PE-D-03: The December 2022 – 2023 Boluarte-Era Protests

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1. Key Takeaways

  • The post-7-December-2022 protest cycle was the deadliest political-protest episode in Peru since the 1980s–1990s internal-armed-conflict period documented by the Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR). The Defensoría del Pueblo's mid-2023 cumulative tally recorded 49 direct protest-related deaths in the December 2022 – April 2023 window (plus 11 protest-adjacent deaths). Amnesty International's Racism and Repression (May 2023) and the IACHR May 2023 country report recorded 60+ deaths under broader inclusion criteria. The geographic concentration in the southern Andean regions, the demographic profile of the dead (overwhelmingly young Quechua- and Aymara-speaking men, median age early twenties), and the forensic record of bullet-wounds to the upper body and head established the cycle's character as a mass-casualty episode of asymmetric state violence rather than a conventional public-order operation.

  • The cycle's geographic core was the southern Andean trapecio — Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, and Puno, with Arequipa, Madre de Dios, and Junín supplementary, plus Lima in the late-January – February 2023 Toma de Lima phase. Of the 49 confirmed deaths: 18 in Puno (17 in Juliaca on 9 January 2023), 10 in Ayacucho (8 in the city on 15 December 2022), 6 in Apurímac (5 in Andahuaylas and Chincheros on 11–12 December), 4 in La Libertad (3 in Virú on 14 December), 2 in Arequipa, 2 in Junín, and the rest in Cusco, Madre de Dios, Ica, and Lima. The geography mapped almost exactly onto Castillo's 2021 electoral base: the southern sierra departments where he had won 70–90 per cent in the second round.

  • The 9 January 2023 events at the Aeropuerto Internacional Inca Manco Cápac in Juliaca were the deadliest single day. Approximately 17 protesters were killed in and around the airport perimeter and adjacent streets; an eighteenth (Marco Antonio Samillán Sanga, a medical resident attending the wounded) died after being shot in the abdomen. Forensic and ballistic evidence documented FAL 7.62 mm, AKM 7.62 mm, and AR-15 5.56 mm rounds in the recovered ballistic record; the IACHR May 2023 report concluded the Juliaca events involved "extrajudicial executions" within the Inter-American jurisprudential meaning. The Boluarte government characterised them as a security-services response to a terrorist-aligned attack on a strategic installation. The criminal investigation through 2024–2025 has not produced final charges against the principal command-line; the case is the central legal-historical test of the cycle.

  • The Boluarte government's principal institutional instrument was the estado de emergencia declared by DS No. 143-2022-PCM (14 December 2022, national) and DS No. 009-2023-PCM (14 January 2023, departments of Lima, Callao, Cusco, Puno). Under Article 137 of the 1993 Constitution, the framework suspended the rights of inviolability of the home, freedom of transit, freedom of assembly, and personal liberty; authorised the Armed Forces to assume internal-order control alongside the National Police; and provided the legal-and-operational architecture under which the protest-period deaths occurred. The IACHR and the CNDDHH criticised the renewals as functionally permanent rather than exceptional.

  • The casualty record is empirically contested but procedurally well-documented. The Defensoría's case-by-case methodology produced the 49-death figure as the institutional-Peruvian baseline. The IACHR, Amnesty, HRW, OHCHR, and CNDDHH applied broader inclusion criteria (deaths-in-custody, deaths-from-injuries-sustained, vehicle-incidents during dispersal, road-blockade medical-access-denial) to produce 60+ figures. The Boluarte government's own framework — the Inspectoría General de la Policía Nacional, the Ministerio Público carpetas fiscales — has produced limited public findings. The Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas has not publicly released the operational record.

  • The cycle's demands evolved through December 2022 – April 2023. Initial demands: Castillo's release, Boluarte's resignation, closure of Congress, advanced general elections, and a Constituent Assembly. By January–February 2023 the demands narrowed to advanced elections, Boluarte's resignation, and accountability for the dead. The Congress's December 2022 first-round vote to advance the next election from July 2026 to April 2024 was not confirmed in the required second round in February 2023; the election-date reverted to April 2026, where it has remained.

  • The protest coalition's organisational structure was decentralised. The principal mobilising organisations included regional frentes de defensa in each southern department, rondas campesinas (particularly in Cajamarca and Apurímac), indigenous-organisation networks (Confederación Nacional Agraria, AIDESEP for Amazon-adjacent regions), and ad-hoc local committees. The Aymara-region frente único de defensa de los intereses and the southern Apurímac and Cusco quechua-speaking communities provided the principal social base. The cycle was not coordinated by a single national-level organisation; the Lima-establishment framing of the cycle as "Castillo-loyalist" or "Cerrón-faction" mobilisation was contested by Andean academic and organisational commentary emphasising the autonomous-regional and indigenous-political character of the mobilisation.

  • The post-protest political-coalition trajectory through 2024 produced four characteristics: (i) the Boluarte government continued through low-approval conditions (7–15 per cent in major polling); (ii) the Congressional coalition sustaining her consolidated around a centre-right and Fujimorista bloc (Fuerza Popular, Alianza para el Progreso, Renovación Popular, Avanza País), increasingly criticised as obstructive of constitutional reform and of protest-death accountability; (iii) the protest coalition's electoral expression remained fragmented, with no unified vehicle for the 2026 election; (iv) the Inter-American human-rights engagement continued, with case-flow to the Inter-American Court anticipated through 2025–2027.

  • The Inter-American engagement was the principal external-institutional response. The IACHR's January 2023 visita in loco (unusually rapid by Commission standards) produced a May 2023 country report concluding "extrajudicial executions" had occurred, that the response had been characterised by excessive use of force and by structural-discriminatory patterns against indigenous and Andean populations, and that the institutional-investigation architecture was deficient. The OAS Permanent Council debated the report in May–June 2023; the Boluarte government rejected it as "biased" and as "interference"; selected cases (Juliaca, Ayacucho, Santisteban) have advanced through the IACHR's individual-petition system, with case-flow to the Inter-American Court anticipated 2025–2027.

  • The contested record has crystallised around three positions. The excessive-force-and-extrajudicial-execution position (IACHR, Amnesty, HRW, OHCHR, CNDDHH, principal Peruvian human-rights organisations, much Peruvian academic commentary) holds the response was characterised by systematic excessive force, violations of the rights to life and peaceful assembly, structural-discriminatory patterns against Andean populations, and a deficient accountability framework. The legitimate-public-order-response position (Boluarte government, Comando Conjunto, Lima political-and-media establishment segments, post-2022 Congressional majority, selected international academic commentary) holds the response was the legitimate exercise of state authority against violent and selectively-terrorist-aligned protest activity threatening strategic installations. The mixed-pattern position (Vergara, Meléndez, Muñoz, Levitsky's commentary) holds the pattern was mixed — some protest violence was genuine, some response elements were legitimate, but the cumulative casualty record cannot be reconciled with a uniform-legitimate-response account, and the investigation framework's deficiencies indicate a structural-accountability deficit.

  • The 2022–23 cycle reset the political economy of the post-Fujimori presidential system in ways the 7 December auto-coup and removal alone would not have done. The cycle made systematically visible the Lima/Andean cleavage that had been present since the 1980s but had been mediated through the post-2000 multiparty-coalition framework. Whether the cycle marks the beginning of a more durable Andean-rural political mobilisation, or whether it is contained within the existing institutional architecture, remains the principal open question of the post-2022 period.

2. Pre-Protest Configuration — The Castillo Coalition and the Andean-Rural Political Economy

2.1 Castillo's 2021 Electoral Geography

Castillo won the 6 June 2021 second-round by 50.13 per cent to Keiko Fujimori's 49.87 — a 44,000-vote margin of 18 million cast. The geographic pattern is the precondition for the 2022–23 protest geography. Castillo carried the southern Andean trapecio — Apurímac (84.0 per cent), Ayacucho (82.6), Huancavelica (84.1), Puno (89.4), Cusco (82.8), and adjacent rural-Andean departments — by margins exceeding any post-2000 second-round precedent for an Andean candidate. Fujimori carried Lima Metropolitana (64.1 per cent), the coastal-urban departments, and selected northern departments. The 2021 map was the most polarised Lima/Andean second-round map of the post-2000 cycle. The pattern reflected Castillo's biographical positioning (rural primary-school teacher and rondero from Tacabamba, Cajamarca), the Perú Libre party's Andean-Marxist programmatic origins (founder Vladimir Cerrón, former regional governor of Junín), and a 2021 first-round field of eighteen candidates that fragmented the centre and centre-left vote so thoroughly that the second-round produced an unusually stark Castillo–Fujimori binary.

2.2 The Castillo Administration's Andean Connection (28 July 2021 – 7 December 2022)

The Castillo seventeen-month administration did not produce significant policy implementation in the Andean rural regions. Cabinet instability (five Prime Ministers), the Castillo-Cerrón Perú-Libre rupture, Congressional-coalition arithmetic giving Castillo only 50–60 reliable votes against the 65 majority, and corruption-investigation pressures combined to limit the policy record. The principal Andean-region policy implementation consisted of Pensión 65 expansion (rural elderly-pension), selected wage-increases for rural teachers, the Rutas de Aprendizaje curriculum revisions, and modifications to mining-project consultation processes. The administration's symbolic-political linkage to the Andean rural regions was nonetheless significant — Castillo's frequent regional visits, Quechua address-fragments, and Andean-and-indigenous cabinet figures (Anahí Durand at MIMP, Iber Maraví at MTPE, Pedro Francke at MEF) gave his presidency a symbolic weight that exceeded the policy-implementation record. The post-7-December mobilisation drew on this reservoir.

2.3 The Rondas Campesinas and the Frente de Defensa Tradition

The rondas campesinas (peasant patrols) emerged in northern-Andean Cajamarca in the 1970s as community self-defence against rural cattle-rustling and police absence; through the 1980s–90s internal-armed-conflict period the rondas in selected Junín, Apurímac, and Ayacucho regions became counter-insurgency auxiliary forces against Sendero Luminoso; in the post-2000 period they have been recognised in Peruvian law (Ley No. 27908, 2003) as community-justice and community-security organisations and have been the organisational vehicle for rural-political mobilisation including the 2009 Baguazo (PE-A-04) and the 2011 Conga anti-mining mobilisation. The frentes de defensa — regional-departmental coalitions of unions, peasant organisations, indigenous organisations, professional associations, and party affiliates — have been the principal organisational vehicles for departmental protest mobilisation in the post-2000 period (the Frente Único de Defensa de los Intereses de Puno, the Frente de Defensa de Apurímac, the Frente de Defensa de Ayacucho, and parallel regional fronts). The 2022–23 cycle drew principally on these frente networks and on the rondas in the affected regions.

2.4 The 2009 Bagua Precedent

The 2009 Bagua / Baguazo protests (PE-A-04) — the indigenous mobilisation against the García administration's extractives decree-laws, culminating in the 5 June 2009 Bagua confrontation (33+ deaths: 23 police officers and 10+ indigenous protesters) — were the principal post-2000 precedent for a mass-casualty Andean-and-Amazon event. Bagua shaped the 2022–23 cycle in three ways: it provided the institutional-investigation template (Ministerio Público carpetas fiscales, Defensoría case-tracking, IACHR individual-petition engagement); the political memory of Bagua — particularly the failure to produce comprehensive accountability for the deaths — conditioned the 2022–23 protest coalition's distrust of the Boluarte investigation framework; and the Baguazo fed a continuing debate about Armed-Forces use in protest-policing that the 2022–23 cycle reproduced and extended.

3. The December 2022 Initial Mobilisation

3.1 The 7–14 December 2022 Period

The protest cycle commenced within 48 hours of the 7 December 2022 Mensaje a la Nación and Castillo's removal. The initial mobilisation was concentrated in the southern Andean regions of Apurímac, Cusco, Puno, Ayacucho, and Junín. By 8 December, regional frentes de defensa had called for indefinite-duration protests demanding Castillo's release and Boluarte's resignation. By 9 December, road-blockades on the Carretera Panamericana Sur (the principal coast-highway), on the Carretera Interoceánica Sur (the Cusco–Puno–Brazil highway), and on multiple regional access-routes had begun. By 10 December, the Aeropuerto Internacional Alejandro Velasco Astete (Cusco) had been temporarily closed by protester-occupation; parallel temporary closures occurred at the Arequipa airport and at selected smaller regional airports.

The first deaths of the cycle occurred on 11 December 2022 in Andahuaylas, Apurímac. A confrontation between protesters attempting to take the Aeropuerto Andahuaylas (a small regional airport in the city) and a National Police contingent supplemented by Armed Forces personnel produced two deaths (Beckham Romario Quispe Garfias, 18, and David Athos Huamaní Bedia, 20) and dozens of injured. On 12 December, three additional deaths occurred in Andahuaylas and the adjacent town of Chincheros (John Henry Mendoza Huarancca, 34, Wilfredo Lizarme Barboza, 18, and Christopher Michel Ramos Aimi, 15 — a 15-year-old, the youngest of the cycle's confirmed dead). On 14 December, three additional deaths occurred in Virú, La Libertad, in a road-blockade-confrontation with the National Police.

3.2 The 14 December Cabinet Response and the State of Emergency

The Boluarte government's first major institutional response was the 14 December 2022 declaration of a national state of emergency under Decreto Supremo No. 143-2022-PCM. The decree, signed by President Boluarte and Prime Minister Pedro Angulo (the first Boluarte era PM, succeeded shortly thereafter by Alberto Otárola), invoked Article 137 of the 1993 Constitution and suspended for thirty days the constitutional rights of inviolability of the home, freedom of transit, freedom of assembly, and personal liberty in the entire national territory. The decree authorised the Armed Forces to assume control of internal order in coordination with the National Police.

The state-of-emergency declaration was accompanied by the deployment of Armed Forces personnel to the affected southern regions. The deployment included Army (Ejército del Perú) personnel from the Second and Third Military Regions (Sur and Centro), with reinforcement from the First and Fourth Regions; National Police personnel from the Dirección de Operaciones Especiales (DIROES) and from regional commands; and selected Air Force and Navy personnel for transport-and-logistics support. The principal command-coordination was through the Comando Operacional established for the protest-period operations, headed at various points by Army general officers reporting to the Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas.

3.3 The 15 December 2022 Ayacucho Events

The 15 December 2022 events in the city of Ayacucho produced ten deaths in a single day — until that point, the deadliest day of the cycle. The events centred on the Aeropuerto Coronel FAP Alfredo Mendívil Duarte in Ayacucho, where an estimated 6,000–8,000 protesters had gathered to demand Castillo's release and Boluarte's resignation; some protesters attempted to enter the airport perimeter. Armed Forces personnel deployed under the state of emergency, supplemented by National Police, used live ammunition against the crowd. The ten Ayacucho dead included Edgar Prado Arango (51, killed while attending the wounded in the street), Clemer Rojas García (22), José Luis Aguilar Yucra (20), Leonardo Hancco Ccayllahua (32), Raúl García Gallo (35), Luis Miguel Urquizo Lopez (22), Ronaldihno Wari Vilca (15, the second 15-year-old of the cycle), and additional named victims.

The Ayacucho events were the first major mass-casualty episode in which Armed Forces personnel rather than National Police were the principal proximate cause of deaths. The forensic record (Instituto de Medicina Legal autopsies, reviewed by EPAF) documented bullet-trajectories and projectile-types consistent with FAL 7.62 mm and AKM 7.62 mm Army-issue rifle rounds. The IACHR May 2023 report and the Amnesty Racism and Repression report identified Ayacucho as the first major case in which Armed-Forces live-ammunition use against civilian protesters produced a clear forensic record of excessive force. The Boluarte government's account characterised the events as a security response to a violent protest attempting to seize a strategic-military installation; the government noted protesters had thrown stones, sticks, and homemade cohetones, and asserted that some protesters were carrying firearms — a claim the IACHR and Amnesty reports found weakly evidenced.

3.4 The Late-December 2022 Trajectory

Through late December 2022 the cycle continued in modified form. Road-blockades on the principal Andean highways persisted with significant supply-chain disruption; Christmas and New Year produced a temporary reduction in mobilisation as protesters returned to home communities. Boluarte's negotiation efforts — altos comisionados (high commissioners) for the southern regions, cabinet-level engagement with regional authorities — did not produce a stable settlement. The Congress's first-round vote on 20 December 2022 to advance the next general election from July 2026 to April 2024 (a constitutional amendment requiring two consecutive legislative-period approvals) did not satisfy the protest coalition's demand; the required second-round vote in February 2023 did not occur, and the amendment lapsed. By 31 December 2022 the Defensoría's preliminary tally stood at 28 deaths — already exceeding any post-2000 protest-casualty episode except the 2009 Baguazo.

4. The 2023 Acute Phase — The Juliaca Massacre and the Toma de Lima

4.1 The Reactivation in Early January 2023

The protest cycle re-intensified in the first week of January 2023. The principal trigger was the Boluarte government's New Year address, which committed to advanced elections through the constitutional-amendment process but rejected the protest coalition's demand for an immediate-resignation. The post-New Year mobilisation in Puno produced the deadliest single day of the cycle: the 9 January 2023 Juliaca events.

The Aymara-and-Quechua-speaking Puno region had been a central component of Castillo's 2021 electoral base (89.4 per cent second-round vote — Castillo's highest departmental result). The post-7-December mobilisation in Puno had been substantial through December 2022 but had not yet produced mass-casualty events. The Aymara-region frente único de defensa de los intereses had called for indefinite-duration general-strike across the southern altiplano; by 8 January 2023, road-blockades, market-closures, and protest-mobilisations were affecting Juliaca, Puno, Ilave, Yunguyo, Desaguadero, and the principal Aymara-region settlements.

4.2 The 9 January 2023 Juliaca Events

On 9 January 2023, an estimated 9,000–12,000 protesters gathered in and around Juliaca (Peru's fifth-largest city, population approximately 280,000, the principal commercial centre of the Aymara altiplano region). The principal protest-objective was the Aeropuerto Internacional Inca Manco Cápac (named after the Inca founding-figure of the Andean foundational tradition). Some protesters attempted to enter the airport perimeter. The security-services deployment included approximately 700 National Police officers, 300 Armed Forces personnel (Army and Air Force), and selected DIROES special-operations elements.

The confrontation began at approximately 14:30 Lima time (UTC-5). Within approximately three hours, the security-services response had produced seventeen confirmed protest-related deaths. The eighteenth, Marco Antonio Samillán Sanga, a medical-resident doctor who had attended the wounded in the street, died after being shot in the abdomen. The dead included:

  • Roberto Romario Aroquipa Pacuri (22); Brayan Apaza Jumpiri (15); Carlos Lazo Mamani (23); David José Aguilar Quispe (32); Eberth Mamani Arqui (28); Héctor Manjarres Villuca (45); Hernán Choquepuma Curasi (30); Jhon Erick Mamani Coari (29); José Luis Aroquipa Hancco (22); Marco Antonio Samillán Sanga (32, medical-resident, post-event death); Plinio Hernán Melgar Iruri (45); Ramiro Ticona Mamani (35); Reynaldo Quispe Quispe (27); Rosalino Florentino Sánchez Hancco (29); Salomón Valenzuela Chua (32); Yamilet Aroquipa Hancco (17, the youngest female death of the cycle); Hernán Diego Núñez Mamani (28); and additional named victims documented in the Defensoría and CIDH reports.

The forensic record (autopsies by the Instituto de Medicina Legal of Puno, reviewed by EPAF and by the Inter-American Commission's medical-forensic team during the IACHR January 2023 in loco visit) documented:

  • Sixteen of the eighteen deaths had bullet-wounds to the upper body (chest, abdomen, neck, head). Two had wounds consistent with multiple-trajectory shooting.
  • Recovered ballistic evidence included FAL 7.62 mm rounds (Army-issue), AKM 7.62 mm rounds (Police and Army), and AR-15 5.56 mm rounds (Police DIROES).
  • Bullet-trajectory analysis indicated that fatal shots had been fired from elevated positions consistent with rooftop or vehicle-mounted shooting, and from positions consistent with deployed-line shooting.
  • No protester was confirmed to have been carrying a firearm. The contemporaneous government account that protesters had used firearms was not supported by the recovered evidence.

The IACHR May 2023 country report concluded that the Juliaca events involved "extrajudicial executions" within the Inter-American jurisprudential meaning. The Amnesty International report concurred. The Human Rights Watch report concurred. The OHCHR report (October 2023) registered concerns consistent with the IACHR finding.

4.3 The Boluarte Government's Account of Juliaca

The Boluarte government's contemporaneous account of the Juliaca events characterised them as a security-services response to a violent and terrorist-aligned attack on a strategic installation. The government's account, articulated in a 10 January 2023 cabinet press conference and in subsequent communications, included:

  • The protest had been infiltrated by "terrorist" elements aligned with the residual Sendero Luminoso and with the Movadef (Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales, a Sendero-aligned political organisation).
  • Protesters had used firearms and homemade explosives in the assault on the airport perimeter.
  • The security-services response had been within the framework of the state of emergency and had been calibrated to the level of threat.
  • The post-event investigation would proceed through the Ministerio Público and the Inspectoría General de la Policía Nacional.

The contested-record on the Juliaca events has not been resolved. The Ministerio Público's Carpeta Fiscal No. 506015002-2023-13 (Juliaca) has proceeded through investigation through 2023–2025; as of mid-2025, formal charges have not been filed against the principal command-line. The case is the central legal-historical test of the protest cycle.

4.4 The Toma de Lima (Late January – February 2023)

The post-Juliaca period shifted the cycle's geographic centre. From mid-January 2023 the Toma de Lima ("Taking of Lima") mobilisation brought southern-Andean protesters to the capital — 10,000–20,000 at peak, in the Plaza San Martín, Plaza Dos de Mayo, and adjacent locations. The Lima mobilisation produced one fatality: Víctor Santisteban Yacsavilca (55, a journalist-and-protest-participant killed in the Plaza Dos de Mayo on 28 January 2023 by a tear-gas canister fired at close range; his death has been the subject of a Carpeta Fiscal investigation through 2023–2024). Property damage in selected Lima episodes included the burning of a building near Plaza San Martín on 28 January. The Boluarte response included the DS No. 009-2023-PCM departmental state-of-emergency renewal and continued military-supplemented police deployment. The Toma de Lima phase declined through February 2023 as protest organisations returned to regional bases; by March 2023 the cycle had entered its declining phase, though sporadic protests and road-blockades continued through April 2023 and intermittently through 2024.

5. The State-of-Emergency and Military-Deployment Architecture

5.1 The Constitutional Framework

Article 137 of the 1993 Peruvian Constitution provides two emergency instruments. The estado de emergencia (state of emergency) may be declared in cases of disturbance of peace, internal order, catastrophe, or grave circumstances; it may run up to 60 days, may be renewed by decree; it suspends the constitutional rights of inviolability of the home, freedom of transit, freedom of assembly, and personal liberty; it authorises the Armed Forces to assume internal-order control. The estado de sitio (state of siege), the more restrictive instrument, has not been declared in the post-2000 period.

The Boluarte government's reliance on the estado de emergencia followed established post-2000 practice. The instrument has been used routinely in mining-conflict zones (Conga, Las Bambas, Tía María), in narco-affected regions (the VRAEM), and in internal-security situations. The 2022–23 application was distinctive for its national-then-departmental geographic scope and its sustained duration through serial renewals.

5.2 The Decree Sequence

The principal decrees: DS No. 143-2022-PCM (14 December 2022) — national, 30 days, suspending the four standard constitutional rights and authorising Armed-Forces internal-order intervention; DS No. 144-2022-PCM and parallel decrees specifying operational-coordination architecture; DS No. 009-2023-PCM (14 January 2023) — departmental, in Lima, Callao, Cusco, and Puno following the Juliaca events and in anticipation of the Toma de Lima; DS No. 015-2023-PCM and subsequent renewals (February – April 2023). Cumulative state-of-emergency coverage in the southern departments through December 2022 – April 2023 was approximately 130–150 days. The IACHR May 2023 report criticised the renewal pattern as "functionally permanent" rather than exceptional, and as inconsistent with Inter-American Court jurisprudence on the principle of exception conditioning emergency-rights-suspension.

5.3 The Armed Forces Deployment

The Armed-Forces deployment under the state of emergency was the principal operational fact distinguishing the 2022–23 cycle from earlier post-2000 protest episodes. Approximately 6,000–8,000 Army personnel were deployed at peak, principally from the Second Military Region (Cusco-Apurímac-Madre de Dios) and the Third (Arequipa-Moquegua-Tacna-Puno), with reinforcement from the First and Fourth. Approximately 12,000–15,000 National Police personnel were deployed at peak, including DIROES special-operations elements. Air Force deployment was limited to transport-logistics and selected airport-perimeter operations; Navy deployment was limited to the Lake Titicaca region. The Comando Operacional established for the cycle reported through the Comando Conjunto under General Manuel Gómez de la Torre (until February 2023) and his successors. The Ministerio del Interior under Víctor Rojas Herrera, Vicente Romero Fernández, Mariano González, and Juan José Santiváñez Antúnez (successive ministers) provided the civilian command line for the Police component.

5.4 The Use-of-Force Doctrine and the Operational Reality

The Peruvian National Police's use-of-force doctrine (Decreto Legislativo No. 1186, 2015) follows the Inter-American jurisprudence and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms (1990): graduated escalation, less-lethal before lethal, firearms only in defence of life. The Armed Forces' internal-order use-of-force doctrine (Decreto Legislativo No. 1095, 2010) references international-humanitarian-law principles where applicable.

The operational reality during the cycle, documented in the IACHR, Amnesty, HRW, OHCHR, and Defensoría reports, included: use of live ammunition (FAL 7.62 mm, AKM 7.62 mm, AR-15 5.56 mm, shotgun-pellet rounds) against civilian protesters; bullet-wounds to the upper body and head in the majority of fatalities — inconsistent with the doctrine's restriction on body-zone-of-fire; tear-gas canisters fired at close range (the Santisteban death); limited use of less-lethal alternatives in the principal mass-casualty incidents; forced dispersal operations producing vehicle-incidents and stampede-deaths. The Inspectoría General de la Policía Nacional's internal-investigations through 2023–2024 produced limited public findings; the Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas has not publicly released the operational-record.

6. The Casualty-and-Injury Record

6.1 The Defensoría del Pueblo Tally

The Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú is the constitutionally-established independent ombuds-institution for human-rights compliance monitoring and for investigation of alleged state-action excess. Its case-by-case methodology — comisionados deployed to affected departments, conducting interviews, reviewing medical records, attending autopsies, documenting incident-locations — has been the institutional-Peruvian baseline for protest-casualty figures. Its mid-2023 cumulative tally: 49 direct protest-related deaths; 11 additional protest-adjacent deaths (vehicle-incidents during dispersal, deaths from injuries sustained, deaths in custody, traffic accidents linked to road blockades); 1,335+ injuries reported through medical channels; approximately 1,200+ detained at various points. The geographic distribution of the 49 direct deaths:

DepartmentDeathsPrincipal Incidents
Puno18Juliaca 9 January 2023 (17); Macusani; Ilave
Ayacucho10Ayacucho city 15 December 2022 (8); subsequent
Apurímac6Andahuaylas 11–12 December 2022; Chincheros
La Libertad4Virú 14 December 2022
Junín2Pichanaki
Arequipa2La Joya; Aplao
Cusco1Cusco-region
Madre de Dios1—
Ica1—
Lima1Plaza Dos de Mayo, 28 January 2023 (Santisteban)
Other regions3—

Of the 49 direct deaths, 47 were male; 2 were female (Yamilet Aroquipa Hancco, 17, in Juliaca; one further case). The median age was 24; the youngest direct-death was 15 (three cases), the oldest 55. By ethno-linguistic identification (where determinable from family-and-community records), the substantial majority were Quechua- or Aymara-speaking; the geographic concentration in the southern Andean trapezium reinforced the ethno-linguistic concentration.

6.2 The Higher Figures from International Observers

The IACHR (May 2023), Amnesty (May 2023), HRW (April 2023), and OHCHR (October 2023) reported higher cumulative figures, generally 60+. The differences derived from inclusion criteria the Defensoría methodology had not applied: (i) deaths-in-custody following protest-related arrest; (ii) deaths-from-injuries-sustained occurring more than 72 hours after the original incident; (iii) vehicle-incident-and-stampede deaths under broader-causation in forced-dispersal operations; (iv) road-blockade-related medical-access-denial deaths in remote rural areas — this last category contested, as the protest coalition's road-blockade tactics were a contributing factor, but international observers included them under broader human-rights-implications criteria. The contested-record on the casualty figure has not been reconciled; the full mortality impact (including all medium-term and indirect categories) is likely in the 70–80 range, though no figure has been definitively established.

6.3 The Demographic and Forensic Profile

The demographic profile — overwhelmingly young, male, Andean, Quechua- or Aymara-speaking, working-class — was the single most-discussed empirical pattern. The IACHR May 2023 report devoted a section to "structural-discriminatory patterns" against indigenous and Andean populations; Amnesty's Racism and Repression title encapsulated the analytical thesis; the CNDDHH commentary characterised the cycle as the most-significant demographic-asymmetric-violence episode in post-CVR Peru. The forensic profile — bullet-wounds to the upper body and head, use of military-issue ammunition, evidence of elevated-position shooting in selected incidents — was the empirical foundation for the IACHR's extrajudicial-executions finding. The Ministerio Público has not comprehensively released the forensic record; the partial record from the Defensoría investigations, the IACHR in loco visit, and EPAF reviews has been the principal public evidentiary basis.

7. The IACHR / CIDH Engagement

7.1 The January 2023 In Loco Visit

The IACHR (CIDH in Spanish) responded with unusual rapidity. The visita in loco took place 11–13 January 2023 — within four weeks of the initial protest deaths and four days of Juliaca. The visit was led by Commissioner Esmeralda Arosemena de Troitiño (then IACHR President) with the Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples' Rights (Antonia Urrejola), the Special Rapporteur for Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights, and technical staff. Meetings included the Boluarte government, the Defensoría, the Ministerio Público, the Comando Conjunto, Congress, civil-society organisations (CNDDHH, APRODEH, IDL, regional-Andean networks), and families of the dead. The Commission visited Lima, Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Puno. A preliminary observations document was issued 20 January 2023; the formal country report in May 2023.

7.2 The May 2023 Country Report

The principal findings: confirmation of 49+ deaths; determination that the Juliaca 9 January events involved "extrajudicial executions" in the Inter-American jurisprudential meaning; determination that the Ayacucho 15 December events involved excessive use of force; documentation of structural-discriminatory patterns against indigenous and Andean populations; documentation of stigmatising government discourse (the terruqueo pattern) inconsistent with Inter-American jurisprudence on freedom of assembly and peaceful protest; identification of deficiencies in the institutional-investigation framework; recommendations including limitation of Armed Forces use in protest-policing, strengthening of less-lethal alternatives, reform of the use-of-force doctrine, and strengthening of the Defensoría.

The Boluarte government rejected the report as "biased" and as "interference in internal affairs"; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a parallel communication. The OAS Permanent Council debated the report in May–June 2023; the Boluarte position was supported by Argentina (under Milei from late 2023) and Ecuador, and rejected by Colombia (Petro), Mexico (AMLO and Sheinbaum), Brazil (Lula), Bolivia (Arce), and Chile (Boric).

7.3 The Continuing Engagement (2023–2024)

The IACHR's continuing instruments include: rapporteur engagement (country-rapporteur for Peru, thematic rapporteurs); individual-petition cases (Juliaca, Ayacucho, Santisteban) advancing toward Inter-American Court referral if friendly-settlement is not reached, with case-flow anticipated 2025–2027; precautionary measures (medidas cautelares) for selected vulnerable populations and witnesses; follow-up monitoring of compliance with the May 2023 recommendations. Post-2024 reporting has documented continuing concerns about the investigation framework's deficiencies and about the broader human-rights trajectory under the Boluarte government.

8. The Boluarte Government Response

8.1 The Public-Communications Posture

Boluarte's communications posture combined: (i) condolences for the dead; (ii) characterisation of protests as infiltrated by "terrorist" or "subversive" elements; (iii) defence of the security response as legitimate state authority; (iv) commitment to investigation through institutional channels; (v) rejection of the resignation demand and of advanced elections beyond the proposed April 2024 (subsequently retracted). The principal addresses included the 14 December 2022 Mensaje announcing the state of emergency, the 13 January 2023 Mensaje on the Juliaca events ("I ask forgiveness from those who have lost loved ones, but the response was within the framework of legality"), and the 28 January 2023 Mensaje on the Lima mobilisation.

The terruqueo discursive pattern (the characterisation of protesters as "terrorist-aligned", from the Spanish terrorista) was the most-criticised element. The IACHR, the CNDDHH, and academic commentary argued the characterisation was inconsistent with the empirical record (the recovered ballistic record did not support claims of armed protesters; no organised Sendero Luminoso or Movadef infiltration of the protest leadership was publicly documented) and was discursively-stigmatising of indigenous and Andean populations.

8.2 The Cabinet Composition

The Boluarte cabinet through the protest period reflected the right-leaning coalition consolidation of the post-7-December trajectory: Pedro Angulo (PM, 10–21 December 2022, brief); Alberto Otárola (PM, 21 December 2022 – March 2024, the principal Boluarte era PM, former García-administration Defence Minister); Víctor Rojas Herrera and Vicente Romero Fernández alternating at Interior; Jorge Chávez Cresta at Defence; Ana Cecilia Gervasi at Foreign Affairs (the principal interlocutor with Mexico and the IACHR through 2023). The cabinet was Lima-coastal in composition, drew personnel from Fuerza Popular, Alianza para el Progreso, and ex-García-administration veterans, and exhibited high ministerial turnover through 2023–2024.

8.3 The Institutional-Investigation Architecture

Three principal components: the Ministerio Público (Fiscalía de la Nación), with multiple carpetas fiscales opened for the principal incident-sets (Juliaca, Ayacucho, Andahuaylas, Chincheros, Pichanaki, La Joya, Santisteban) — its investigation through 2023–2025 has proceeded but formal charges have not been filed against the principal command-line in the major mass-casualty cases as of mid-2025; the Inspectoría General de la Policía Nacional, which has produced limited public findings; and the Congressional multi-party investigative commission of 2023 (Comisión Investigadora Multipartidaria), whose late-2023 Informe Final was contested in the plenary, with the Boluarte-supporting majority producing a less-critical assessment than the minority and with no binding consequences. The IACHR May 2023 report and follow-ups have characterised the framework as deficient; the Boluarte government has rejected these characterisations.

9. The Long-Arc Implications and the Contested Record

9.1 The Lima/Andean Cleavage Made Visible

The principal political-historical implication of the 2022–23 cycle is the systematic visibility of the Lima/Andean cleavage. The cleavage had been present since the 1980s — the CVR-documented internal-armed-conflict involved Andean populations as both Sendero recruitment-base and principal civilian-casualty group; the post-2000 mining-conflict trajectory had produced repeated Andean-rural mobilisations against Lima-coastal authority; the 2009 Baguazo had produced a major Andean-Amazon casualty episode. The 2022–23 cycle's distinctive feature was the geographic and demographic concentration of the casualty record in the southern Andean regions and the explicit-political-character of the mobilisation as defence of an Andean-rural president against a Lima-coastal-establishment removal. Whether the post-2022 mobilisation produces a unified electoral expression in 2026, or whether it is absorbed within the existing post-2000 multiparty-coalition framework, will be the principal continuing political-historical question.

9.2 The Inter-American Framework's Significance

The Inter-American engagement with the 2022–23 cycle has been the most significant external-institutional engagement with a Peruvian protest cycle since the post-CVR period. The Inter-American Court's eventual judgments — anticipated 2026–2028 — will be the principal external-judicial determination on the cycle, conditioned by the Peruvian state's compliance trajectory and by the broader Latin American context (contested engagement by Boluarte's Peru, Milei's Argentina from late 2023, and Bukele's El Salvador, with the Inter-American system itself increasingly tested).

9.3 The Contested Record on Casualty-Attribution and Excessive-Force

Three interpretive positions, named with principal partisans, have crystallised in the academic-and-policy commentary.

Excessive-force-and-extrajudicial-execution: the IACHR (May 2023), Amnesty (Racism and Repression, May 2023), HRW (Deadly Decline, April 2023), the OHCHR (October 2023), the Defensoría del Pueblo, the CNDDHH and APRODEH, and Peruvian historians including Cecilia Méndez. The response was characterised by systematic excessive force, violations of the rights to life and peaceful assembly, structural-discriminatory patterns against indigenous and Andean populations, and a deficient accountability framework. The Juliaca events constituted extrajudicial executions; the Ayacucho events constituted excessive use of force; institutional reform and accountability are required.

Legitimate-public-order-response: the Boluarte government, the Comando Conjunto, segments of the Lima political-and-media establishment (selected El Comercio editorial commentary, Fuerza Popular and Alianza para el Progreso parliamentary commentary), the post-2022 Congressional-majority coalition, and selected international-academic commentary. The response was the legitimate exercise of state authority against violent and selectively-terrorist-aligned protest activity that threatened public order, strategic installations (airports, highways, government buildings), and the post-7-December constitutional restoration.

Mixed-pattern: Alberto Vergara (El Comercio and La República commentary 2023–2024); Carlos Meléndez and Paula Muñoz (Journal of Democracy 2023–2024); Steven Levitsky (Foreign Affairs 2023). Some protest violence was genuine (airport-perimeter attempts, property damage in selected Lima episodes, road-blockade-related medical-access-denial deaths); some response elements were legitimate; but the cumulative casualty record cannot be reconciled with a uniform-legitimate-response account, and the investigation framework's deficiencies are themselves indicators of a structural-accountability deficit. The longer-arc Lima/Andean cleavage and the post-Fujimori-presidential-system instability condition the interpretation.

The three positions are not mutually exclusive. The first is the Inter-American-and-international-human-rights-institutional position; the second is the Boluarte government and Peruvian-coastal-establishment position; the third is in Peruvian and international academic commentary. Resolution will be conditioned by the Inter-American Court's eventual judgments (2026–2028), by the Ministerio Público's eventual formal charges or their absence, by the post-2026 political trajectory, and by the longer-arc academic-historical assessment emerging through the 2030s.

10. Conclusion — The Boluarte-Era Protests as Constitutional-Democratic Stress Test

The December 2022 – 2023 Boluarte era protests were the deadliest political-protest episode in Peru since the 1980s–1990s internal-armed-conflict period. The 49+ deaths documented by the Defensoría del Pueblo (60+ by Amnesty and the IACHR), concentrated geographically in the southern Andean regions and demographically among young Quechua- and Aymara-speaking men, produced the most-significant Peruvian human-rights episode of the post-CVR period.

The cycle's three principal events — the 11–12 December 2022 Andahuaylas-Chincheros events, the 15 December 2022 Ayacucho events, and the 9 January 2023 Juliaca events — produced the bulk of the casualty record. The state-of-emergency-and-Armed-Forces-deployment architecture under which they occurred has been the principal target of criticism by the IACHR, Amnesty, HRW, the OHCHR, and the Peruvian human-rights organisations. The Boluarte government's investigation framework has produced limited public findings; the Inter-American Court engagement through 2026–2028 will be the principal external-judicial determination.

Three structural questions will determine the longer-arc verdict. First, whether the accountability framework produces formal charges against the principal command-line, or whether the post-2025 trajectory produces continuing impunity — the Ministerio Público's carpetas fiscales, the Inter-American case-flow, and the post-2026 political environment will be the principal elements. Second, whether the post-2022 trajectory produces durable institutional reform of the use-of-force doctrine, the state-of-emergency framework, and the protest-policing architecture, or whether the cycle's implications are absorbed without structural reform. Third, whether the post-2022 Andean-rural mobilisation produces durable electoral and institutional incorporation, or whether the cycle marks an episode within the existing post-2000 multiparty-coalition framework.

This document, written in the post-2024 Boluarte government period and prior to the 2026 election, records the December 2022 – 2023 Boluarte era protests, the casualty record, the investigation trajectory, the Inter-American engagement, and the contested record as they have crystallised through mid-2025 — on the methodological premise that the corpus's value lies in preserving the contested record at the moment of crystallisation rather than in premature settlement of the longer-term verdict.

Spiral Index

Level 2 Deep Dives (DD)

  • PE-D-03-DD-01: The 9 January 2023 Juliaca Massacre — single-day mass-casualty event analysis: tactical sequence, ballistic record, command-chain identification, post-event criminal-investigation trajectory through Carpeta Fiscal No. 506015002-2023-13, comparative reference to the 2009 Bagua precedent, the eighteenth death of medical-resident Marco Antonio Samillán Sanga, the Aymara-altiplano regional context.
  • PE-D-03-DD-02: The IACHR / CIDH Engagement and the Inter-American Court Trajectory — the January 2023 visita in loco, the May 2023 country report, the OAS Permanent Council debate, the individual-petition case-flow, the precautionary-measures architecture, the anticipated 2026–2028 Inter-American Court judgments.
  • PE-D-03-DD-03: The State-of-Emergency Architecture and the Article 137 Framework — the constitutional-and-legal framework, the DS No. 143-2022-PCM and the subsequent decree-sequence, the rights-suspension scope, the Armed-Forces internal-order deployment, the Inter-American jurisprudence on principle-of-exception, the comparative-Latin-American emergency-frameworks.
  • PE-D-03-DD-04: The 15 December 2022 Ayacucho Events — the airport-perimeter confrontation, the eight deaths, the Armed-Forces live-ammunition record, the forensic and ballistic record, the post-event criminal-investigation trajectory, the Ayacucho-region post-CVR political-historical context.
  • PE-D-03-DD-05: The Toma de Lima (Late January – February 2023) and the Santisteban Death — the southern-Andean-to-Lima mobilisation, the Plaza San Martín and Plaza Dos de Mayo central-Lima protests, the 28 January 2023 death of journalist-and-protest-participant Víctor Santisteban Yacsavilca, the property-damage episodes, the National-Police protest-policing record in the Lima context.
  • PE-D-03-DD-06: The Use-of-Force Doctrine and the Inspectoría-General Investigation Framework — the Decreto Legislativo 1186 and 1095 frameworks, the Inter-American jurisprudence and the UN Basic Principles, the Inspectoría General de la Policía Nacional investigation record, the Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas operational-record-non-release, the comparative-Latin-American use-of-force-doctrine frame.
  • PE-D-03-DD-07: The Casualty-and-Injury-Attribution Record — the Defensoría del Pueblo case-by-case methodology, the higher-figure international-observer methodologies, the demographic-and-forensic profile, the inclusion-criteria differences, the broader mortality-impact estimation, the post-2025 reconciliation prospects.

Level 3 Profiles

  • PE-D-03-P-01: Marco Antonio Samillán Sanga — medical-resident doctor, killed in Juliaca on 9 January 2023 while attending the wounded; the eighteenth death of the Juliaca event-set; the symbolic-political weight of his case in the post-2023 protest-coalition memory and in the IACHR engagement.
  • PE-D-03-P-02: Víctor Santisteban Yacsavilca — journalist-and-protest-participant, killed in the Plaza Dos de Mayo on 28 January 2023 by a tear-gas canister fired at close range; the principal Lima-incident fatality of the cycle; the post-event criminal-investigation trajectory.
  • PE-D-03-P-03: Yamilet Aroquipa Hancco — 17-year-old female, killed in Juliaca on 9 January 2023; the youngest female death of the cycle; the demographic-symbolic weight of her case in the post-2023 Aymara-region political memory.
  • PE-D-03-P-04: Alberto Otárola — Prime Minister of Peru, 21 December 2022 – March 2024; the principal Boluarte era PM during the protest cycle; former García-administration Defence Minister; the principal political-civilian command-line interlocutor for the security-services response; subsequent resignation in March 2024 over a contractual-and-personal scandal.
  • PE-D-03-P-05: Esmeralda Arosemena de Troitiño — IACHR Commissioner and IACHR President at the time of the January 2023 visita in loco; the principal Inter-American institutional figure in the engagement with the Peruvian state during the protest cycle; the principal author of the May 2023 country report's framing.

End of document. Status: DRAFT. Contested-record framing applied. Sources: 22 primary references. Cross-references: 10 forward-and-back. Symmetry pass pending until PE-A-04, PE-D-01, PE-D-04, PE-D-05, PE-J-03, PE-K-03, PE-M-02, PE-O-01 are written.

Sources

  1. Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú, Reporte Diario de Conflictos Sociales (daily reports, December 2022 – December 2023) and Crisis Política y Protesta Social: Saldo de las Manifestaciones en el Marco de las Movilizaciones Sociales (cumulative casualty reports, multiple editions through 2023–2024).
  2. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH / IACHR), Situación de los Derechos Humanos en el Perú en el Contexto de las Protestas Sociales, Informe de País, May 2023 (post-visita in loco, January 2023).
  3. Amnesty International, Racism and Repression: Excessive Force and Extrajudicial Executions during the 2022–2023 Protests in Peru, May 2023; subsequent updates 2023–2024.
  4. Human Rights Watch, Deadly Decline: Brutality and Failed Reforms in Peru, April 2023; subsequent World Report 2024 chapter on Peru.
  5. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Informe sobre Derechos Humanos en el Perú: 1 de diciembre de 2022 al 30 de abril de 2023, October 2023.
  6. Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH), Crisis de Derechos Humanos en el Perú, multiple bulletins December 2022 – 2024.
  7. Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH), Informes sobre las Víctimas de las Protestas 2022–2023, multiple editions.
  8. Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL) and IDL-Reporteros, investigative reports on the Juliaca events, the Ayacucho 15 December events, and the Andahuaylas 11 December events (2023–2024).
  9. Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense (EPAF), forensic-investigation reports on selected cases of death.
  10. Ministerio Público (Fiscalía de la Nación), formal investigations and carpetas fiscales into the protest-period deaths, including Carpeta Fiscal No. 506015002-2023-13 (Juliaca, processed through the Fiscalía Provincial Penal Corporativa Especializada en Derechos Humanos e Interculturalidad de Puno, 2023–2025) and parallel carpetas for Ayacucho, Andahuaylas, Chincheros, Pichanaki, La Joya, and the Lima-incident-set.
  11. Poder Judicial del Perú, autos and rulings in the constitutional-protection (amparo) and criminal proceedings related to the protest deaths, 2023–2025.
  12. Decretos Supremos del Poder Ejecutivo declaring states of emergency: DS No. 143-2022-PCM (14 December 2022, national); DS No. 009-2023-PCM (14 January 2023, departments of Lima, Callao, Cusco, and Puno); subsequent renewals through 2023.
  13. Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas del Perú, communications and partes (situation reports) on the military deployment.
  14. Policía Nacional del Perú, official communications and the Inspectoría General internal-investigation reports.
  15. Congreso de la República del Perú, Informe Final de la Comisión Investigadora Multipartidaria (multi-party investigative commission, 2023) and the Comisión de Constitución records.
  16. President Dina Boluarte Zegarra, Mensajes a la Nación and press statements through the protest period (December 2022 – April 2023); cabinet press communications.
  17. La República, El Comercio, IDL-Reporteros, Ojo Público, and Convoca archive coverage December 2022 – December 2023.
  18. Alberto Vergara, La danza hostil: Poderes subnacionales y Estado central en Bolivia y Perú (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2018); commentary in El Comercio and La República 2023–2024.
  19. Carlos Meléndez and Paula Muñoz, multiple academic analyses of the post-7-December trajectory and the Andean-rural mobilisation, Journal of Democracy and Latin American Politics and Society 2023–2024.
  20. Steven Levitsky, multiple analyses on Peru's competitive-authoritarian dynamics and the post-2022 trajectory, Foreign Affairs and academic journals 2023–2024.
  21. Cecilia Méndez, The Plebeian Republic: The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820–1850 (2005), and subsequent commentary on the southern-Andean political-historical formation that conditioned the 2022–23 mobilisation.
  22. Inter-American Court of Human Rights, jurisprudence on protest-policing and use of force (Corte IDH, Caso del Penal Miguel Castro Castro v. Perú, 2006; Caso Cruz Sánchez y otros v. Perú, 2015; Caso Mujeres Víctimas de Tortura Sexual en Atenco v. México, 2018), referenced in the IACHR May 2023 country report and in CNDDHH commentary.
  • PE-A-04: 2009 Bagua / "Baguazo" Indigenous Protests — protest-precedent doc; the prior major Andean / Amazon-protest casualty event (33+ deaths)
  • PE-C-02: November 2020 Five-Day Crisis (Merino, Sagasti, Protests) — proximate antecedent; the prior Lima-centred protest casualty event (2 deaths, 100+ injuries)
  • PE-D-01: Pedro Castillo Presidency (2021–2022) — First Andean Rural-Teacher President (sister doc; Castillo's electoral base in the southern Andean regions is the precondition for the 2022–23 protest geography)
  • PE-D-02: 7 December 2022 Castillo Auto-Coup Attempt and Removal — proximate trigger; the institutional-rupture event
  • PE-D-04: Dina Boluarte Presidency (2022–present) — sequel; the post-protest governance trajectory
  • PE-D-05: 2026 Election — sequel; the electoral test of the post-2022 trajectory
  • PE-J-03: December 2022 – 2023 Protest Casualties — contested-record companion (the dedicated J-block treatment)
  • PE-K-01: 1993 Constitution and Fujimori Autogolpe Aftermath (1992–2000) — constitutional-architecture predecessor; the 1993 unicameral Congress and vacancia mechanism that structured the institutional response to the protests; the CVR 2003 as the prior benchmark for mass-casualty political violence
  • PE-K-03: 7 December 2022 Castillo Decision to Attempt Dissolution — decision companion
  • PE-M-02: Andean Indigenous Politics in Peruvian Federalism — frame doc
  • PE-O-01: Presidential-Instability Trajectory and Possible Constitutional Reform
  • PE-R-01: Peru Governance Books Canon
  • PE-B-01: Humala and Kuczynski Presidencies (2011-2018)
  • PE-A-01: The Fujimori First Presidency (1990–2000)
  • PE-D-06: Peru 2026 general election + post-Boluarte transition
  • PE-F-01: back-reference added by symmetry sweep
  • PE-K-02: back-reference added by symmetry sweep
  • PE-A-03: The Velasco Alvarado Military Government, Agrarian Reform, and the Bermúdez Phase
  • PE-H-PRES-06: José Pedro Castillo Terrones — A Biography
  • PE-H-PRES-07: Dina Ercilia Boluarte Zegarra — A Biography
  • PE-J-01: Lava Jato in Peru — The Odebrecht–Camargo Corrêa Bribery Architecture and the Six-President Prosecutorial Sequence
  • PE-A-06: Fernando Belaúnde Terry's Second Presidency — Restored Democracy, Sendero Luminoso's Onset, and the 1983 IMF Stabilisation
  • PE-G-02: Peruvian Mining Political Economy — Copper, Gold, the Communidad-Conflict Cycle, and the Post-2003 Commodity Supercycle
  • PE-D-07: Boluarte's Final Year (August 2025 – July 2026) — Pre-Election Limbo, Cabinet Rotation, and the Pre-Transfer-of-Power Dynamics
  • PE-D-08: Peru's 2026 Second-Round Runoff and the Post-Election Transition — The 7 June 2026 Runoff, the Bicameral First-Test Senate–Chamber Dynamics, the 28 July 2026 Bicentenario Transfer of Power, and the 2026–2031 Governing Arithmetic
  • PE-N-01: Peru in International Perceptions — Fragile Democracy, Resource State
  • PE-I-01: The Peruvian Institutional Architecture — Congress, Constitutional Tribunal, JNE, and JNJ
  • PE-F-02: Peru–United States Relations — From the Fujimori Counter-Narcotics Bargain to the Hedged Partnership
  • PE-G-03: The Informality Political Economy — The Other Path and the Seventy-Percent Economy (1980–2026)
  • PE-I-02: Peruvian Decentralisation — Regional Governments and the Territorial State
  • PE-J-02: Three Accounts — The 2009 Bagua Massacre (El Baguazo)
  • PE-M-01: Fujimorismo as Political Idea and Movement
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