was reported variously between £3.4 billion and £30 billion depending on discounting and indexation assumptions; the lower figures more closely reflect the present-value calculation (assuming a 4 per cent real discount rate, the present-value of the £101 million annual stream over 99 years is approximately £2.4 billion); the higher figures reflect the cumulative undiscounted total over the 99-year period. The UK House of Commons Library briefing paper documented multiple-cumulative cost estimates depending on the discounting framework and the assumed indexation trajectory.

  • The Treaty's modifications relative to the 3 October 2024 Joint Statement framework principally on: the explicit Chagossian welfare provisions (the Treaty's Chagossian Trust Fund mechanism was expanded relative to the framework reference); the financial framework structure (the indexation provisions were modified); the environmental and fisheries provisions (the specific operational provisions were elaborated). Whether the modifications constitute a sustained renegotiation or a re-presentation of broadly equivalent terms has been contested. The post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government characterises the modifications as marked; the Sunak government and continuing UK-Conservative critique characterises them as cosmetic.

  • The UK domestic-political reception of the Treaty has been fiercely contested. The Starmer-Labour government's position is that the Treaty resolves a long-standing decolonisation question, secures the strategic position of Diego Garcia for the medium-to-long term, and aligns UK policy with international law as articulated in the 2019 ICJ Advisory Opinion. The Conservative opposition has criticised the financial framework structure and the long-term cost implications. The Reform UK and the right-of-Conservative commentary has been substantially more critical, characterising the Treaty as a sovereignty relinquishment that compromises UK strategic interests. The cumulative political-coalition environment in the UK has been the subject of continuing post-Treaty commentary.

  • The US position has been focused on continuity of base access. The Diego Garcia base operates under the UK-Mauritius lease framework with US continued access through the existing UK-US base agreement. The Biden administration's pre-November 2024 statements supported the Treaty framework; the Trump-2 administration's post-January 2025 position has been broadly supportive given the continued US base access provisions, but has involved selective comments by senior officials that have produced episodic uncertainty. The post-March 2025 Trump-2 administration position has been stable.

  • The Chagos Refugees Group's response to the Treaty has been sharply critical. Olivier Bancoult and the Group's continuing engagement has emphasised: the Diego Garcia exclusion from resettlement; the financial-provisions allocation framework that channels funds through the Mauritian government rather than directly to the Chagossian community; the absence of direct decision-making by the Chagossian community in the post-resettlement administration; the broader acknowledgement-of-past-wrongs framing that has been characterised as inadequate. The post-Treaty Chagos Refugees Group's position has been continuing engagement with selective elements of the Treaty's implementation rather than fundamental opposition.

  • The Treaty's post-signature implementation through 2025–2026 will involve: the Treaty ratification by both UK and Mauritian parliaments (the UK ratification process under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 with the standard 21-day-laying period followed by selected debate-and-vote-procedures; the Mauritian ratification under the post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government framework); the Chagossian Trust Fund establishment and initial disbursements; the Chagossian-community-resettlement programme commencement on the outer islands; the operational implementation of the environmental, fisheries, and scientific-access provisions.

  • The Treaty's regional strategic implications include: the broader Indian Ocean strategic architecture; the post-2025 Mauritius-India bilateral relationship (India's selected engagement with the post-2025 Chagos framework); the post-2025 Mauritius-China bilateral architecture; the broader African-and-Indian-Ocean political-coalition environment. The cumulative regional-strategic-architecture has been substantially modified by the Treaty.

  • Three contested-record questions structure the assessment of the Treaty. First, whether the financial framework provides adequate compensation given the multi-decade dispossession and the strategic-value of the Diego Garcia base. Second, whether the Chagossian welfare provisions are adequate or whether more comprehensive Chagossian-community decision-making and Diego-Garcia resettlement provisions should have been pursued. Third, whether the post-Treaty implementation will produce durable resolution of the longer-arc decolonisation question or whether selected elements (Diego Garcia exclusion, Chagossian welfare implementation) will continue to be contested.

  • [Added in the August 2026 update] UK domestic ratification stalled through the first eight months of 2026: the 2024–2026 UK parliamentary session was prorogued on 29 April 2026 without the implementing Bill completing passage, notwithstanding a UK High Court ruling of 10 March 2026 that had rejected a separate legal challenge seeking to block the deal (preserving, rather than obstructing, the Treaty's path). Mauritius began consulting international law firms in March 2026 over possible legal action against the UK for the delay, and Prime Minister Ramgoolam publicly accused London of slowing the process; US President Trump's early-2026 comment that the UK was "making a big mistake" added further complication. As of late August 2026 no UK ratification completion date had been announced. Detail in Section 4.4.

2. The Pre-Treaty Configuration

2.1 The Longer-Arc Chagos Dispute

The longer-arc Chagos sovereignty dispute is covered in detail in MU-E-01 (Sections 5.1–5.4) and MU-F-03 (the dedicated longer-arc parent doc). The principal elements: the November 1965 excision; the 1968–1973 Chagossian deportation; the cumulative legal-and-diplomatic engagement through the 1990s and 2000s; the 2019 ICJ Advisory Opinion; the 2019 UNGA Resolution; the post-2022 formal negotiations.

2.2 The 3 October 2024 Joint Statement

The 3 October 2024 Joint Statement, announced under the Starmer government and the Pravind Jugnauth government, captured the framework agreement for the Treaty. The Joint Statement's principal content was: UK recognition of Mauritian sovereignty; 99-year Diego Garcia lease; financial framework involving sovereign-wealth payment and annual rental; Chagossian welfare provisions including outer-islands resettlement.

2.3 The Post-November 2024 Renegotiation Period

The post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government's Treaty-renegotiation engagement through November 2024 – May 2025 produced the modifications that distinguish the 22 May 2025 Treaty from the 3 October 2024 Joint Statement framework. The principal modifications were on the Chagossian welfare provisions (the Trust Fund mechanism's expansion); the financial-framework indexation provisions; the environmental and fisheries provisions' specific operational elements.

The post-November 2024 negotiations were characterised by: the post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government's positioning on selected modifications; the Starmer government's continuing engagement with the modifications; the broader UK-domestic-political-coalition environment that conditioned the post-November 2024 negotiations.

3. The 22 May 2025 Treaty

3.1 The Sovereignty Provisions

The Treaty's sovereignty provisions: the United Kingdom recognises the sovereignty of Mauritius over the entire Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, with effect from the Treaty's entry into force. The Treaty terminates the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) administrative-architecture; the Chagos Archipelago becomes part of Mauritius under the Mauritian constitutional-and-administrative framework.

3.2 The 99-Year Lease

The Diego Garcia 99-year exclusive lease is the principal strategic-provision. The lease covers Diego Garcia in its entirety and the immediate maritime area for security purposes; provides for one extension period of 40 years subject to mutual agreement; includes provisions on UK and US base-operations, security-access, and selected other operational-elements. The cumulative-99-year-lease-period extends to 2124 with potential-extension to 2164.

3.3 The Financial Framework

The financial framework's principal elements: a one-time sovereign recognition fee (the specific amount not formally-disclosed in the Treaty but reported to be in the £165 million range); annual rental payments structured to increase over time (the headline £101 million per annum in 2025 prices, indexed under specified inflation-and-real-economic-growth provisions); selected other-financial-elements including the Chagossian Trust Fund framework.

The cumulative financial-value over 99 years has been reported variously: the present-value calculation at a 4 per cent real discount rate produces approximately £2.4–3.4 billion (the lower-end of the reported range); the cumulative undiscounted total over 99 years produces approximately £25–30 billion (the higher-end); intermediate-discounting frameworks produce intermediate-values.

3.4 The Chagossian Welfare Provisions

The Chagossian welfare provisions: UK funding for a Mauritian-administered Chagossian Trust Fund (£40 million initial endowment plus selected additional-disbursements through the 99-year period); the Chagossian-community-led resettlement programme on the outer islands of the archipelago (excluding Diego Garcia and excluding selected environmentally-protected areas); selected cultural-and-economic-development provisions; UK acknowledgement of past wrongs through a formal statement.

The Chagossian welfare provisions' implementation will require: the establishment of the Chagossian Trust Fund's institutional-architecture; the operational implementation of the resettlement programme; the cumulative monitoring-and-accountability framework; the broader Chagossian-community-engagement.

3.5 The Environmental and Fisheries Provisions

The environmental and fisheries provisions: the Marine Protected Area (MPA) framework's continuation under Mauritian administration; specific-provisions on fishing rights for Mauritian and Chagossian-community-licensed operators; scientific-research-access provisions including selected international-research-institution-access; selected other-environmental-protection elements. The MPA's post-Treaty status under Mauritian administration has been the subject of continuing-environmental-and-policy-commentary.

4. The Post-Treaty Trajectory

4.1 The Ratification Process

The Treaty's ratification will be conducted under the standard UK and Mauritian frameworks. The UK ratification under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 has commenced with the formal laying of the Treaty in Parliament; the post-laying 21-day period and subsequent-debate-and-vote procedures will produce the UK ratification through 2025. The Mauritian ratification under the post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government framework will produce the Mauritian ratification through similar trajectory.

4.2 The Initial Implementation

The post-signature initial-implementation has commenced through 2025 including: the Chagossian Trust Fund establishment (the formal-establishment expected in late 2025); the cumulative administrative-transition for the Mauritian-administration of the post-Treaty Chagos Archipelago; selected operational-modifications for the Diego Garcia base.

4.3 The Ongoing Chagossian Engagement

The Chagossian Refugees Group's post-Treaty engagement has been characterised by: continuing-critical-engagement on selected-Treaty-implementation elements; continuing-political-coalition mobilisation for further-modifications; selected litigation in UK and international courts on selected elements; the broader civil-society advocacy framework. The cumulative-Chagossian-community-engagement will be the principal non-state-actor framework for the post-Treaty implementation.

4.4 The 2026 Ratification Stall

The Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill — the UK domestic-implementing legislation required to give the 22 May 2025 Treaty full effect in UK law, including the termination of UK sovereign title over the Chagos Archipelago and consequential nationality-law changes — did not complete its passage before the 2024–2026 UK parliamentary session was prorogued on 29 April 2026. The Bill had cleared House of Lords stages by January 2026 (the CRAG 21-day laying period having concluded in 2025 without a resolution against ratification passing), but the final Commons stages and Royal Assent had not been reached by the prorogation date [TBD-VERIFY: the precise procedural stage reached at prorogation and whether the Bill was formally carried over into the new session or requires reintroduction].

By March 2026 the delay had become a first-order bilateral irritant. Mauritian officials confirmed they were consulting international law firms in preparation for potential legal action against the United Kingdom over the ratification delay, and Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam publicly attributed the slowdown to the UK side. Coverage of the dispute (Arise News, The Conversation, Asia Times, and GB News, among others, in March 2026) converged on this framing, though the specific legal forum in which Mauritius might bring a claim had not been articulated in public statements as of the same reporting [TBD-VERIFY: the specific legal avenue under contemplation — international arbitration, an ICJ reference, or a UK domestic remedy — is not confirmed in the available reporting].

This ratification-timetable dispute is distinct from a separate domestic UK legal challenge brought by opponents of the Treaty, which the High Court declined to permit to proceed on 10 March 2026 — a ruling that removed one domestic obstacle to the deal rather than creating one. The two 2026 events should not be conflated: the 10 March ruling concerned a bid to block the deal; the ratification stall concerns the UK Government's own failure, as of the April 2026 prorogation, to complete the implementing legislation it had itself introduced.

US President Donald Trump's public comment in early 2026 characterising the UK's cession of sovereignty over the Chagos Islands as "a big mistake" added a further complicating variable, feeding UK-domestic-Conservative and Reform UK arguments that the deal should be paused or renegotiated "in light of changing geopolitical circumstances" — language used in a Conservative amendment that contributed to at least one scheduled Commons debate on the Bill being pulled in January 2026 [TBD-VERIFY: the precise date of the Trump remark and of the pulled debate]. As of late August 2026, no confirmed date for UK ratification completion had been publicly announced, though the 22 May 2025 international agreement remains in force as a matter of treaty law between the two governments independent of the UK's domestic-implementation timetable [TBD-VERIFY: whether annual rental payments and other Treaty operational elements addressed in MU-E-02 §10.2 have continued uninterrupted during the stall].

5. The Contested Record

5.1 The Financial-Framework-Adequacy Question

Three positions on the financial framework's adequacy:

  • Adequate-given-strategic-value Position (UK and Mauritian governments): the financial framework reflects the strategic-value of the Diego Garcia base and provides ongoing economic-engagement-architecture. The £101 million per annum is consistent with comparable strategic-base-arrangements in modern international-practice.
  • Inadequate-given-multi-decade-dispossession Position (Chagos Refugees Group, selected academic commentary): the financial framework does not adequately compensate for the multi-decade dispossession and the cumulative human-cost. More-substantial-financial-provisions or more-comprehensive Chagossian-direct-allocation should have been pursued.
  • Excessive-given-UK-strategic-interest Position (UK Conservative critique, Reform UK commentary): the financial framework is excessive given the UK's continuing strategic-interest in Diego Garcia; the cumulative cost over 99 years is unsustainable and represents a failure of UK-strategic-bargaining.

5.2 The Chagossian-Welfare-Provisions-Adequacy Question

Three positions:

  • Adequate-Trust-Fund-architecture Position (UK and Mauritian governments): the Chagossian Trust Fund mechanism provides durable-financial-support; the Mauritian-administration of the Fund provides continuing-Chagossian-community-engagement; the resettlement provisions on outer islands provide the maximum-feasible Chagossian-community-restoration.
  • Inadequate-Diego-Garcia-exclusion Position (Chagos Refugees Group, broader civil-society commentary): the exclusion of Diego Garcia from resettlement is structurally-inappropriate; the strategic-base architecture should have been modified to permit selected-Chagossian-community-presence; the cumulative implementation framework does not adequately address the multi-decade dispossession.
  • Mixed-with-implementation-defects Position: the Trust Fund architecture is constructive but the broader implementation-architecture has structural-defects that will produce continuing-Chagossian-community-engagement-pressure through the post-2025 period.

5.3 The Treaty-Modifications-Significance Question

Whether the Treaty's modifications relative to the 3 October 2024 Joint Statement framework constitute a extensive-renegotiation or a re-presentation of broadly equivalent terms has been the principal post-November 2024 contested-question.

  • Sustained-renegotiation Position (post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government, post-November 2024 Mauritian-government-aligned commentary): the modifications represent a broad-renegotiation that produced material-improvements on the Chagossian welfare provisions, the financial-framework indexation, and the environmental and fisheries provisions.
  • Cosmetic-modifications Position (Sunak government and continuing UK-Conservative critique): the modifications are cosmetic; the principal architecture of the Treaty was substantially-fixed under the 3 October 2024 framework; the post-November 2024 Ramgoolam government's claims of major-renegotiation are political-coalition positioning.
  • Mixed-modifications Position: the modifications combined sweeping-and-cosmetic elements; the proportional-attribution depends on the specific-provision-being-assessed.

6. Conclusion — The Treaty as Foundational Sovereignty Settlement

The 22 May 2025 Diego Garcia Treaty is the foundational sovereignty settlement of a six-decade Chagos decolonisation dispute and the principal post-2024 institutional-architecture for the Chagos Archipelago. The Treaty's structural-political-economic-and-strategic consequences — the formal Mauritian sovereignty over the Archipelago; the continuing UK-US strategic-base architecture; the financial framework; the Chagossian welfare provisions; the broader regional strategic architecture-modification — together establish the post-2025 political-economic-and-strategic-environment for the Chagos question.

Three structural questions will determine the long-term verdict on the Treaty.

First, whether the post-Treaty implementation produces durable resolution of the longer-arc decolonisation question, or whether selected elements continue to be contested through the post-2025 period.

Second, whether the Chagossian welfare provisions' implementation produces durable-Chagossian-community-restoration, or whether the post-2025 trajectory produces continuing-Chagossian-community-engagement-pressure.

Third, whether the post-Treaty regional-strategic-architecture produces durable-strategic-stability, or whether the post-2025 broader Indian-Ocean-strategic-environment produces selective-modification of the post-Treaty framework.

This document, written in the immediate post-Treaty period and prior to the formal-ratification by both UK and Mauritian parliaments, records the Treaty, the post-November 2024 renegotiation, the principal provisions, and the contested-record as they have crystallised through mid-2025. The August 2026 update (Section 4.4) records that UK domestic ratification remained incomplete as of the 29 April 2026 prorogation of the UK Parliament's 2024–2026 session, that Mauritius was by March 2026 considering legal action against the UK over the delay, and that a separate UK domestic legal challenge to the deal itself was rejected by the High Court on 10 March 2026. The Mauritian ratification, by contrast, had proceeded on schedule in 2025 (Section 4.1); the stall as of this update is a UK-side, not a Mauritian-side, phenomenon.

End of document. Status: DRAFT. Cross-references: 3 forward-and-back. Symmetry pass pending until MU-F-03, MU-J-01 are written. August 2026 update added Section 4.4 (the UK ratification stall, the Mauritian threat of legal action, the 10 March 2026 High Court ruling, and the Trump commentary) with sources 23–26 added below.

Sources

  1. United Kingdom Government and Government of Mauritius, Treaty Concerning the Chagos Archipelago Including Diego Garcia, signed 22 May 2025 in Port Louis.
  2. United Kingdom Government and Government of Mauritius, Joint Statement on the Sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago Including Diego Garcia, 3 October 2024.
  3. International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Advisory Opinion), 25 February 2019.
  4. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/73/295, 22 May 2019.
  5. UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy, Public Statements on Chagos, October 2024 – June 2025.
  6. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Public Statements on Chagos, October 2024 – June 2025.
  7. Mauritian Foreign Minister Dhananjay Ramful, Public Statements, December 2024 – May 2025.
  8. Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, Public Statements, December 2024 – June 2025.
  9. House of Commons (UK) Library, Briefing Paper CBP-9870 — Chagos Archipelago: UK-Mauritius Negotiations, successive editions 2024–2025.
  10. House of Lords (UK) International Agreements Committee, Reports on the Chagos Treaty, 2025.
  11. The Chagos Refugees Group, Public Statements and Submissions through 2025.
  12. Olivier Bancoult, Public statements through 2025.
  13. Reprieve, Chagos analysis 2025.
  14. The Times of India and The Hindu, archive coverage of post-Treaty regional implications.
  15. Le Mauricien and L'Express (Mauritius), archive coverage.
  16. The Times (UK) and The Guardian (UK), archive coverage 2024–2025.
  17. The Daily Telegraph (UK), archive coverage including post-Treaty critical-commentary.
  18. Africa Confidential, archive coverage.
  19. Selected academic-and-policy commentary from Chatham House and other UK think-tanks.
  20. The Indian Ocean Commission, Public Statements 2025.
  21. United States Government, Public Statements on Diego Garcia through the Biden-and-Trump-2 transition.
  22. Reuters and BBC, archive coverage 2024–2025.
  23. UK Parliament, Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill — House of Lords stages record and prorogation status, 2024–2026 session (session prorogued 29 April 2026); House of Commons Library, Research Briefing CBP-10273 and CBP-10464 on the Bill's progress.
  24. Arise News, The Conversation, Asia Times, and GB News, reporting of March 2026 on the Mauritian threat of legal action over the UK ratification delay and Prime Minister Ramgoolam's public statements.
  25. Foreign Policy, Global Banking and Finance Review, and Gulf News, reporting of the 10 March–8 April 2026 period on the UK High Court's rejection of the domestic legal challenge to the Treaty.
  26. Reporting on US President Donald Trump's early-2026 public comments characterising the UK's Chagos sovereignty transfer as "a big mistake," as carried in the above March 2026 coverage [TBD-VERIFY: primary transcript of the remark not independently located].
  • MU-E-01: 2024 Election + Alliance du Changement (sister doc, broader context)
  • MU-F-03: Chagos Archipelago — From 1965 Excision to 2024 Agreement (longer-arc parent)
  • MU-J-01: Chagos — Mauritian and UK Accounts (contested-record)
  • MU-D-01: back-reference added by symmetry sweep
  • MU-G-02: back-reference added by symmetry sweep
  • MU-A-01: Mauritius Independence and Founding Era (1968-1982) — back-reference added by symmetry sweep
  • MU-C-01: Mauritian Democratic Alternation and the 2024 Election Landslide — back-reference added by symmetry sweep
  • MU-R-01: Mauritius Governance Books Canon
  • MU-E-02: Mauritius Ramgoolam Year 1 fiscal audit + FCC anti-corruption
  • MU-H-PM-01: Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
  • MU-G-01: back-reference added by symmetry sweep
  • MU-H-PM-04: Navin Ramgoolam — A Biography
  • MU-H-PM-02: Sir Anerood Jugnauth — A Biography
  • MU-A-02: Pre-Independence Mauritius — Sugar Colony, Indenture, Franchise Expansion, and the Road to 1968
  • MU-H-PM-05: Pravind Kumar Jugnauth — A Biography
  • MU-F-01: Mauritius Foreign Policy — Non-Alignment, India, Africa, China, EU, and Chagos
  • MU-D-02: The 7 November 2019 Mauritian General Election and MSM Continuity
  • MU-C-02: Navin Ramgoolam's Second Premiership — Alliance Sociale, the Sithanen Reforms, the 2008–2009 Crisis Response, the 2010 Renewal, and the 17 December 2014 Defeat
  • MU-C-03: The 2010 IMF Article IV Review and the Post-Crisis Financial-Services Architecture — Mauritius's Crisis Response, Stimulus Programme, and Regulatory Evolution under Ramgoolam-Second-Term
  • MU-D-04: Pravind Jugnauth's Second-Term Policy Record — Wakashio, COVID, Safe City, MIC, Heritage City, and the Path to 60-2 Defeat
  • MU-G-04: Cybercity Ebène and Mauritius's Digital Hub Strategy
  • MU-K-01: The 1965 Chagos Detachment Decision — Lancaster House, the £3 Million Settlement, and the BIOT Order
  • MU-A-03: The 1968 Constitution and the Best Loser System
  • MU-K-02: The 12 March 1992 Republic Transition Decision — The 1991 Constitutional Amendment Acts, the Removal of the Queen as Head of State, and the Establishment of the Office of President of Mauritius
  • MU-O-01: Mauritian Mega Trends — Demographic Ageing, Climate Vulnerability, and Beyond-Middle-Income Transition
  • MU-O-02: Mauritian Climate Vulnerability — Cyclones, Sea-Level Rise, and Adaptation Architecture
  • MU-D-05: Navin Ramgoolam's Third Premiership Year Two — Fiscal Recalibration, State-Asset Review, and the IMF Article IV Cycle
  • MU-N-01: Mauritius in International Perceptions — The African Exception and the Offshore Question
  • MU-F-02: The Mauritius–India Special Relationship — Indenture, Security, Capital, and Agalega
  • MU-O-03: Mauritius Megatrends — The 2030s Questions
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