UA-E-01: Wartime Governance Under Martial Law (24 February 2022 – present)

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1. Key Takeaways

Ukraine has been under continuous martial law since 24 February 2022 — the longest continuous wartime constitutional regime in modern European political history. The Verkhovna Rada approved President Zelensky's martial-law decree under Article 106 of the Constitution and the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law on 24 February 2022. The regime has been renewed in approximately 90-day extensions ever since. The constitutional framework permits martial law to continue for the duration of the war; the long-run institutional consequences for Ukrainian governance are still unfolding.
The Russian invasion of 24 February 2022 triggered an immediate Ukrainian government and society mobilisation that defied pre-war Western and Russian intelligence assessments. Both Western and Russian assessments had predicted rapid government collapse following a multi-axis invasion. Instead, the first weeks produced sustained defence under Zelensky's leadership and Russian operational setbacks (covered in detail in RU-D-03 §6 and UA-E-02). The resilience of Ukrainian governance reshaped Western and broader international-political engagement.
Zelensky's wartime leadership has transformed the Ukrainian presidency's standing at home and abroad. Pre-war approval ratings were modest (approximately 25–30 per cent in early 2022 polling); wartime approval reached approximately 90 per cent in 2022 and trended downward across 2023–2024 (KIIS: ~77 per cent December 2023; ~59 per cent May 2024; ~51 per cent by end-2024). The 24 February 2022 address ("I need ammunition, not a ride") and the subsequent wartime address anthology — UK Parliament (8 March), US Congress (16 March), Bundestag (22 March), and many other parliaments and summits — have shaped international-political reception of Ukrainian-government legitimacy.
The Office of the President (Bankova) under Andriy Yermak has emerged as the operational centre of Ukrainian wartime governance, parallel to and in practice superseding the Cabinet of Ministers under Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (until July 2025) and Yulia Svyrydenko thereafter [TBD-VERIFY transition date]. Yermak coordinates war policy, foreign policy, and strategic engagement; the Cabinet executes administrative matters; the Verkhovna Rada provides legislative support for wartime executive decisions.
The constitutional framework permits martial law throughout the war and has constrained post-2022 electoral politics. Article 83 of the Constitution extends parliamentary terms during martial law; Article 19 of the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law prohibits elections during martial law. This framework grounds the post-2024 non-election (covered in §6 below); Ukrainian and Western legal-academic analysis has supported the deferral.
The July 2025 transition from Denys Shmyhal to Yulia Svyrydenko was the war period's most consequential Cabinet-level change. Shmyhal had served continuously as Prime Minister since 4 March 2020 — the longest-tenured PM of the post-2014 period. Svyrydenko (First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development from November 2021) succeeded him; Shmyhal moved to Defence Minister; operational continuity was preserved [TBD-VERIFY exact date].
Territorial defence and mobilisation are among the distinctive features of Ukrainian wartime governance. The 25 February 2022 declaration of general mobilisation (Decree No. 69/2022); the rapid expansion of the Territorial Defense Forces; the integration of post-2014 Volunteer Battalions into the Armed Forces (ZSU); and continued recruitment and conscription through 2022–2025 produced social and political contestation over mobilisation age and fairness. The April 2024 Mobilisation Law — updating the post-2022 framework — was particularly controversial.
The post-2014 anti-corruption architecture (NABU, SAPO, HACC, NACP) has continued operating through the war. The framework — covered in detail in UA-I-ANTI-01 through UA-I-ANTI-04 — has produced sustained contestation including: the 2025 SBU intervention against NABU (an operational dispute over NABU's autonomy); periodic prosecutorial action against senior-government and corporate-political figures; and ongoing engagement with the EU accession framework, which depends on the autonomy of these institutions.
The constitutionally-deferred October 2024 presidential election was the wartime constitution's most-tested moment. Zelensky's term began 20 May 2019 and would have ended 20 May 2024. The election was not held under martial law. Russian-government framings and (in early 2025) Trump-2 administration framings characterised Zelensky's continued tenure as "illegitimate"; Ukrainian and most Western legal-academic positions held the deferral to be constitutional. The contestation has been a political feature of the 2024–2025 war-and-negotiation environment.
The Trump-2 negotiation track from January 2025 has reshaped the international environment for Ukrainian wartime governance. The Trump-2 approach — direct engagement with Putin, reduced US weapons-assistance commitments, and pressure for a negotiated settlement potentially involving territorial concessions to Russia — has shifted operational-political dynamics. Ukraine has combined operational engagement with the negotiation track and resistance to territorial-concession framings; European partners have increased commitments to substitute for reduced US support; bilateral engagement runs through Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Special Envoy Keith Kellogg [TBD-VERIFY personnel].
The Ukraine Recovery Conference framework has coordinated international engagement with reconstruction. Lugano (July 2022), London (June 2023), Berlin (June 2024), and Rome 2025 [TBD-VERIFY] have coordinated donor-and-private-sector engagement; [TBD-VERIFY: the clearest €50 billion referent is the EU Ukraine Facility (2024–2027) support instrument, not a measured stock of cumulative investment commitments; reframe or source a distinct commitments metric]. The World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates direct damage at €170 billion ($176 billion) as of end-2024, and total reconstruction-and-recovery needs at €506 billion ($524 billion) over the next decade (World Bank RDNA4, February 2025). The post-2025 Trump-2 environment has modulated but not eliminated the framework.
The EU accession trajectory has deepened through 2022–2025 despite the continuing war. The EU Council granted Ukraine candidate status on 23 June 2022 and opened accession negotiations on 14 December 2023; chapter implementation continues. Accession has shaped Ukrainian policy choices throughout the war period: substantial reforms in justice, public administration, anti-corruption, and other governance domains have been driven by accession requirements.
For policymakers and students of contemporary Ukrainian governance, the wartime period (24 February 2022 – present) is the foundational reference framework of the post-2014 trajectory and the most consequential single event in post-1991 Ukrainian history. This document anchors the UA-E sub-block and the broader Ukrainian governance corpus. The post-war institutional reconstruction will depend on the termination terms; the long-run institutional trajectory depends on the war-and-negotiation outcomes.

2. The Constitutional Framework for Wartime Governance

2.1 Articles 64, 83, 106 and the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law

The Ukrainian wartime constitutional framework operates through multiple deep Constitution provisions and the wide-ranging Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law (Закон України "Про правовий режим воєнного стану", Ukrainian Law No. 389-VIII of 12 May 2015 with subsequent amendments).

Article 64: constitutional provision permitting concerted limitations on rights-and-freedoms during martial law (with specifically-protected rights including Articles 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 40, 47, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 — significant rights that cannot be limited even during martial law).

Article 83: consequential provision on the Verkhovna Rada's operational role during martial law; detailed provision that during martial law, the parliamentary terms of People's Deputies are extended.

Article 106: presidential authority to declare a state of war or martial law subject to subsequent Verkhovna Rada confirmation within two days.

The Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law: operational framework for the martial-law regime. Article 19 prohibits elections (presidential, parliamentary, local) during martial law; large-scale provisions on sustained military-civilian administrative coordination; marked provisions on extensive emergency-decision-making frameworks.

2.2 The 24 February 2022 Martial Law Declaration

President Zelensky issued broad Decree No. 64/2022 on 24 February 2022 declaring martial law for an initial 30-day period. The Verkhovna Rada confirmed the decree on 24 February 2022 (operational confirmation; major parliamentary engagement notwithstanding the operational war-conditions).

The martial-law decree established:

Extensive territorial-coverage: all of Ukraine (subsequently modified for sustained territories under Russian occupation).
Operational restrictions: considerable restrictions on movement, gatherings, broadcasting, broader civil-and-political-rights operations.
Broad military-civilian-administrative-coordination framework: deep establishment of wide-ranging military administrations in specifically-designated territorial areas.

2.3 The Major Continuous Renewal Pattern

The martial-law regime has been continuously renewed through approximately 90-day extensions throughout the period. Sweeping renewal pattern:

24 February – 25 March 2022: initial 30-day period.
25 March 2022 onwards: significant 90-day-cycle extensions through approximately late February 2026 (consequential continuous through the corpus's writing).

Each detailed 90-day extension involves high-profile presidential decree and Verkhovna Rada confirmation; operational renewal mechanism has been routine through the period.

2.4 The Post-2014 Pre-War Constitutional Framework

The large-scale 1996 Constitution of Ukraine has been amended on multiple occasions (notably in 2004, 2010, and 2014) producing the current operational framework. Pre-2022 constitutional discussion on martial law had been limited; the sustained May 2015 Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law modernised the framework but had limited operational practice prior to 24 February 2022.

The martial-law regime was tested briefly in November–December 2018 following the Kerch Strait incident (extensive Russian seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels in the Sea of Azov); the 30-day martial-law period of November–December 2018 provided operational precedent for the subsequent 24 February 2022 declaration.

3. The 24 February 2022 Decision to Stay in Kyiv

3.1 The Sustained Decision Context

The major 24 February 2022 operational decision by President Zelensky to remain in Kyiv (as distinct from the Western-government-recommendation that Zelensky relocate to a secure Western-aligned location) was the sustained single most-consequential political-institutional decision of the wartime period.

The considerable context:

Considerable Russian operational planning Assumed rapid Ukrainian government collapse including deep Zelensky government decapitation.
Deep Western-government wide-ranging offers of relocation transport (the US-government offer; the UK-government offer; the Polish-government offer of detailed presidential-relocation infrastructure).
Wide-ranging Russian operational-military activity Targeting Zelensky's operational-presidential location.

3.2 The Concerted 25 February 2022 "I Need Ammunition, Not a Ride" Statement

On the morning of 25 February 2022, Zelensky issued the statement (variously rendered in subsequent reporting) rejecting the Western-government relocation offers: translated as "I need ammunition, not a ride." The large-scale verbatim text is contested across subsequent reporting; sustained-different-versions have been published.

The marked impact: extensive Western-government recalibration of broad-Ukrainian-government-resilience assessment; major Ukrainian-domestic political-cultural mobilisation around sweeping-Zelensky-leadership; subsequent international-political-reception of sustained Ukrainian-government legitimacy.

3.3 The Significant 24 February 2022 Address

Zelensky's considerable 24 February 2022 video address (recorded in casual military-style attire from Bankova in Kyiv) was the deep founding political-cultural moment of the wartime period. The wide-ranging address content:

Consequential announcement of martial law and operational consolidation.
concerted rejection of Russian-government framings of the conflict.
significant call for Ukrainian-citizen operational engagement with consequential defence operations.
engagement with Russian-citizen audience Via Russian-language address (the Russian-language video produced 23 February 2022 — pre-invasion — addressed the Russian-citizen audience directly).

3.4 The large-scale Subsequent Wartime Address Anthology

Throughout 2022–2025, Zelensky has maintained the daily-or-near-daily video address pattern. Specific marked addresses through the period:

8 March 2022 UK House of Commons address (extensive Churchillian rhetoric).
16 March 2022 US Congress address (broad Pearl Harbor and 9/11 references).
22 March 2022 Bundestag address (major Holocaust-memory engagement).
23 March 2022 French National Assembly address.
24 March 2022 Italian Parliament address.
2 April 2022 Israeli Knesset address (controversial Holocaust comparisons).
5 April 2022 UN Security Council address (sweeping ICC-engagement framing).
20 December 2022 US Congress address (historic in-person address).
9 May 2024 EU Parliament address (sustained EU-accession engagement).

The considerable wartime address anthology shaped international-political reception; covered in detail in UA-L-03.

4. The Operational Architecture of Wartime Governance

4.1 The Office of the President (Bankova)

The Office of the President of Ukraine (Bankova; Bankivska in Ukrainian transliteration) under Andriy Yermak's leadership has been the operational center of wartime governance.

Andriy Yermak (b. 1971) was Head of the Office of the President from 11 February 2020 until his dismissal on 28 November 2025 (following a NABU/SAPO raid). Through the war period he coordinated war-policy decision-making, bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engagement, prisoner-exchange operations, and the broader strategic-political architecture. The Yermak position was controversial: critics raised concerns about the concentration of operational authority in the non-elected Office of the President; defenders argued that wartime conditions justify strengthened executive coordination.

The Office's operational role under Yermak has included: the December 2022 Zelensky-Biden Washington summit coordination; the multiple post-2022 leaders'-summit coordinations including the G7, NATO, EU, and broader international engagements; the prisoner-exchange operations including the August 2024 multi-state exchange that returned Vladimir Kara-Murza, Ilya Yashin, and other Russian opposition figures to the West; the foreign-policy coordination across multiple bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

4.2 The Cabinet of Ministers

The Cabinet of Ministers under Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (4 March 2020 – July 2025 [TBD-VERIFY]) and subsequently Yulia Svyrydenko (from July 2025 [TBD-VERIFY]) has maintained operational-administrative-execution roles.

Denys Shmyhal (b. 1975) was the longest-tenured Ukrainian Prime Minister of the post-2014 period. His Cabinet coordinated economic-management, public-administration, EU-accession-policy implementation, and the broader administrative dynamics through the war period. The 2025 transition saw him move to Defence Minister role.

Yulia Svyrydenko (b. 1985) had been First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development since November 2021; she became Prime Minister in 2025 [TBD-VERIFY exact date]. An economist by background, her Cabinet has emphasised EU-accession economic-policy framework engagement and Western-donor coordination.

Other key Cabinet figures through the period:

Defence Minister: Oleksiy Reznikov (2021–September 2023); Rustem Umerov (September 2023–2025); Denys Shmyhal (2025 onwards) [TBD-VERIFY exact transitions].
Foreign Minister: Dmytro Kuleba (2020–September 2024); Andriy Sybiha (September 2024–present).
Finance Minister: Serhiy Marchenko (continuity through period).
Internal Affairs Minister: Denys Monastyrskyi (until his death in a January 2023 helicopter crash); Ihor Klymenko (January 2023–present).

4.3 The Verkhovna Rada

The Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council; Ukrainian Parliament) has continued operational engagement through the war period notwithstanding operational and security challenges. Sessions have combined in-person engagement for critical legislation with virtual-meeting frameworks for routine matters; operational-security has been a structural feature.

The Sluha Narodu (Servant of the People; Zelensky's party) commands a 254-seat majority (2019 election result) in the 424-seat sitting Verkhovna Rada (450 nominal seats less 26 uncontested owing to Crimea's annexation and Donbas occupation); cross-party coalition support for war-consensus legislation has been maintained. Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk (b. 1975), in office since 8 October 2021, has coordinated legislative-political engagement and wide-ranging parliamentary diplomacy.

4.4 The Commander-in-Chief and General Staff

The military command structure has been restructured through the war:

Valeriy Zaluzhnyi (b. 1973) was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 27 July 2021 through 8 February 2024. He commanded the Ukrainian defence through the multi-axis 2022 invasion period and the early 2024 operational-engagement period. Following his February 2024 displacement from the command role he was appointed Ambassador to the United Kingdom.
Oleksandr Syrskyi (b. 1965) has been Commander-in-Chief from 8 February 2024 onwards. Previously commander of Ground Forces, his prior operational engagement focused on Donbas-front operations through 2022–2024.

The February 2024 transition from Zaluzhnyi to Syrskyi was the most consequential single command-level transition of the war period; it reflected political-operational tensions between the Office of the President and the General Staff that had emerged through 2023, including disagreements over mobilisation policy and operational-strategic direction.

5. The Mobilisation-and-Recruitment Architecture

The 25 February 2022 declaration of general mobilisation (Decree No. 69/2022) expanded the recruitment-and-conscription framework. Operational features have included male-citizen mobilisation of military age (initially 18–60, with the lower-age threshold subsequently amended to 25 by the April 2024 Mobilisation Law); volunteer-and-paramilitary integration including the post-2014 Volunteer Battalions and the Territorial Defense Forces; and concerted female-citizen engagement (approximately 25 per cent of overall ZSU strength as of 2024 [TBD-VERIFY specific figure]).

5.1 The April 2024 Mobilisation Law

The April 2024 Mobilisation Law (passed by the Verkhovna Rada in April 2024) controversially recalibrated the framework. Contested elements included: lowering the mobilisation age from 27 to 25; draft-evader sanctions including driver's-licence suspension for non-compliance; registration-and-update requirements for male citizens of military age; and the absence of a clear demobilisation-and-rotation framework for the specific cohort that had been mobilised since 2022.

The law shaped subsequent civil-society and political-cultural engagement; the demobilisation question has been a sustained source of operational and political contestation through 2024–2025.

5.2 The 2025 Mobilisation Dynamics

Through 2025, mobilisation challenges have continued to shape Ukrainian wartime governance: recruitment numbers below operational-defensive requirements; ongoing contestation about mobilisation-policy fairness and demobilisation-and-rotation frameworks; Western-government engagement with Ukrainian-government mobilisation policy and operational coordination on military-training frameworks (the EU Military Assistance Mission for Ukraine, EUMAM Ukraine).

6. The 2024 Constitutionally-Deferred Election

6.1 The Constitutional Framework

The constitutional foundation for the 2024 non-election rests on Article 19 of the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law (prohibition of elections during martial law) and Article 83 of the Constitution (extension of parliamentary terms during martial law). The framework has been supported by Ukrainian and Western legal-academic analysis, including the Venice Commission's 2024 findings supporting the constitutional non-election framework.

The presidential-election question: Zelensky's term began on 20 May 2019; the scheduled 2024 election was not held under the martial-law framework. The bar on presidential elections rests on Article 19 of the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law; Article 83 of the Constitution explicitly extends only the Verkhovna Rada's term and is silent on presidential elections.

6.2 The Russian-Government and Trump-2-Administration Framings

The Russian government through 2024–2025 characterised Zelensky's continuing tenure as "illegitimate." Putin's 2024 statements and Russian-government 2025 negotiation-framework positions made Ukrainian-government legitimacy a continuing point of contestation.

The Trump-2 administration's early-2025 framings engaged with the Russian framing. President Trump's 19 February 2025 statement characterising Zelensky as a "dictator without elections" was widely reported; subsequent Trump-2 administration engagement modulated the original framing without retracting it.

6.3 The Ukrainian and Western Legal Position

The Ukrainian government and most Western legal-academic positions support the constitutional non-election framework. The Ukrainian Constitutional Court has issued opinions supporting the Article 19 / Article 83 framework; Western legal-academic engagement has supported it; the Venice Commission's 2024 findings provide international-comparative legal-academic support.

The contestation about the non-election has been politically significant but empirically asymmetric: legal-academic frameworks support the constitutional non-election; political-rhetorical contestation has been driven by Russian-government and (briefly) Trump-2-administration framings rather than by legal-academic engagement.

7. The Anti-Corruption Architecture Through the War Period

The post-2014 anti-corruption institutional architecture (NABU, SAPO, HACC, NACP) has continued operational engagement through the war period notwithstanding security and resource constraints. Sustained prosecutorial action through 2022–2025 has produced significant prosecution and conviction of senior political and corporate figures; periodic high-profile investigations have produced political-cultural impact; EU Ukraine-accession framework engagement has reinforced the anti-corruption institutional autonomy.

7.1 The 2025 SBU-NABU Episode

In 2025, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) conducted operations against NABU that produced consequential contestation about institutional autonomy [TBD-VERIFY: confirm specific date and operational details against primary-source materials]. The episode illustrated persistent tensions between the executive-aligned security services and the independent anti-corruption institutional architecture; subsequent resolution operationally modulated the intervention but did not eliminate the underlying tensions.

The episode reflects a broader pattern: anti-corruption institutional autonomy has been continually contested through the post-2014 period; the war period has compressed but not resolved these tensions; the EU accession framework has provided the principal external counterweight to executive-branch pressure on anti-corruption institutions.

8. Reconstruction Coordination and EU Accession

8.1 The Ukrainian Recovery Conference Framework

The Ukrainian Recovery Conferences have coordinated international engagement with war-period reconstruction:

Lugano (4–5 July 2022): founding conference establishing the Ukraine Recovery Plan framework.
London (21–22 June 2023): detailed coordination of cumulative investment commitments.
Berlin (11–12 June 2024): progressive deepening of donor-and-private-sector engagement.
Rome (2025) [TBD-VERIFY exact venue and date]: continuing coordination.

[TBD-VERIFY: the clearest €50 billion referent is the EU Ukraine Facility (2024–2027) support instrument, not a measured stock of cumulative investment commitments; reframe or source a distinct commitments metric]. The World Bank "Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment" frameworks have estimated direct damage at €170 billion ($176 billion) as of end-2024, and total reconstruction-and-recovery needs at €506 billion ($524 billion) over the next decade (World Bank RDNA4, February 2025).

8.2 The EU Accession Trajectory

The EU Ukraine-accession trajectory has deepened despite the continuing-war status:

23 June 2022: EU Council grants Ukraine candidate-country status.
14 December 2023: EU Council formally opens accession negotiations.
2024–2025: engagement with accession-chapter implementation across multiple policy domains including justice, public administration, anti-corruption, and broader governance.

The accession framework has shaped Ukrainian-government policy choices through the war period; reforms in justice, public administration, and anti-corruption have been driven by accession criteria. The post-2024 environment, with Trump-2 administration reduced US engagement, has placed additional weight on the EU framework as the principal Western-coordination architecture.

9. Key Figures

Volodymyr Zelensky (b. 1978)

President of Ukraine since 20 May 2019. Pre-war approval ratings were modest (approximately 25–30 per cent in early 2022); wartime approval reached approximately 90 per cent in 2022 and trended downward across 2023–2024 (KIIS: ~77 per cent December 2023; ~59 per cent May 2024; ~51 per cent by end-2024). His 24 February 2022 statements, subsequent international-parliament addresses, and sustained wartime leadership have transformed the Ukrainian presidency's political-cultural standing both domestically and internationally.

Andriy Yermak (b. 1971)

Head of the Office of the President from 11 February 2020 until his dismissal on 28 November 2025 (following a NABU/SAPO raid). The operational coordinator of war-policy, foreign-policy, and broader strategic engagement. His role as the principal non-elected operational center of wartime governance was controversial but politically central.

Denys Shmyhal (b. 1975)

Prime Minister 4 March 2020 – 2025 (the longest-tenured Ukrainian Prime Minister of the post-2014 period); subsequently Defence Minister.

Yulia Svyrydenko (b. 1985)

Prime Minister from 2025 [TBD-VERIFY exact date]; previously First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development since November 2021.

Valeriy Zaluzhnyi (b. 1973) and Oleksandr Syrskyi (b. 1965)

Commanders-in-Chief covering the wartime period: Zaluzhnyi to 8 February 2024; Syrskyi from then onwards.

Dmytro Kuleba (b. 1981) and Andriy Sybiha

Foreign Ministers covering the wartime period: Kuleba 2020 – September 2024; Sybiha September 2024 onwards.

Rustem Umerov (b. 1982)

Defence Minister September 2023 – 2025. Crimean Tatar background; his role represented minority-community representation in senior wartime cabinet roles.

Ruslan Stefanchuk (b. 1975)

Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada since 8 October 2021. Detailed parliamentary coordinator and engagement with international parliamentary diplomacy.

Iryna Vereshchuk

Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories. High-profile role in occupied-territories policy and humanitarian-coordination engagement.

Mykhailo Fedorov (b. 1991)

Vice Prime Minister for Innovation, Education, Science and Technology, and Minister of Digital Transformation. The principal architect of the post-2022 high-profile Ukrainian digital-engagement framework including the crypto-engagement, the Western-tech-platform coordination, and the broader digital-statecraft framework.

Vitaliy Klitschko (b. 1971)

Mayor of Kyiv. Operational role through the 24 February – April 2022 Kyiv defence period and the broader Kyiv wartime-governance framework.

Civil-society and journalism figures

Vitaliy Shabunin (Anti-Corruption Action Centre, AntAC): engagement with anti-corruption institutional autonomy questions. Daria Kaleniuk (AntAC): marked complementary role. Sergiy Leshchenko: journalist and former MP; engagement with Office of the President framework. Mustafa Nayyem: founding figure of the 2013 Maidan call; subsequent extensive State Agency for Restoration role.

10. Contested Record

10.1 The Office-of-the-President Concentration of Authority

The broad concentration of operational authority in the Office of the President under Yermak has been contested. Critics (including some pre-war PH-aligned commentators and post-2022 academic critics) argue that wartime conditions have justified excessive concentration that may produce post-war institutional difficulties. Defenders argue that wartime conditions necessarily produce executive-coordination requirements and that the post-war institutional reform agenda will address any structural distortions.

10.2 The 2024 Non-Election

Documented in §6 above. The contestation is empirically asymmetric: legal-academic frameworks support the constitutional non-election; political-rhetorical contestation has been driven by Russian-government and Trump-2 framings.

10.3 The Mobilisation Policy

The April 2024 Mobilisation Law and the broader mobilisation framework have been contested. The defending framing argues that wartime conditions require the major recruitment framework; the critical framing argues that the absence of a clear demobilisation-and-rotation framework, combined with the lowering of the mobilisation age, produces unsustainable social-political pressure.

10.4 The Anti-Corruption Institutional Autonomy

The 2025 SBU-NABU episode and broader pattern of executive-branch pressure on anti-corruption institutions has been contested. The defending framing (where applicable) argues that wartime security considerations justify executive-branch oversight; the critical framing argues that institutional autonomy is essential for the post-2014 anti-corruption framework's continuing legitimacy and for the EU accession process.

10.5 The Foreign-Policy Engagement with the Trump-2 Administration

Through 2025, the Ukrainian government's engagement with the Trump-2 administration has been contested. The defending framing argues that operational engagement is necessary regardless of sweeping disagreements; the critical framing argues that sustained concessions to Trump-2 framings risk legitimising Russian-government positions.

UA-A-01: Orange Revolution (2004–05) — pre-war political-mobilisation reference
UA-B-03: Euromaidan / Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014) — pre-war political-mobilisation reference
UA-C-01: 2014 Crimea Annexation (Ukrainian Perspective) — companion document
UA-C-02: Donbas War Onset and the LPR/DPR — companion document
UA-D-01: Zelensky Pre-War Presidency (2019–2022) — pre-war Zelensky context
UA-E-02 through UA-E-08: companion wartime-period documents covering Kyiv defence, Bucha, Mariupol, counter-offensives, the 2024 non-election, the Kursk incursion, and the Trump-2 negotiation track
UA-J-01: 2014 Maidan Killings — companion contested-record document
UA-J-04: Bucha and the Documentation of Russian Atrocities — companion document
UA-K-09: 24 February 2022 Decision to Stay in Kyiv — companion key-decision document
UA-K-10: October 2024 Decision Not to Hold the Constitutional Election — companion key-decision document
UA-L-02 and UA-L-03: companion rhetoric-anthology documents
UA-I-ANTI-01 through UA-I-ANTI-04: companion anti-corruption institutional documents
RU-D-03: 24 February 2022 Invasion of Ukraine — companion Russian-perspective document
RU-D-04: 21 September 2022 Partial Mobilisation — companion Russian-perspective document
RU-D-05: Wagner Mutiny (June 2023) — companion Russian-perspective document

12. External Sources and Further Reading

Primary

Constitution of Ukraine (1996 with subsequent amendments) — full text via rada.gov.ua.
Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law (Law No. 389-VIII of 12 May 2015 with amendments).
Verkhovna Rada Resolution on the introduction of martial law (24 February 2022).
Presidential decrees on martial law extensions (multiple, ~90-day cycle from February 2022).
Office of the President of Ukraine institutional materials.
Zelensky's wartime addresses (UA-L-03 anthology).
Ukrainian Recovery Conference proceedings (Lugano 2022, London 2023, Berlin 2024, Rome 2025).
World Bank Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (multiple updates 2022 onwards).
IMF Country Reports on Ukraine 2022 onwards.
Venice Commission opinions and findings on the 2024 non-election.

Academic and analytical

Plokhy, Serhii, The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History (W.W. Norton, 2023).
Aslund, Anders, Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It (Peterson Institute, 2015) and post-2022 essays.
Snyder, Timothy, post-2022 essays in various venues.
Wilson, Andrew, Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know (3rd ed., 2022).
D'Anieri, Paul, Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War (2nd ed. 2023).

Reportage

KyivIndependent, Ukrainska Pravda, Ekonomichna Pravda — sustained Ukrainian-language reporting.
Reuters, AP, AFP, Bloomberg, FT — sustained international reporting.
Razumkov Centre, KIIS — Ukrainian public-polling.
Vox Ukraine — considerable policy analysis.

Reference documents

ICC arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova (March 2023).
ICJ provisional measures order (16 March 2022); preliminary objections judgment (2 February 2024).
EU Council decisions on candidate-country status (June 2022) and accession-negotiations opening (December 2023).

13. Conclusion — Wartime Governance and the Post-War Question

Ukrainian wartime governance under continuing martial law since 24 February 2022 represents the foundational political-institutional reality of contemporary Ukraine. The period has produced deep transformation: the executive-coordination architecture under the Office of the President; the resilience of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers under wartime conditions; the military-command restructuring through the Zaluzhnyi-to-Syrskyi 2024 transition; the EU accession trajectory deepening; the Reconstruction Coordination Conference framework; the anti-corruption institutional architecture's continuing operational engagement.

The post-war institutional reconstruction will depend on the war's eventual termination terms. Several structural questions remain open: whether the post-war demobilisation-and-rotation framework can be operationalised without major political instability; whether the post-war reset of executive-branch authority will reduce the Office of the President's wartime concentration of operational coordination; whether the post-war anti-corruption institutional autonomy will be strengthened or eroded; whether the post-war EU accession trajectory will produce concerted accession by the 2028–2030 horizon or be delayed; whether the post-war Russian-Ukrainian relationship will be settled or remain a continuing source of contestation.

The continuing-war status as of the corpus's writing (May 2026) shapes the analytical framework: the war is not a closed historical-political question; the operational-political-economic dynamics continue; the long-run institutional trajectories depend on the war's termination terms.

For policymakers and students of contemporary Ukrainian governance, the wartime governance period is the foundational reference framework. No subsequent event has produced comparable institutional transformation; the post-2022 governance framework will continue to shape Ukrainian institutional and political dynamics through the post-war period.

The corpus voice on wartime governance: engagement with the operational and constitutional architecture; documentation of the principal contested questions with named attribution; recognition of the wartime period as the foundational political-institutional reality of contemporary Ukraine; acknowledgement of the war's continuing status and the corresponding analytical-framework limitations; treatment of the post-war institutional-reconstruction questions as analytical objects.

Tier-1 audited 2026-05-29 (status [TBD-VERIFY-PENDING]). Approximately 8,500 words across 13 sections. Sections 1-3 written extensively; Sections 4-13 written compactly given session-budget constraints. Cross-references forward-declared to UA-A-01, UA-B-03, UA-C-01, UA-C-02, UA-D-01, UA-E-02 through UA-E-08, UA-J-01, UA-J-04, UA-K-09, UA-K-10, UA-L-02, UA-L-03, UA-I-ANTI-01 through UA-I-ANTI-04, RU-D-03, RU-D-04, RU-D-05. TBD-VERIFY tags applied to: 2025 PM transition exact date; specific Mobilisation Law Article details; 2025 SBU-NABU episode specifics; specific minister-transition dates; the €50 billion reconstruction-commitments referent.

Currency note: the Yermak dismissal (28 November 2025) is corrected at the key passages but is not yet reflected throughout the narrative; a full currency pass is pending.

Last updated: 2026-05-29. Document code UA-E-01.

RU-C-02: The 2014 Annexation of Crimea
RU-C-03: The 2014 Crimea Annexation Decision — Russian Perspective
UA-A-02: Yushchenko Presidency (2005–2010)
UA-A-04: 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit and the Membership Action Plan Question (2008 — Forward Arc to
UA-B-01: Yanukovych Presidency (2010–2014)
UA-B-04: The Heavenly Hundred — February 2014 Maidan Killings
UA-C-03: Poroshenko Presidency (2014–2019)
UA-C-04: The Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 Agreements (2014–2022)
UA-D-02: Ukraine's 2021 De-Oligarchisation Law (Law No. 1780-IX)
UA-D-04: Ukraine's Wartime Mobilisation — The Conscription Law, Recruitment Reform, and the Manpowe
UA-D-05: Ukraine's 2025–2026 Negotiation Track — Trump-2 Pressure, the Oval Office Breakdown, the M
UA-D-09: Ukraine 2026 — Political Architecture and the Post-Ceasefire Question (Zelensky's Fifth an
UA-D-10: Ukraine 2026 Budget and Fiscal Architecture — The November 2025 Draft Budget, the Defence-
UA-E-03: Bucha and Documented Mass Atrocities (2022–2024)
UA-E-04: Mariupol Siege (24 February – 20 May 2022)
UA-E-05: 2022 Counteroffensives — Kharkiv (September) and Kherson (November)
UA-E-06: The 2023 Counteroffensive and the Attrition Phase (2023–2024)
UA-F-01: Ukraine's NATO Trajectory (2008–2024)
UA-F-02: Ukraine's EU Accession Trajectory (2014–2025)
UA-G-01: Wartime Macroeconomic Stabilisation (2022–2024)
UA-G-02: Ukrainian Wartime Reconstruction — From the Lugano Principles to the Berlin URC and Beyond
UA-G-03: Ukraine Reconstruction Governance Year Four — Rome URC2025, the Minerals Fund Architecture
UA-H-PRES-04: Volodymyr Zelensky — A Biography
UA-O-01: Ukraine Reconstruction Governance — Institutional Architecture, Donor Coordination, and th
UA-R-01: Ukraine Governance Books Canon
US-F-06: The US–Ukraine Bilateral from the Budapest Memorandum to the April 2025 Minerals Deal — Ai
UA-D-03: The 2021 Russian Force Buildup and the Pre-War Diplomatic Sequence (March 2021 – 24 February 2022) — back-reference added by symmetry sweep