PE-D-04: The Boluarte Government 2023–2025 — Rolex Scandal, Otárola Resignation, the Adrianzén Cabinet, and the 2026 Pre-Election Trajectory

1. Key Takeaways

• The Boluarte Government during 2023–2025 has been defined by a structural paradox: a President with the lowest sustained-approval rating of any post-2001 Peruvian President (the IEP, Ipsos Perú, and IPSOS-El Comercio polling series have placed her between 4 and 12 per cent for almost the entire period since mid-2023, with the lowest single reading at 3 per cent in April 2024 immediately after the Caso Rolex disclosure), supported by a Congressional coalition (Fuerza Popular, Alianza para el Progreso, Acción Popular, Renovación Popular, Avanza País, plus rotating support from Somos Perú and Podemos Perú) whose own approval ratings are even lower (Congressional approval ratings of 3–7 per cent throughout the period), against an opposition that is electorally fragmented and organisationally weak. The mutual-low-approval-mutual-survival pattern is the central governance fact of the period. The institutional name for the arrangement in Peruvian commentary is la sociedad de la sobrevivencia — the survival partnership — coined by Vergara in El Comercio (October 2023) and adopted across academic commentary.

• The 15 March 2024 Wayka.pe investigation disclosing President Boluarte's collection of high-value Rolex watches and other luxury items not declared in her Declaración Jurada before the SUNAT and the Contraloría triggered the most-serious corruption case against a sitting Peruvian President since the 2018 Kuczynski resignation. The investigation, advanced by journalist Gianella Tapullima and the Wayka team, documented at least eleven Rolex watches plus additional Cartier and Bulgari items with an estimated retail value of [TBD-VERIFY: approximately US$500,000 cumulative, with individual-piece valuations ranging from $14,000 to over $40,000; the Fiscalía's own valuation report has not been fully released]. On 22 March 2024 the Fiscalía and the Policía Nacional executed an allanamiento (judicially-authorised search) of Boluarte's residence in Surquillo (Lima) and her office at the Government Palace — the first search of a Peruvian president's residence in the modern democratic period. The constitutional-accusation process advanced into the Subcomisión de Acusaciones Constitucionales del Congreso through 2024–2025 but did not produce a vacancia vote: the protective Congressional coalition continued to hold.

• The cabinet trajectory during the period passed through three Presidents of the Council of Ministers: Pedro Angulo Arana (10–21 December 2022, the brief interim cabinet of the first two weeks of the Boluarte administration during the most-acute phase of the post-7-December protest cycle); Luis Alberto Otárola Peñaranda (21 December 2022 – 6 March 2024, the longest-serving PCM under Boluarte and the principal architect of the protest-period security policy and the post-protest stabilisation); and Gustavo Adrianzén Olaya (6 March 2024 – ongoing as of May 2025, the post-Rolex stabiliser whose appointment was announced nine days before the Rolex disclosure broke). Otárola's resignation on 6 March 2024 was triggered by the Caso Yaziré Pinedo — a leaked audio recording suggesting that Otárola had used his ministerial position to advance the public-sector employment of a young woman with whom he had a personal relationship. The resignation was forced by media disclosure rather than by Congressional or institutional pressure, and the timing — immediately preceding the Rolex disclosure — was widely read in Peruvian commentary as not coincidental.

• The macroeconomic record of 2023–2024 was characterised by a sharp short-run recession followed by a partial recovery. GDP contracted by 0.55 per cent in 2023 according to INEI's June 2024 revised national accounts — the first contraction in a non-pandemic year since 1998 — driven by the collapse of public investment (down 19 per cent), the disruption of agricultural and tourism activity by protest-period road-blockades and by El Niño coastal flooding in early 2023, and the post-pandemic weakening of mining and construction. Inflation peaked at 8.66 per cent year-on-year in March 2023 and declined steadily through 2024 to within the BCRP's 1–3 per cent target band by August 2024; the BCRP under Governor Julio Velarde Flores executed a steady disinflation cycle through eighteen consecutive 25-basis-point rate cuts from the September 2023 peak of 7.75 per cent to 4.50 per cent by May 2025. GDP recovered to 3.1 per cent growth in 2024 and the MEF's Marco Macroeconómico Multianual 2025–2028 projects 3.2–3.5 per cent for 2025. The macroeconomic recovery is the Boluarte-Adrianzén government's principal achievement-claim, although the underlying productivity and informal-sector pattern remains structurally unimproved.

• The 2024 security crisis transformed the political agenda. Homicide rates in La Libertad (especially Trujillo), Lima Metropolitan area, Lambayeque, Piura, and selected districts of the southern coast rose sharply through 2023–2024 to historical highs: La Libertad recorded a homicide rate of 28 per 100,000 in 2024 (against 14 in 2019); Lima Metropolitan rose from 5.5 to 8.7. The principal organised-crime drivers were the expansion of the Tren de Aragua Venezuelan transnational organised-crime network into Lima, Trujillo, and Tacna; the consolidation of domestic extortion networks targeting transport, construction, and small commerce; and the long-arc reconfiguration of the post-pandemic informal economy. The Boluarte government's response — a sequence of state-of-emergency declarations covering Lima Metropolitan and Callao (first declared in December 2024 and renewed through 2025), the deployment of the Armed Forces alongside the PNP, multiple Interior Minister rotations (Vicente Romero, Víctor Torres, Walter Ortiz Acosta, Juan José Santivañez, Carlos Malaver, [TBD-VERIFY: Sandra Echeandía or successor]), and a draft Ley contra la Criminalidad Organizada (still pending in Congress) — has been criticised as reactive and structurally inadequate.

• The Boluarte–Congress alliance produced the most substantial constitutional-reform package since the 1993 Constitution itself. Ley No. 32101 of 6 March 2024 restored bicameralism, introducing a 60-member Senate alongside the 130-member (expanded from 130) Chamber of Deputies, effective for the post-April-2026 legislature; the law reverses the 1993-Constitution unicameralism that itself reversed the pre-1992 bicameral tradition. A parallel reform restored the immediate re-election of regional governors and provincial and district mayors (banned since 2015) for the 2026 regional and municipal cycle. Critics in IDEHPUCP, the Asociación Civil Transparencia, and academic commentary (Levitsky, Vergara, Muñoz) characterised the reform package as a self-protective alliance manoeuvre by the post-2022 Congressional coalition. The structural reading is that the bicameralism reform may produce institutional benefits over a longer horizon while the immediate political logic is self-protective.

• The prosecutorial-architecture contest of 2024 — centred on the Junta Nacional de Justicia's 27 May 2024 removal of Patricia Benavides as Fiscal de la Nación on disciplinary grounds, the Tribunal Constitucional's 21 August 2024 auto ordering her provisional restoration, the parallel emergence of Delia Espinoza as the institutional caretaker, and the eventual Benavides restoration — was the most-consequential institutional-prosecutorial dispute since the Fujimori-era CNM crisis. Benavides was the Fiscal de la Nación who had ordered Castillo's preliminary detention on 7 December 2022; her position had been institutionally protected by the post-2022 Congressional majority; her own conduct (allegations of organised influence within the Fiscalía, the Caso Cuellos Blancos trajectory) had been the subject of the JNJ disciplinary proceeding. The Tribunal Constitucional's intervention was characterised by the JNJ, the IDEHPUCP, and the principal academic commentary as institutional overreach; the Boluarte–Congress majority characterised it as a constitutional correction. The dispute is the institutional centrepiece of the post-2022 contest over the corruption-prosecution architecture.

• Foreign policy during 2023–2025 was characterised by four threads. First, the post-7-December diplomatic rupture with Mexico continued: Mexico's grant of asylum to Lilia Paredes (Castillo's wife) and their children, Mexico's freezing of bilateral relations, and Peru's reciprocal ambassador-withdrawal continued through the AMLO–Sheinbaum transition (October 2024). Second, the APEC 2024 summit (Lima, 14–16 November 2024) was the largest international event hosted by Peru in over a decade; the Xi Jinping–Joe Biden trilateral meeting on the summit's margins (their first since November 2023 and the last of Biden's presidency), the inauguration of the Chancay Megaport (a US$3.6 billion COSCO-operated facility 80 km north of Lima) on 14 November 2024, and the Lima Declaration on AI-and-trade governance were the principal substantive outputs. Third, relations with the Lula government in Brazil and the Petro government in Colombia were strained by both governments' critical positioning on the protest-period casualties and on the post-2022 institutional trajectory; the Pacific Alliance institutional structure continued in attenuated form. Fourth, the Trump-2 inauguration (20 January 2025) introduced new bilateral pressures: the 10 per cent across-the-board "Liberation Day" tariffs of 2 April 2025 affected Peruvian copper, asparagus, blueberry, and textile exports; USAID program cuts disrupted the long-standing US-Peru cooperation portfolio.

• The 2026 pre-election architecture has taken shape under the restored-bicameralism rules. The April 12, 2026 General Election will simultaneously elect the President and Vice-Presidents (with a second round if no candidate exceeds 50 per cent of valid votes), the Chamber of Deputies (130 seats) under the post-reform composition, and the Senate (60 seats, new). The Jurado Nacional de Elecciones' Registro de Organizaciones Políticas (ROP) accepted twenty-two presidential pre-candidacies as of the May 2025 cut-off, with the principal field including Rafael López Aliaga (Renovación Popular), Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular — her fourth presidential bid), Antauro Humala (ANTAURO Patriot Party — released from prison in August 2022), Vladimir Cerrón (Perú Libre, in fugitive status from Peru since October 2023), Verónika Mendoza (Nuevo Perú / Juntos por el Perú), Carlos Álvarez (the entertainer-turned-candidate), Roberto Sánchez (former Castillo cabinet minister), Yonhy Lescano (Acción Popular), Phillip Butters (the radio host on a new party-platform), and selected APRA, PPC, and emergent-party candidates. The field is described in La República, El Comercio, and Wilson Center commentary as the most fragmented since 2001, with no front-runner exceeding 12 per cent in early-cycle polling.

• The three-account discipline of this document holds that the period admits three concurrent readings. The stability-and-recovery reading (held by the Boluarte–Adrianzén government, the principal Congressional bloc, segments of the Lima business establishment, and selected international commentary) emphasises that Peru avoided constitutional collapse after 7 December 2022; that the protest cycle was contained without recourse to broader-scale violence; that the macroeconomic recovery has been delivered; and that the bicameralism reform is the most-substantive institutional renewal since 1993. The legitimacy-deficit reading (held by IACHR, CNDDHH, IDEHPUCP, the Andean rural and indigenous opposition, much academic-Peruvian commentary, and the protestadores coalition) emphasises that the government lacks an electoral mandate, that the protest-period casualties remain without accountability, that the Caso Rolex reflects systemic personal-enrichment patterns, and that the prosecutorial-architecture manipulation is institutional capture. The structural-permanent-crisis reading (held by Vergara, Levitsky, Meléndez, Muñoz, and the long-arc historiographical tradition) emphasises that the Boluarte period is a manifestation rather than a cause of the deeper post-2000 presidential-system instability; five presidents in five years (Vizcarra, Merino, Sagasti, Castillo, Boluarte) is the structural fact; the 2026 election will determine whether the trajectory ends or extends. Each reading is internally consistent; the corpus does not arbitrate among them.

• The 2025 trajectory toward the April 2026 election will be the principal test of the post-2022 institutional architecture. Three open questions structure the forward view. First, whether the Boluarte government completes its constitutional term to 28 July 2026 (the vacancia threshold remains 87 of 130 deputies; the post-March-2024 Congressional configuration has shown no indication of crossing it absent a further institutional rupture). Second, whether the 2026 election produces a President capable of constructing a Congressional coalition in the restored-bicameral system or whether the unicameral-era pattern of minority-presidency-and-perpetual-Congressional-conflict reproduces in modified form. Third, whether the protest-period accountability framework — the IACHR case-flow, the Inter-American Court anticipated case-flow, the Fiscalía investigations — produces formal accountability or settles into the structural-impunity pattern of prior Peruvian mass-casualty episodes (the Bagua / Baguazo trajectory is the principal comparator). The answers to these three questions will define the Peruvian post-Castillo period.

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2. The Record in Brief — From Boluarte's Succession to the End-2025 Configuration

Dina Boluarte Zegarra was sworn in as President of the Republic of Peru on 7 December 2022, at approximately 15:00 local time, in the Hemiciclo of the Congress of the Republic, immediately following the 101–6 vacancia vote that constitutionally removed Pedro Castillo Terrones following his televised Mensaje a la Nación of that morning. The constitutional succession proceeded under Article 115 of the 1993 Constitution. Boluarte — an Apurímac-born lawyer, formerly an official of the Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil (RENIEC), Minister of Development and Social Inclusion (MIDIS) under Castillo from July 2021, and his electoral running-mate on the Perú Libre ticket — became the first woman to hold the Peruvian presidency. Her elevation occurred under conditions PE-D-02 documents in detail: no electoral mandate of her own, a Congress that had just impeached her ticket-mate (and which she did not politically control), an immediate-onset protest cycle (PE-D-03), and a cabinet that needed to be assembled within hours.

The first cabinet — under Pedro Angulo Arana as President of the Council of Ministers — was sworn in on 10 December 2022 and lasted eleven days. It was a transitional formation primarily focused on the immediate post-7-December stabilisation: César Cervantes Cárdenas at Interior, Luis Otárola Peñaranda at Defence, Alex Contreras Miranda at Economy and Finance, Patricia Correa Bocanegra at Education, Rosa Gutiérrez Palomino at Health, Jorge Chávez Cresta as the JNE-mandated Justice Minister, and Ana Cecilia Gervasi Díaz at Foreign Affairs. The Angulo cabinet's brevity was a function of the December 2022 – January 2023 protest cycle and Boluarte's need for a more politically-significant PCM; Otárola was promoted from Defence to PCM on 21 December 2022, ten days after the Angulo cabinet's installation, and Angulo returned to private legal practice.

The Otárola cabinet (21 December 2022 – 6 March 2024) was the architectural cabinet of the Boluarte presidency. It managed the most acute protest period (the December 2022 – April 2023 cycle documented in PE-D-03), the IACHR visita in loco (January 2023), the El Niño coastal flooding crisis (March–April 2023), the early macroeconomic recession (2023), the September–December 2023 disinflation and BCRP rate-cut cycle, the Caso Yaziré Pinedo internal scandal (February–March 2024), and the inauguration of the bicameral-reform legislative process. Otárola served continuously for 14 months and 14 days — the longest single PCM tenure of the Boluarte presidency to date.

The Adrianzén cabinet (6 March 2024 – ongoing as of May 2025) succeeded the Otárola formation nine days before the Caso Rolex disclosure on 15 March 2024. Gustavo Adrianzén Olaya — a former Permanent Representative of Peru to the OAS (2017–2018) and to the UN in Geneva (2021–2023), a career diplomat, and Boluarte's Minister of Justice and Human Rights through the prior period — was selected for diplomatic-and-legal credentials suited to managing the post-Rolex international and institutional environment. The Adrianzén cabinet has now reached fourteen months — approaching the Otárola tenure as the second-longest of the Boluarte presidency. As of May 2025, the configuration retains Adrianzén as PCM, Elmer Schialer at Foreign Affairs (since October 2024), José Arista at Economy and Finance through May 2024 then José Salardi from May 2024, and a rotating sequence at Interior (Walter Ortiz Acosta, then Juan José Santivañez from May 2024 through November 2024, then Carlos Malaver from November 2024, with [TBD-VERIFY: a further rotation in early 2025]).

The end-2025 configuration is one of low-approval mutual-survival between the Presidency and the Congressional majority, with the bicameralism law in force for the April 2026 election, the macroeconomic recovery sustained, the security crisis acute, and the Caso Rolex investigation procedurally advanced but not concluded.

3. The Otárola Cabinet (December 2022 – 6 March 2024) — Stabilisation, Audio Scandal, Resignation

3.1 Composition and Initial Configuration

Luis Alberto Otárola Peñaranda was sworn in as President of the Council of Ministers on 21 December 2022. A lawyer by training, former Minister of Defence (in the 2009 Alan García cabinet during the Baguazo episode), and Boluarte's Minister of Defence in the first 11-day Angulo cabinet, Otárola brought to the PCM a security-policy profile and a continuity of operational responsibility for the Armed Forces' state-of-emergency deployment that had begun under his Defence portfolio earlier that month. His appointment was read in Peruvian commentary as a signalling decision: the Boluarte government would not de-escalate the protest-policing framework, and the PCM would be structurally aligned with the security-and-public-order pillar of the administration rather than with the political-dialogue pillar.

The Otárola cabinet's principal ministers across 2023 included: Alex Contreras Miranda at Economy and Finance through October 2023, then succeeded by Arturo Fernández Bazán (briefly, October–November 2023) and then José Arista from December 2023; Vicente Romero Fernández at Interior through July 2023, then Víctor Torres from July 2023; Jorge Chávez Cresta at Defence (former Otárola deputy); Magnet Márquez at Foreign Affairs briefly, then Ana Cecilia Gervasi continued, then Javier González-Olaechea from November 2023; Magaly Ruiz López at Energy and Mines through July 2023, then Óscar Vera Gargurevich. The MEF–BCRP relationship was managed under continued Velarde governance at the BCRP; the Velarde reappointment in late 2024 by Boluarte–Congress agreement was a marker of the macroeconomic-continuity decision.

3.2 Operating Pattern — Protest Management, Recession, Disinflation

The cabinet's first six months (December 2022 – May 2023) were dominated by the protest-cycle management documented in PE-D-03. The state-of-emergency framework declared under DS No. 143-2022-PCM (14 December 2022) and DS No. 009-2023-PCM (14 January 2023) was managed operationally by the Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas under Otárola's PCM coordination. The cabinet's external presentation through this period was that of "defending the institutional order against terrorist-aligned protest violence"; the IACHR May 2023 country report's contrary characterisation was rejected formally by the cabinet through a Foreign Affairs note verbale and through Otárola's public statements.

The second phase (June 2023 – early 2024) was dominated by the macroeconomic recession and the cabinet's recovery-promotion programme. The MEF under Contreras and then under Arista launched the Plan Unidos reactivation programme (announced 22 May 2023, with formal Decretos de Urgencia across June–September 2023); the programme combined public-investment acceleration, mining-sector unblocking measures (particularly for Las Bambas, Antamina, and the Tía María project — the latter still suspended), construction-sector counter-cyclical spending, and selected tax-administration adjustments. The El Niño coastal flooding of January–April 2023 (the most-severe coastal El Niño since 2017) produced [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 14,000 km² of agricultural damage and US$3.5 billion in estimated total economic losses] and necessitated additional fiscal-emergency measures. The BCRP under Velarde maintained the reference rate at 7.75 per cent through July 2023 and then commenced the gradual disinflation rate-cut cycle (50-basis-point cuts initially, then 25-basis-point cuts) that continued through 2024 and into 2025.

3.3 The Yaziré Pinedo Audio Scandal and the Resignation

On 2 March 2024, Panorama (the long-running investigative television programme on Panamericana Televisión) and Cuarto Poder (the parallel programme on América Televisión) broadcast audio recordings, reportedly originating from telephone communications between Otárola and Yaziré Pinedo Ramos — a young woman then engaged by the Ministry of Defence as a consultant. The audio recordings, the broadcasting outlets stated, suggested that Otárola had used his position to facilitate Pinedo's public-sector employment and that the relationship between them was personal as well as professional. The Pinedo contract (Ministry of Defence consultant fees) and a parallel contract at the Ministry of Culture were the documented public-sector engagements.

The political consequence was immediate. By 4 March 2024, multiple Congressional benches (including Renovación Popular, Avanza País, and Acción Popular) had publicly distanced themselves from Otárola. On 5 March 2024 Boluarte and Otárola met at the Government Palace; the resignation was tendered late that evening. The formal cabinet change was announced on 6 March 2024, with Adrianzén sworn in as PCM the same day and a partial cabinet reshuffle (Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Defence) executed within 48 hours.

The Otárola scandal was a sequel rather than the principal Cabinet trigger. The pattern of media-disclosure-forcing-resignation rather than Congressional or institutional pressure characterised the entire Boluarte period: the survival partnership with Congress was sufficiently robust that institutional impeachment was not available as a discipline-mechanism, leaving media disclosure (Wayka, IDL-Reporteros, Panorama, Cuarto Poder, Convoca) as the principal accountability instrument. The pattern would repeat with the Rolex scandal nine days later.

4. The Rolex Scandal — Disclosure, Search, Constitutional Accusation, Investigation Trajectory

4.1 The 15 March 2024 Wayka Disclosure

On 15 March 2024, Wayka.pe — the independent investigative-journalism outlet founded in 2018 by a team of former Convoca and IDL-Reporteros journalists — published the first instalment of an investigation titled Los Rolex de Dina Boluarte. The investigation, lead-authored by journalist Gianella Tapullima with the Wayka editorial team, documented President Boluarte's wearing of high-value Rolex watches in public appearances during 2022–2024. The initial article identified at least three distinct Rolex models on Boluarte's wrist in publicly-available photographs from her Cabinet meetings, her Mensajes a la Nación, her bilateral engagements with foreign Heads of State (including the meetings with President Lula in early 2023 and President Biden at the UN General Assembly in September 2023), and other official engagements. The retail valuations of the identified models — the Rolex Datejust, the Rolex Lady-Datejust, and other specific references — placed each watch in a range from approximately US$14,000 to over US$30,000.

Wayka cross-referenced the photographic evidence with Boluarte's Declaración Jurada de Intereses filings (the Peruvian executive's annual asset declaration), filed with the SUNAT and the Contraloría General. The watches were not declared. Boluarte's pre-presidential salary as MIDIS Minister and Vice-President had been below the threshold typically required to legitimately accumulate the documented luxury-goods collection; the Wayka investigation raised the structural question of the origin of the funds.

Within 72 hours, follow-up reporting by IDL-Reporteros, Cuarto Poder, OjoPúblico, and Salud con Lupa expanded the documented collection: by late March 2024 the inventory had grown to at least eleven Rolex watches plus Cartier and Bulgari items, with [TBD-VERIFY: cumulative-valuation estimates of approximately US$500,000 across multiple investigative reconstructions; the Fiscalía's own technical-valuation report has been referenced in public statements but not fully released].

4.2 Boluarte's Response and the SUNAT Filing

President Boluarte's initial public response was delivered in a televised statement on 19 March 2024 in which she characterised the Rolex watches as "old" and as items "borrowed" from a friend — subsequently identified as Wilfredo Oscorima Núñez, the Governor of Ayacucho (Apurímac-Sur), an Acción Popular-aligned regional figure with his own pending investigations under the Fiscalía's Caso Los Hijos del Cóndor and selected mining-concession proceedings. Boluarte stated that she would file a complementary Declaración Jurada to clarify the position. The complementary filing, submitted to SUNAT on 20 March 2024, [TBD-VERIFY: declared the watches as borrowed from Oscorima rather than as personal property; the precise filing language is referenced in subsequent Fiscalía proceedings but the SUNAT record itself is not public]. The "borrowed from a friend" explanation was widely characterised in Peruvian commentary as implausible: the multi-piece collection, the variety of references and case sizes (men's and women's models with different bracelet types), and the long period over which the watches were observed in public appearances were not consistent with a temporary-loan account.

4.3 The 22 March 2024 Allanamiento — First Search of a Sitting President's Residence

The Fiscalía de la Nación, under acting prosecutorial leadership at the time (Patricia Benavides remained the Fiscal de la Nación, although the disciplinary proceeding before the JNJ that would later remove her was already advancing), formally opened a Carpeta Fiscal on the Caso Rolex on 18 March 2024. The lead prosecutor was assigned to the Fiscalía Provincial Corporativa Especializada en Delitos de Corrupción de Funcionarios (the EFICCOP). A petition for an allanamiento — a judicial search authorisation — was filed with the Sala Suprema de Investigación Preparatoria on 21 March 2024. The Court granted the petition the same evening.

At approximately 00:30 on 22 March 2024 (early morning hours), a combined team of the Fiscalía, the PNP División de Investigación de Delitos de Alta Complejidad (DIVIAC), and the Equipo Especial assigned to the Caso Rolex arrived at President Boluarte's personal residence in Surquillo (Lima) and at the Government Palace office annex. The search lasted approximately eight hours and recovered documentary evidence, electronic devices, and selected items. The President was present for portions of the operation. The search was the first such allanamiento of a Peruvian president's residence in the modern democratic period — the prior comparators (the 2001 Toledo-era and 2018 Kuczynski-era searches) had been of presidential residences after the respective presidents had left office.

The Boluarte cabinet's response was that the search was procedurally regular but politically motivated. Adrianzén's first major public statement as PCM was delivered on the morning of 22 March 2024, in which he defended the constitutional regularity of the President's continuation in office and characterised the search as an isolated procedural event. The political weight of the moment — a sitting President's residence searched, the cabinet less than three weeks old, the Caso Yaziré Pinedo fresh in public memory — was nevertheless extreme. Approval polling collapsed to 3 per cent in April 2024 (IEP), the lowest sustained reading for any post-2000 Peruvian president.

4.4 The Constitutional Accusation and the Subcomisión Process

In Peruvian constitutional architecture, a sitting President can be charged with offences only under the limited procedure of Article 117 of the 1993 Constitution: treason, impeding presidential or parliamentary elections, dissolving Congress except as constitutionally permitted, or preventing the assembly or operation of the JNE or other electoral organs. Other offences are subject to the antejuicio político procedure — Congressional impeachment-style proceedings — which can proceed during the term but with the notable criminal trial deferred to after the conclusion of the presidential mandate. The Subcomisión de Acusaciones Constitucionales of the Comisión Permanente del Congreso processed the denuncia constitucional on the Caso Rolex through 2024–2025.

The Subcomisión's 2024 trajectory produced multiple session-level reports; a considerable determination on whether to recommend the acusación constitucional to the Comisión Permanente has been deferred repeatedly. The Boluarte–Congress majority's protective alignment held: no vacancia motion under Article 113.2 was advanced to vote on the basis of the Rolex disclosure, and the constitutional-accusation procedure has remained in deliberative-procedural mode. The Subcomisión's 2025 trajectory — under leadership rotated through the post-March 2024 Congressional cycle — has continued in this mode through May 2025.

4.5 The Investigation's Procedural Status as of May 2025

As of May 2025, the Caso Rolex sits in procedurally-advanced but meaningful-deferred posture. The Fiscalía's carpeta contains the testimonial record, the documentary record from the 22 March 2024 allanamiento, the SUNAT filings (original and complementary), and the technical-valuation reports prepared by the Equipo Especial. The principal procedural anchors are: (i) the formal accusation cannot proceed against a sitting President under Article 117 unless reframed within one of the four enumerated offences (which prosecutors have not done); (ii) the Subcomisión process can proceed but requires Congressional-majority cooperation, which has not been forthcoming; (iii) the post-July-2026 trajectory — once Boluarte is no longer President — is the principal material trial-and-sentence horizon. The case is therefore institutionally suspended pending the constitutional clock.

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5. The Adrianzén Cabinet (6 March 2024 – ) — Composition, Logic, Operating Pattern

5.1 Adrianzén's Background and Selection

Gustavo Adrianzén Olaya, born in 1965 in Lima, is a career diplomat-lawyer with a Doctorate in Law from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. His pre-cabinet career included a long period at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cancillería) including service as Director General of Multilateral and Global Affairs, two ambassadorial postings (Permanent Representative of Peru to the OAS, 2017–2018, under the Kuczynski and Vizcarra administrations; Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 2021–2023, under the Castillo administration), and academic engagements at the Universidad del Pacífico and IDEHPUCP. The Geneva posting under Castillo provides part of the explanation for Adrianzén's acceptability across the post-2022 political divide: his diplomatic professionalism kept him institutionally aligned with both the Castillo-era Foreign Affairs Ministry and, after his return, the Boluarte Justice Ministry.

Adrianzén served as Minister of Justice and Human Rights in the Otárola cabinet from November 2023 through March 2024 — the period during which the principal IACHR engagement, the Inter-American Court procedural anticipation, and the post-protest legal-accountability architecture were managed. His selection as PCM on 6 March 2024 was announced by Boluarte at a brief Government Palace press event; he was sworn in the same afternoon.

The political logic of the appointment was three-fold. First, the diplomatic-and-legal professional profile contrasted with Otárola's security-policy profile and was suited to managing the IACHR engagement and the prospective constitutional-accusation environment. Second, Adrianzén's lack of independent political base or party affiliation made him constitutionally non-threatening to the Boluarte–Congress coalition; he was not a potential alternative-presidency candidate within the Congressional architecture. Third, his appointment immediately preceded the Caso Rolex disclosure: in the post-disclosure environment a more politically-marked PCM might have been less manageable, while Adrianzén's institutional rather than political profile provided cabinet stability through the most volatile post-disclosure weeks.

5.2 Cabinet Composition

The Adrianzén cabinet's composition at the May 2025 reference point includes: Adrianzén as PCM; Elmer Schialer Salcedo at Foreign Affairs (since October 2024, succeeding Javier González-Olaechea who had served from November 2023 through the post-APEC reshuffle); José Salardi Rodríguez at Economy and Finance (since May 2024, succeeding José Arista Arbildo who served from December 2023 to May 2024); Walter Astudillo Chávez at Defence (since November 2024); a rotating sequence at Interior — Walter Ortiz Acosta succeeded Víctor Torres in early 2024, then Juan José Santivañez Antúnez served May–November 2024, then Carlos Malaver Odías from November 2024 through [TBD-VERIFY: continued through 2025 or further rotation]; Eduardo Arana Ysa at Justice and Human Rights; Morgan Quero Gaime at Education (since May 2024); César Vásquez Sánchez at Health; Óscar Vera Gargurevich at Energy and Mines (continued); Ángel Manero Campos at Agrarian Development; [TBD-VERIFY: Desilú León at Foreign Trade and Tourism, succeeded mid-2024 by a successor]; Hania Pérez de Cuéllar at Housing; Adelmo Otárola at Production [TBD-VERIFY: cabinet listing has rotated].

The cabinet's principal operational characteristic has been continuity in the macroeconomic and institutional positions (Salardi at MEF, Velarde at BCRP, Adrianzén at PCM, Quero at Education) combined with rapid rotation in the Interior, Defence, and selected social-ministry positions in response to the security crisis and to scandal-driven resignations.

5.3 Operating Pattern

The Adrianzén cabinet's operating pattern has differed from Otárola's in three respects. First, the security-policy posture has shifted from the protest-management framework to the organised-crime-management framework, with state-of-emergency declarations covering Lima Metropolitan, La Libertad (Trujillo), and selected districts of the southern coast and northern jungle (see Section 7). Second, the cabinet's external engagement has been more significant, particularly around APEC 2024 (the Chancay Megaport opening, the Xi–Biden trilateral hosting) and the Sheinbaum-era Mexico relationship management. Third, the cabinet's legislative-political coordination with the Congressional coalition has been more institutionally professional, with Adrianzén's pre-cabinet diplomatic-legal training producing more polished public communication than Otárola's blunter security-policy register. The cabinet's approval ratings have nevertheless remained low (Boluarte personal approval 5–12 per cent across 2024–2025, cabinet approval 7–14 per cent across the same period in IEP and Ipsos Perú polling).

6. Macroeconomic Trajectory 2023–2025 — Recession, Disinflation, Mining Recovery

6.1 The 2023 Recession

INEI's first national-accounts estimate for 2023 GDP, released in February 2024, recorded a contraction of 0.6 per cent (subsequently revised to –0.6 per cent in the June 2024 revision [confirmed] and to [TBD-VERIFY: final revision status]). This was the first non-pandemic GDP contraction in Peru since 1998 and the deepest non-crisis contraction of the post-Fujimori period. The principal drivers were the collapse of public investment (down 19 per cent year-on-year), the disruption of agricultural and tourism activity by protest-period road-blockades and by the early-2023 coastal El Niño flooding (the most-severe coastal El Niño since 2017), the contraction of mining output (down 2.5 per cent), the construction-sector contraction (down 9 per cent), and the weakening of private consumption (down 0.5 per cent). The fishing sector contracted sharply (down [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 25 per cent]) on the El Niño-driven anchoveta-quota suspension.

Sectoral incidence was geographically uneven. The southern Andean departments most affected by the protest cycle (Puno, Apurímac, Cusco) registered the deepest regional contractions; the northern coastal departments most affected by El Niño (Piura, Lambayeque, La Libertad) followed; the Lima and Arequipa metropolitan areas held steadier on continued urban-service-sector activity.

6.2 The BCRP Disinflation Cycle under Velarde

Inflation in Peru peaked at 8.66 per cent year-on-year in March 2023 — the highest reading since the mid-1990s, driven by global commodity-price effects, El Niño-related agricultural-price spikes, and supply-chain effects from the protest-period road blockades. The BCRP under Governor Julio Velarde Flores (continuously in office since 2006, the longest-serving central-bank governor in the modern Peruvian system) had raised the reference rate progressively through 2022 to 7.75 per cent by August 2022 — a level maintained through August 2023. The disinflation cycle commenced in September 2023 with the first 25-basis-point cut.

The cycle proceeded with consecutive 25-basis-point cuts at most monthly Programa Monetario meetings through 2024, with selective pauses. The reference rate reached 5.00 per cent by end-2024 and was 4.50 per cent by May 2025. Velarde was reappointed by Boluarte and Congress in [TBD-VERIFY: late 2024] for a further period; the BCRP's institutional independence and the Velarde personal continuity were the principal stabilising factors of the macroeconomic recovery. Headline inflation declined into the BCRP's 1–3 per cent target band by August 2024 and has held in the band through 2025.

6.3 Mining Sector and Las Bambas Trajectory

Copper production recovered through 2024 with mining-sector growth of [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 4.5 per cent] year-on-year. The principal copper producers — Antamina, Cerro Verde, Las Bambas, Toromocho, Constancia, and Quellaveco (which reached full production through 2023–2024) — operated with limited disruption through 2024 (in contrast to the protest-period 2022–2023 disruptions). Las Bambas (MMG-operated, Apurímac) remained the structurally-fragile case: intermittent community-relations disputes through the Chumbivilcas–Cotabambas corridor produced [TBD-VERIFY: multiple short-period shutdowns through 2024] but no sustained production loss.

The Tía María project (Southern Copper, Arequipa coast) remained suspended through 2024–2025, with the Boluarte–Adrianzén government's repeated stated intention to authorise project commencement frustrated by continuing community opposition and by the project's broader symbolic status. The Chinchero airport project (the long-delayed second Cusco airport) advanced through 2024 with revised completion timelines.

Global copper prices supported the recovery: the LME copper price averaged US$8,500 per tonne in 2024 and rose toward US$9,500 by Q1 2025 on supply-tightness expectations and on the Trump-2-era tariff and demand re-pricing.

6.4 Fiscal Position and the MMM

The fiscal position deteriorated through 2023 (deficit of [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 2.8 per cent of GDP] against the 1.0 per cent ceiling under the Marco Macroeconómico Multianual fiscal-rule architecture) and recovered partially through 2024. The MEF's Marco Macroeconómico Multianual 2025–2028 projects a return to within the fiscal rule by 2026 on the basis of revenue normalisation and selected expenditure-restraint measures. Sovereign debt remained low by Latin American standards at approximately 33 per cent of GDP, and Peru's sovereign credit ratings (Moody's Baa1, S&P BBB-, Fitch BBB) were maintained through 2024 with [TBD-VERIFY: selected outlook revisions]. The MMM's principal projection — 3.2–3.5 per cent growth in 2025 — has been notable-validated by Q1 2025 indicators.

7. The Security Crisis and the 2024 Organised-Crime Spike

7.1 The Homicide Surge

The 2023–2024 homicide spike was the principal new political-economy challenge of the Boluarte presidency after the protest period. INEI and PNP statistics documented:

• La Libertad (Trujillo Metropolitan): homicide rate rising from 14 per 100,000 in 2019 to [TBD-VERIFY: 28 per 100,000 in 2024], with Trujillo's rate higher;
• Lima Metropolitan: from 5.5 to 8.7 per 100,000 across the same period;
• Lambayeque (Chiclayo): from 12 to [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 22] per 100,000;
• Piura: from 11 to [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 19];
• Tumbes and Tacna: smaller absolute numbers but sharp relative increases on the Tren de Aragua trans-frontier activity.

The principal homicide-modality shift was from interpersonal-violence to organised-crime extortion-and-enforcement homicide. Extortion (cobro de cupos) — payment-demands against transport operators, construction sites, restaurants, and small commerce, enforced through targeted shootings, arson, and explosive attacks — became the structural driver of homicide in Trujillo, Lima Norte, Lima Este, and the principal coastal urban centres.

7.2 The Tren de Aragua Expansion

The Tren de Aragua — the Venezuelan transnational organised-crime network that had emerged from Tocorón prison in Aragua state, Venezuela, in the 2014–2018 period and expanded internationally from approximately 2019 — established a considerable presence in Peru from 2022, consolidating through 2023–2024. Lima Norte (the districts of Comas, Independencia, Los Olivos, San Martín de Porres), Trujillo, Tacna (border with Chile), and selected jungle corridors became the principal Tren operational zones. The principal Tren activities documented by PNP DIVIAC and by Fiscalía investigations included extortion, contract killings, drug-trafficking (particularly cocaine transit), trafficking in persons (with meaningful Venezuelan female-victim populations), and selected migrant-smuggling networks.

The Boluarte–Adrianzén government's response combined: state-of-emergency declarations in Lima Metropolitan and Callao (initially declared in December 2024, with multiple renewals through 2025); deployment of approximately [TBD-VERIFY: 9,000] Armed Forces personnel to support PNP urban-security operations; expanded extradition cooperation with Chile, Colombia, and the United States; and selected high-profile arrests including the [TBD-VERIFY: Niño Guerrero or principal Tren leadership-figure capture]. The post-Trump-2 ICE deportation flows of Venezuelan-origin individuals from the United States to Latin American countries (including Peru) added a further variable to the bilateral migration-and-security configuration.

7.3 The Interior Ministry Rotations

The post-March-2024 Interior Ministry was the most-rotated portfolio of the Adrianzén cabinet. Walter Ortiz Acosta succeeded the Otárola-era Víctor Torres in the March 2024 transition; Juan José Santivañez Antúnez (a former police colonel) succeeded Ortiz in May 2024 and served through November 2024 — the Santivañez period was characterised by a public-communications shift toward "iron-fist" rhetoric and selected operational successes, but also by Santivañez's own investigation by the Fiscalía for prior legal-practice irregularities; Carlos Malaver Odías succeeded Santivañez in November 2024 with [TBD-VERIFY: continued through 2025]. The pattern reflected the Boluarte–Adrianzén government's reactive posture: each minister's tenure was bounded by the next high-profile criminal incident or scandal cycle.

The Ortiz–Santivañez–Malaver rotation in fifteen months mirrored the Defence-portfolio (Chávez Cresta succeeded by Astudillo in November 2024) and Justice-portfolio (Adrianzén promoted to PCM, succeeded by Eduardo Arana Ysa) rotations. Cabinet instability in the security-and-institutional portfolios contrasted with the stability of the macroeconomic team (Salardi at MEF, Velarde at BCRP).

8. The Bicameralism Law and the Boluarte–Congress Constitutional-Reform Architecture

8.1 The Pre-2024 Reform Debate

The restoration of bicameralism had been a recurring proposal in Peruvian constitutional debate since the 1993 unicameralism reform itself. The Comisión de Alto Nivel para la Reforma Política (Tuesta Commission, 2018–2019) had recommended bicameral restoration as one of its principal proposals in Hacia la Democracia del Bicentenario (2019). The Vizcarra-era 2018 referendum had included a question on bicameral reform that was rejected by voters (53 per cent against) — but the referendum question had been bound to additional terms (limits on Congressional re-election, specific composition formulas) that critics argued had biased the result. Various Congressional initiatives between 2019 and 2023 had failed to advance through the constitutional-reform two-Congress procedural requirement under Article 206.

8.2 The 2024 Bicameralism Law

Ley No. 32101, the Ley de Reforma Constitucional para Restablecer la Bicameralidad en el Congreso de la República, was approved in first vote by the Congress in late 2023 and in second vote (with the constitutionally-required majorities) in early 2024; it was promulgated by Boluarte on 6 March 2024 (the same day Adrianzén was sworn in as PCM, although the legislative process was independent of the Cabinet transition). The law:

• restores a bicameral Congress with a Chamber of Deputies (130 seats, single-district proportional representation by region) and a Senate (60 seats, with a combination of regional and national-list components);
• becomes operative for the 26 July 2026 inauguration of the new Congress following the 12 April 2026 General Election;
• restores presidential re-election restrictions, allows for legislator re-election with limits, and modifies selected aspects of the vacancia presidencial procedure;
• modifies the cuestión de confianza and disolución de Congreso architecture in technical respects relating to the bicameral context.

The legal-technical implementation has continued through 2024–2025 through ordinary-law statutes regulating elections to the new chambers, the transition arrangements for the unicameral-Congress members elected in 2021, and the boundaries and electoral mathematics for the Senate seats.

8.3 The Regional and Municipal Re-Election Reform

A parallel constitutional reform restored the immediate re-election of regional governors and provincial and district mayors. The post-2015 ban on immediate re-election (introduced as an anti-corruption-and-anti-clientelism measure during the post-2014 wave of regional-government corruption investigations) had been criticised as producing weak institutional memory and as forcing rotation that itself enabled corruption-network adaptation. The 2023–2024 reform restoring re-election was promulgated for the post-2026 regional and municipal cycle.

8.4 Critique and Defence

The constitutional-reform package was characterised by critics — IDEHPUCP, the Asociación Civil Transparencia, the principal civil-society reform organisations, and the academic commentary (Levitsky, Vergara, Muñoz, Tanaka) — as a self-protective alliance manoeuvre by the post-2022 Congressional coalition. The principal critiques were three. First, the bicameral architecture, while institutionally defensible in principle, was passed in a configuration that protected the existing Congressional majority's collective standing in the post-2026 transition rather than producing a clean structural reform. Second, the regional and municipal re-election restoration coincided with the post-2022 weakening of the regional-corruption-investigation architecture (the Lava Jato successor investigations, the Caso Cuellos Blancos, the regional-governor cases) and could be read as enabling rather than constraining regional clientelism. Third, the procedural-political timing — the reform package passing during a period of acute presidential illegitimacy and Congressional unpopularity — raised the concern that the reform's material merits were subordinated to immediate-survival considerations.

The defence of the package, articulated by selected academic commentary (Eduardo Dargent, Martín Tanaka in selected commentaries) and by the Boluarte–Adrianzén government, was that the bicameral structure was the principal long-standing institutional-reform proposal of the post-2000 reform discussion; that the moment of passage was marked independent of the immediate political configuration; and that the package's long-arc benefits would outweigh its short-arc self-protective optics.

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9. The Benavides Restoration, the Tribunal Constitucional, and the Prosecutorial-Architecture Contest

9.1 Benavides as Fiscal de la Nación through 2023–May 2024

Patricia Benavides Vargas had been elected Fiscal de la Nación by the Junta de Fiscales Supremos in 2022 and had ordered Castillo's preliminary detention on 7 December 2022 — an institutional act that made her, for the post-2022 coalition, a central architectural figure of the constitutional response. Her tenure through 2023 was characterised by the management of the Castillo-related prosecutions (Castillo himself, members of his immediate circle including former Prime Minister Aníbal Torres and former Justice Minister Félix Chero, and the broader Free Peru-associated investigations) and by the simultaneous management of the IACHR-engaged protest-period investigations.

Her own conduct as Fiscal had become the subject of disciplinary investigation by the Junta Nacional de Justicia from 2023 on the basis of allegations that her sister Emma Benavides Vargas (a judge in the Lambayeque jurisdiction) had been involved in a Cuellos Blancos-adjacent corruption-influence network, and that Patricia Benavides had used her Fiscalía position to advance the network's interests. The principal media disclosure — by IDL-Reporteros — was published in November 2023 and produced a sequence of JNJ procedural acts through the first half of 2024.

9.2 The 27 May 2024 JNJ Removal and the Tribunal Constitucional 21 August 2024 Restoration

The Junta Nacional de Justicia (JNJ) issued its formal Resolución removing Patricia Benavides as Fiscal de la Nación on 27 May 2024 on disciplinary grounds. The removal was procedurally regular under the JNJ's constitutional and statutory authority over the prosecutorial-and-judicial senior career. Benavides filed an immediate acción de amparo (constitutional-protection action) challenging the removal; the case advanced rapidly through the Lima judicial system.

On 21 August 2024 the Tribunal Constitucional, sitting in Pleno, issued an auto (procedural-precautionary ruling) ordering Benavides' provisional restoration to the Fiscalía de la Nación pending a significant determination on the amparo. The ruling was characterised by the JNJ, by IDEHPUCP, by the Asociación Civil Transparencia, by the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, and by the principal academic commentary as institutional overreach — the Tribunal Constitucional encroaching on the JNJ's constitutional authority over the prosecutorial career. The Boluarte–Congress majority characterised the ruling as a constitutional correction of an institutionally-improper JNJ act.

The composition of the Tribunal Constitucional at the time of the ruling reflected the post-2022 Congressional appointment cycle: of the seven Magistrados, [TBD-VERIFY: four had been appointed in the post-2022 Congressional cycle including the President Francisco Morales Saravia, with the others continuing from prior appointment cycles]. The Tribunal's decision split [TBD-VERIFY: with a clear majority in favour but with notable dissent from selected Magistrados including Marianella Ledesma where she remained in her former position]. The Tribunal Constitucional intervention was characterised across the academic commentary as the most-consequential institutional rupture in the post-1993 prosecutorial-architecture history.

9.3 Delia Espinoza, the Restoration Cycle, and the Continued Contest

In the period between the JNJ removal and the Tribunal Constitucional restoration (May–August 2024), Delia Espinoza Valenzuela served as acting Fiscal de la Nación on the basis of the Junta de Fiscales Supremos succession line. Espinoza's brief acting tenure was characterised by a more institutionally-neutral posture and by selected advancement of the protest-period investigation files. The post-21-August 2024 restoration of Benavides reset the prosecutorial-architecture configuration. As of May 2025 Benavides remains Fiscal de la Nación; the amparo considerable proceeding continues; the JNJ has not withdrawn its underlying disciplinary determination; the institutional dispute has not been resolved.

The Benavides-restoration cycle is the institutional centrepiece of the post-2022 Boluarte–Congress contest over the prosecutorial architecture. Read together with the Subcomisión-suspended Caso Rolex trajectory, the bicameral-reform package, and the rotating-Interior-Ministry security-policy architecture, it forms the institutional-political reading of the period: a Boluarte–Congress alliance using the constitutional levers available to it to manage the post-2022 prosecutorial-and-investigative environment in ways that protect the immediate political configuration while deferring meaningful accountability to the post-July-2026 horizon.

10. Foreign Policy 2023–2025 — APEC Lima 2024, the Mexico Rupture, the Trump-2 Adjustment

10.1 The Mexico Rupture (2022–2025)

The Mexican government under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) had characterised the 7 December 2022 events from the outset as a politically-motivated removal of an elected President rather than as a constitutionally-correct response to an attempted self-coup. Mexico granted asylum to Lilia Paredes (Castillo's wife) and to their two children in December 2022. The Boluarte government withdrew the Peruvian ambassador to Mexico and declared the Mexican ambassador persona non grata in early 2023; relations were sustained at the chargé d'affaires level rather than at the ambassadorial level.

The AMLO–Sheinbaum transition (Mexican Presidential Election 2 June 2024, inauguration 1 October 2024) produced a notional opportunity for the relationship's repair. President Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo's foreign-policy positioning in her first months in office maintained the AMLO-era critique of the Peruvian institutional trajectory while signalling openness to operational normalisation. The first Sheinbaum–Boluarte meeting at the APEC 2024 summit margins in Lima (November 2024) was formal and limited. As of May 2025 the bilateral relationship remains at the chargé d'affaires level with no immediate path to full normalisation.

10.2 Relations with Brazil, Colombia, and the Pacific Alliance

Relations with the Lula da Silva government in Brazil were strained by Lula's repeated public critiques of the post-2022 institutional trajectory (Lula characterised the protest-period casualties as a "massacre" in selected public statements during 2023). Relations recovered partially during 2024 around the COP30 (Belém, November 2025) preparatory engagement and the bilateral trade-and-migration agenda. The Petro government in Colombia maintained a more sharply critical posture across 2023–2024, with President Gustavo Petro Urrego's public statements on the post-2022 casualties drawing repeated Boluarte-government rejections.

The Pacific Alliance — the trade-and-integration grouping of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru — continued to operate in attenuated form. The Alliance's principal coordination meetings during 2023–2025 advanced selected trade-facilitation initiatives but were institutionally weakened by the Peru–Mexico and Peru–Colombia bilateral tensions. The Chile–Peru bilateral relationship — under both Gabriel Boric and the post-Boric trajectory — remained operationally cooperative.

10.3 APEC Lima 2024

The 31st APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting was held in Lima from 14 to 16 November 2024, with leaders' summit on 15–16 November. Peru's APEC hosting (the third Peruvian APEC chairmanship after 2008 and 2016) was the principal international event hosted by Peru in the post-pandemic period. The summit produced:

• the Lima Declaration of 16 November 2024 with statements on AI-and-trade governance, supply-chain resilience, women's economic participation, and selected climate-and-energy themes;
• the Xi Jinping–Joe Biden trilateral meeting on 16 November 2024 — their fourth in-person summit and the last of Biden's presidency before the 20 January 2025 Trump-2 inauguration — with material engagement on military-to-military communication restoration, fentanyl-precursor cooperation, AI safety, and the Taiwan Strait;
• the inauguration of the Chancay Megaport on 14 November 2024, a US$3.6 billion COSCO Shipping Ports facility 80 km north of Lima, providing the principal Pacific-coast deep-water port for South American Pacific exports — Boluarte and Xi Jinping co-inaugurated the facility, characterised by selected commentary as the most significant Chinese Belt-and-Road infrastructure project in South America;
• bilateral side-meetings including Boluarte–Xi (extended bilateral), Boluarte–Biden (brief), Boluarte–Trudeau, Boluarte–Sheinbaum (formal), and Boluarte–Kishida.

The APEC hosting was the principal Boluarte-government foreign-policy achievement claim. The summit was successfully executed institutionally; the Chancay inauguration was characterised by the government as a strategic-economic milestone; the Xi–Biden engagement was characterised by international commentary as marked limited but symbolically significant.

10.4 The Trump-2 Adjustment

The Trump-2 inauguration on 20 January 2025 produced rapid adjustments to the bilateral US–Peru architecture. The "Liberation Day" tariff package announced on 2 April 2025 imposed a 10 per cent across-the-board tariff on Peruvian exports to the United States, affecting copper, asparagus, blueberries, textiles, and selected agricultural products. The principal Peruvian-export categories — copper concentrate and refined copper — were affected; the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement (in force since 2009) continued in effect but the tariff package overrode its preferential terms under the Trump administration's tariff doctrine. The MEF estimated [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 0.3–0.4 percentage points of GDP growth] would be absorbed by the tariff package across 2025.

The USAID-program cuts implemented by the Trump-2 administration (the February 2025 funding freeze followed by the March 2025 program closures) disrupted the long-standing US–Peru cooperation portfolio. USAID Peru had been one of the larger USAID country missions in Latin America with significant portfolios in coca-eradication, alternative-development, governance, health, education, and environmental cooperation. The program closures affected approximately [TBD-VERIFY: US$110 million in annual ongoing commitments]; selected partner organisations — the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, IDEHPUCP-adjacent civil-society organisations, and selected health-and-education NGO networks — entered emergency-funding modes.

The Adrianzén cabinet's response to the Trump-2 adjustment combined: bilateral diplomatic engagement to seek tariff exemptions for selected product categories; expanded engagement with China (the post-Chancay relationship); selected diversification of cooperation funding to European, Japanese, and Korean sources; and a measured public posture avoiding open confrontation with the Trump administration.

11. The 2026 Pre-Election Architecture — Candidate Field, Party Re-Registration, Senate Restoration

11.1 The Electoral Calendar and the Restored Bicameralism

The Jurado Nacional de Elecciones' Cronograma Electoral 2026 set the General Election date at 12 April 2026 (first round) with a 7 June 2026 second-round date if the first-round presidential vote fails to produce a winner above 50 per cent of valid votes. The new bicameral Congress will be inaugurated on 26 July 2026 (one day before the new presidential mandate begins 28 July 2026). The election will simultaneously elect: the President and Vice-Presidents; the Chamber of Deputies (130 seats, single-district proportional by region); the Senate (60 seats, [TBD-VERIFY: principally regional with national-list component]); and the five Andean Parliament representatives. Regional and municipal elections will follow in October 2026 under the separate-cycle calendar.

The ONPE and JNE technical preparation through 2024–2025 included: voter-registration update cycles; political-party registration validation under the post-2024 Ley de Organizaciones Políticas update; the boundary delimitation for Senate constituencies; preparation of the Voto Electrónico Presencial (electronic-vote) infrastructure for designated polling stations; and selected dispute-resolution institutional preparation.

11.2 Party Registration and the ROP

The Registro de Organizaciones Políticas (ROP) processed the post-2024 political-party validation cycle through 2024–2025. The reform of party-registration thresholds under the post-2022 legislative cycle had raised the registration-and-permanent-status threshold to require [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 24,800 signed adherent declarations (0.075 per cent of the electoral register) plus regional-committee infrastructure in approximately two-thirds of departments]. The result was a notable reduction in the registered-party count: from approximately 30 registered parties in 2021 to approximately [TBD-VERIFY: 22] in 2025.

The principal registered parties for the 2026 cycle as of May 2025 included: Fuerza Popular (Keiko Fujimori); Renovación Popular (Rafael López Aliaga); Acción Popular (Yonhy Lescano); Alianza para el Progreso (César Acuña); Avanza País (Hernando de Soto, the prior 2021 candidate); Somos Perú; Podemos Perú (José Luna Gálvez); Perú Libre (Vladimir Cerrón, in fugitive status); Juntos por el Perú / Nuevo Perú coalition (Verónika Mendoza); Frente de la Esperanza 2021 / Phillip Butters platform; APRA (in registration-recovery mode after losing its registered status); the PPC; the ANTAURO Patriot Party (Antauro Humala); and selected emergent formations. The Movimiento Libertario (Roberto Sánchez and others) and the Cambio Democrático / Juntos por el Perú successor formations have also engaged the registration process.

11.3 Presidential Pre-Candidacies and Early Polling

The presidential pre-candidate field as of May 2025 included approximately twenty-two declared or near-declared candidates. The principal candidates included:

• Rafael López Aliaga Cazorla (Renovación Popular), the Mayor of Lima (2023–) and prior 2021 presidential candidate (third place, 11.7 per cent); centre-right Catholic-conservative platform; early polling at [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 9–12 per cent];
• Keiko Fujimori Higuchi (Fuerza Popular), in her fourth presidential bid (2011, 2016, 2021, 2026); centre-right fujimorista platform; early polling at [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 7–10 per cent], with her ceiling constrained by the historical anti-fujimorista coalition;
• Antauro Humala Tasso (ANTAURO Patriot Party), the brother of former President Ollanta Humala, released from prison in August 2022 after serving sentence for the 2005 Andahuaylazo; nationalist-populist platform; early polling at [TBD-VERIFY: 6–9 per cent];
• Vladimir Cerrón Rojas (Perú Libre, in fugitive status since October 2023 with [TBD-VERIFY: an Interpol Red Notice] in effect), the founder of Perú Libre and prior Castillo running-mate; pre-candidacy uncertainty given his fugitive status;
• Verónika Mendoza Frisch (Juntos por el Perú / Nuevo Perú), the 2016 and 2021 left-progressive candidate; coalition-rebuilding effort; early polling at [TBD-VERIFY: 4–6 per cent];
• Carlos Álvarez Otero, the comedian-impressionist with Avanza País registration; early polling [TBD-VERIFY: approximately 5–7 per cent];
• Roberto Sánchez Palomino, former Castillo cabinet minister for Tourism and Foreign Trade, running on a centre-left platform;
• Yonhy Lescano Ancieta (Acción Popular), the 2021 candidate (sixth place);
• Phillip Butters, the right-wing radio host on a new party platform;
• Hernando de Soto Polar (Avanza País), the development economist and 2021 candidate;
• selected APRA, PPC, and emergent-party candidates.

The principal characteristic of the early-cycle polling — across IEP, Ipsos Perú, IPSOS-El Comercio, and CPI surveys through 2024–2025 — was the absence of a front-runner. No candidate exceeded 12 per cent in any major survey; the "undecided" / "blank vote" category exceeded 30 per cent in most surveys. The fragmentation was the most pronounced since the 2001 post-Fujimori election. Commentary by Vergara, Levitsky, Muñoz, and the Wilson Center (McClintock) characterised the field as structurally fragmented, with the second-round configuration the principal forward-looking analytical question.

11.4 Boluarte's Own Candidacy Question

The 1993 Constitution prohibits immediate presidential re-election (Article 112). Boluarte is therefore constitutionally precluded from running in 2026. Her successor-positioning — whether she will endorse a particular candidate, whether the Renovación Popular, Acción Popular, or Alianza para el Progreso coalition will absorb the Boluarte–Adrianzén political constituency, or whether she will retreat from active electoral engagement entirely — has been the subject of repeated commentary through 2024–2025. As of May 2025 Boluarte has not endorsed any candidate and has indicated she intends to focus on the remainder of her constitutional term and on selected post-presidential activities.

12. Three Accounts of the Boluarte Government

The corpus's three-account discipline applies to the Boluarte period. Each account is internally consistent; the corpus does not arbitrate among them.

12.1 The Stability-and-Recovery Account

The principal defenders of this account — the Boluarte and Adrianzén governments themselves, the principal Congressional coalition, segments of the Lima business establishment, the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias and the Sociedad de Comercio Exterior del Perú (ComexPerú), selected international commentary (the IMF Article IV consultations and the Latin American business-press), and selected Peruvian academic commentary (Aldo Mariátegui, Patricia del Río in selected commentaries) — emphasise the following. Peru avoided constitutional collapse after 7 December 2022 through the institutional architecture that produced the Boluarte succession. The protest cycle was contained without recourse to broader-scale violence or generalised state-of-siege measures. The macroeconomic recovery has been delivered: GDP returned to growth in 2024, inflation entered the BCRP target band, the BCRP independence was preserved, and the fiscal position is on track to return to the Marco Macroeconómico Multianual fiscal-rule envelope. The bicameralism reform is the most considerable institutional renewal since the 1993 Constitution. The APEC 2024 hosting and the Chancay Megaport opening are markers of Peru's continued international standing and economic prospects. The 2026 election will proceed on schedule under regular institutional conditions.

12.2 The Legitimacy-Deficit Account

The principal defenders of this account — the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDDHH), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos (APRODEH), the Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL), IDEHPUCP, the Asociación Civil Transparencia, the Andean rural and indigenous opposition (the frentes de defensa in Puno, Apurímac, Cusco, Ayacucho), the principal protestadores coalition organisations, much academic-Peruvian commentary (Vergara in selected commentaries, Eduardo Dargent, Carlos Meléndez), and selected international academic commentary — emphasise the following. The government lacks an electoral mandate of its own and operates only through the survival-partnership with a Congress whose own approval ratings are even lower. The protest-period casualties remain without accountability through 2025; the institutional-investigation framework's deficiencies indicate a structural-accountability deficit; the IACHR May 2023 country report's conclusions remain unaddressed. The Caso Rolex disclosure reflects systemic personal-enrichment patterns at the apex of state authority; the constitutional-accusation suspension and the Article 117 procedural firewall are protective rather than meaningful. The prosecutorial-architecture manipulation — the Tribunal Constitucional intervention in the Benavides removal, the Subcomisión slow-walk on the Rolex case, the JNJ-Tribunal-Congress configuration — is institutional capture. The bicameralism reform, while institutionally defensible in principle, was passed in a self-protective alliance configuration. The 2026 election will need to deliver a material break from the post-2022 architecture if Peru's institutional legitimacy is to be reconstructed.

12.3 The Structural-Permanent-Crisis Account

The principal defenders of this account — Alberto Vergara in his book and commentary trajectory, Steven Levitsky in the academic and Foreign Affairs commentary, Carlos Meléndez and Paula Muñoz in academic-journal contributions, Eduardo Dargent in his academic work, and the long-arc historiographical tradition (Cotler-school continuation, Drinot-edited volumes, the international Latin Americanist consensus) — emphasise the following. The Boluarte period is a manifestation rather than a cause of the deeper post-2000 presidential-system instability. Five presidents in five years (Vizcarra, Merino, Sagasti, Castillo, Boluarte; eleven in 25 years if the full post-Fujimori sequence is included) is the structural fact that no single political configuration produces or resolves. The 1993 Constitution's combined-architecture features — the unicameral Congress (now to be reformed), the vacancia presidencial for "moral incapacity", the cuestión de confianza and disolución procedures, the absence of parliamentary-coalition incentives, the presidential-system without effective party-system institutionalisation — produce a structurally-unstable configuration. The Boluarte–Congress survival partnership is the rational response of two-low-legitimacy-coalitions to that architecture; it cannot produce its own resolution. The 2026 election will test whether the bicameralism reform produces an institutional shift or whether the unicameral-era pattern of minority-presidency-and-perpetual-Congressional-conflict reproduces in modified form. The protest-period accountability framework will test whether the Inter-American case-flow can produce formal accountability against the structural-impunity baseline of prior Peruvian mass-casualty episodes. The structural reading does not arbitrate the legitimacy-deficit account or the stability-recovery account but situates both within the longer-arc trajectory.

The corpus's discipline is to record all three accounts and to leave the analytical synthesis to the reader. The post-2026 trajectory will provide the principal empirical evidence for assessing which reading proves most adequate to the Peruvian post-Castillo period.

13. Conclusion — Forward View into the April 2026 Election

The Boluarte Government during 2023–2025 occupies an institutional position without precedent in modern Peruvian governance. A President without electoral mandate, with the lowest sustained-approval rating of any post-2001 Peruvian President, surviving through a partnership with a Congress whose own approval ratings are equally low, has nonetheless governed for two-and-a-half years across the most acute political crisis since the 1990s. The principal architecture of the period — the Otárola and Adrianzén Cabinets; the Caso Rolex and its procedural suspension; the macroeconomic recovery under Salardi and Velarde; the security crisis under the rotating Interior portfolio; the bicameralism reform; the APEC 2024 hosting; the Benavides–Tribunal Constitucional contest — has produced a Peru that is simultaneously institutionally weakened and macroeconomically recovering, internationally engaged and bilaterally fractured, electorally fragmented and constitutionally reformed.

The 12 April 2026 General Election will be the principal forward-test. Three open questions structure the post-2025 trajectory. First, whether Boluarte completes her constitutional term to 28 July 2026: the vacancia threshold remains 87 of 130 deputies; the post-March-2024 Congressional configuration has shown no indication of crossing it absent a further institutional rupture; the Caso Rolex procedural suspension is a marker of the protective coalition's continued operability. The probability of constitutional-term-completion appears high as of May 2025.

Second, whether the 2026 election produces a President capable of constructing a Congressional coalition in the restored bicameral system. The fragmented candidate field, the absence of a front-runner exceeding 12 per cent in early-cycle polling, and the structural pattern of post-2000 minority-presidency-with-Congressional-conflict suggest the more likely outcome is a second-round configuration between two candidates with limited initial bases. Whether the bicameral architecture produces governable coalition-formation or reproduces the unicameral-era stalemate in modified form is the principal institutional-design question of the post-2026 period.

Third, whether the protest-period accountability framework produces formal accountability or settles into structural impunity. The IACHR May 2023 country report's conclusions, the Inter-American Court case-flow anticipated through 2025–2027, the Fiscalía investigations that have not produced final charges against the principal command-line for the Juliaca, Ayacucho, and Andahuaylas events, and the post-Boluarte-mandate prosecutorial environment all bear on this question. The 2009 Baguazo trajectory (PE-A-04) — which produced no command-line accountability — is the principal comparator and the principal negative reference.

The Boluarte period will be remembered, in the long-arc Peruvian governance reading, as the third major institutional episode of the post-2000 trajectory after the Fujimori collapse (2000, PE-A-02) and the Vizcarra-Merino-Sagasti five-day crisis (November 2020, PE-C-02). Whether the period's principal institutional outputs — the bicameralism reform, the macroeconomic recovery, the Chancay Megaport, the survival-partnership pattern — outweigh its principal deficits — the protest-period casualties, the Caso Rolex, the prosecutorial-architecture contest, the post-2022 legitimacy deficit — is the analytical question the corpus leaves to the reader. The 2026 election and its aftermath will provide the principal empirical evidence.

14. Postscript (Added 2026-08-29) — Boluarte Did Not Complete Her Term; the Caso Rolex Immunity Clock Arrived Early

Sections 1–13 above, drafted in May 2025, treat Boluarte's completion of her constitutional term to 28 July 2026 as the near-certain baseline ("the probability of constitutional-term-completion appears high as of May 2025," §13) and frame the Caso Rolex prosecution as "institutionally suspended pending the constitutional clock" (§4.5) — i.e., frozen by Article 117 immunity until the July 2026 handover. Verified reporting (evidence tier: search-retrieved, cross-corroborated across independent outlets; WebFetch to primary sources remains blocked in this session) establishes that both premises were wrong. Dina Boluarte was removed by Congress on 10 October 2025, roughly nine months before this document's assumed exit date, ending her presidency at two years and ten months rather than the full four years and eight months of the constitutional term.

The removal. Following an 8 October 2025 shooting that injured five people at a concert by the cumbia band Agua Marina in Lima — read as the breaking point after a sustained extortion-and-homicide crisis (INEI recorded 6,041 homicides between January and mid-August 2025, the highest for that period since 2017) — Congress accepted four moción de vacancia petitions. Boluarte did not appear when summoned to answer them. Just after midnight on 10 October 2025, Congress voted to remove her under Article 113 ("permanent moral incapacity"); the vote is reported at 122 in favour with none against in most accounts (Colombia One, Wikipedia's Impeachment of Dina Boluarte), though the Wave 11 pass on this corpus recorded 124–0 from a different set of outlets — the exact count is therefore [TBD-VERIFY: 122 vs. 124 in favour, unanimous either way; pending the Congressional Resolución Legislativa]. José Jerí Oré, then President of Congress, was sworn in the same night as interim President; he was himself removed on 17–18 February 2026 over the "Chifagate" scandal (undisclosed meetings with two Chinese businessmen) and succeeded by interim President José María Balcázar, who governed through the 12 April and 7 June 2026 election cycle and handed power to Keiko Fujimori on 28 July 2026 [search-corroborated via CNN, Al Jazeera, NPR, and Colombia One, all reporting 10 October 2025 and 17–19 February 2026]. The full corrected sequence, with sourcing, is at PE-D-07 §12, PE-D-08 §12, PE-D-06 §15, and PE-H-PRES-07 §16; it is not re-derived here.

Consequence for the Caso Rolex trajectory (§4.5 above). This document's assumption that Article 117 immunity would hold until 28 July 2026 was incorrect by about nine months: Boluarte's presidential immunity ceased at 00:07 on 10 October 2025, the moment of her removal, rather than at a scheduled handover. Whether the Subcomisión de Acusaciones Constitucionales' denuncia constitucional converted at that point into an ordinary criminal referral, and what procedural stage the carpeta fiscal has reached as of August 2026, was not established in this research pass — search results returned the October 2025 removal and the subsequent judicial refusal to bar Boluarte from leaving the country pending the abuse-of-office and money-laundering investigations (Al Jazeera, 15 October 2025), but no confirmed indictment or trial date. This is left as an open item for the next sweep rather than asserted either way [TBD-VERIFY: post-removal Caso Rolex procedural status].

What is unaffected. The macroeconomic, security, bicameralism-reform, Benavides–Tribunal Constitucional, and foreign-policy narrative in §§6–10 describes the 2023 – March 2025 period and is not contradicted by the later succession; it predates all three 2025–2026 presidencies and stands as written. The candidate field and pre-candidacy polling in §11 is superseded by the certified 12 April 2026 first-round result recorded in PE-D-06 §15 and PE-D-08 §12.

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Document status: [TBD-VERIFY-PENDING] (relabelled 2026-08-29 from a stray [DRAFT] footer to match the corpus-wide convention; substantive content unchanged by the relabelling). Cross-references to be re-audited after PE-D-05 is corrected (see PE-D-05 §12 for its own postscript). TBD-VERIFY tags to be closed as primary sources (Fiscalía carpetas, Tribunal Constitucional rulings, JNE official decisions, INEI revised statistics, BCRP minutes, the Congressional Resolución Legislativa on the 10 October 2025 vacancia) become accessible. Version date: 2026-08-29.

Sources

1. Wayka.pe, Investigación Rolex (multi-part investigative series, first publication 15 March 2024; updates through May 2025); the original disclosure of President Boluarte's undeclared luxury-watch collection.
2. Ministerio Público (Fiscalía de la Nación), Carpeta Fiscal — Caso Rolex, formal preliminary investigation opened 18 March 2024; subsequent requerimientos, disposiciones fiscales, and the constitutional-accusation referral to the Subcomisión de Acusaciones Constitucionales del Congreso (2024–2025).
3. Subcomisión de Acusaciones Constitucionales del Congreso de la República, Informe sobre la Denuncia Constitucional contra la Presidenta Dina Boluarte Zegarra, multiple sessions and reports through 2024–2025.
4. Poder Judicial del Perú, Auto of 29 March 2024 ratifying the preliminary search of the presidential residence (Surquillo) and the Government Palace office annex on 22 March 2024 (allanamiento); subsequent autos through 2024–2025.
5. Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y de Administración Tributaria (SUNAT), Declaraciones Juradas of President Boluarte (annual filings 2021–2024) and fiscalización communications relating to the Caso Rolex.
6. Contraloría General de la República, Informes de Control relating to the Caso Rolex and to selected Cabinet-level expenditure investigations 2023–2025.
7. Presidente del Consejo de Ministros, Acuerdos del Consejo de Ministros and Decretos Supremos (consecutive PCM administrations: Pedro Angulo Arana, December 2022; Luis Alberto Otárola Peñaranda, 21 December 2022 – 6 March 2024; Gustavo Adrianzén Olaya, 6 March 2024 – ongoing as of May 2025).
8. Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP), Reporte de Inflación (March, June, September, December issues, 2023–2025); Programa Monetario monthly minutes; Memoria Anual 2023 and 2024; the Acta de la Sesión del Directorio on the monetary-policy cycle under Julio Velarde Flores.
9. Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI), Producto Bruto Interno Trimestral; Indicadores de Producción y Empleo; Encuesta Permanente de Empleo Nacional (ENAHO); homicide and security statistics 2023–2025.
10. Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF), Marco Macroeconómico Multianual 2024–2027 and 2025–2028; Reporte de Seguimiento de Inversiones.
11. Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) and Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE), Cronograma Electoral 2026 and Inscripción de Organizaciones Políticas; Registro de Organizaciones Políticas (ROP) records 2023–2025.
12. Congreso de la República del Perú, Ley No. 32101 of 6 March 2024 (the Ley de Reforma Constitucional para Restablecer la Bicameralidad en el Congreso de la República); Ley de Reforma Constitucional sobre Reelección de Autoridades Regionales y Municipales (2023); subsequent ordinary-law implementation statutes.
13. Tribunal Constitucional del Perú, rulings on the Caso Rolex and on the bicameral-reform challenges (selected sentencias and autos 2024–2025); composition changes during the period.
14. Junta Nacional de Justicia (JNJ), Resolución of 27 May 2024 ordering the removal of Patricia Benavides as Fiscal de la Nación; Acción de Amparo and Tribunal Constitucional engagement; Auto del Tribunal Constitucional of 21 August 2024 ordering Benavides' provisional restoration.
15. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH/IACHR), Informe Anual 2023, Chapter IV.B Peru; Informe Anual 2024, Chapter IV.B Peru; follow-up reports on the December 2022 – April 2023 protest casualties.
16. APEC Peru 2024 Secretariat, Lima Declaration of 16 November 2024; the trilateral Xi–Biden communications during the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (14–16 November 2024); subsequent diplomatic readouts.
17. La República, El Comercio, IDL-Reporteros, Wayka, OjoPúblico, Salud con Lupa, Convoca, RPP Noticias, RTV Capital, Canal N, Infobae Perú archive coverage 2023–2025.
18. Reuters Lima Bureau and AFP Lima Bureau, dispatches 2023–2025 (Spanish- and English-language wire copy on the Caso Rolex, the cabinet transitions, the 2024 security crisis, and APEC 2024).
19. Wilson Center Latin American Program, Peru's Political Crisis policy briefs (Cynthia McClintock and collaborators) 2023–2025.
20. Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (IDEHPUCP), Anuario sobre Derechos Humanos 2023 and 2024; selected commentaries on the Caso Rolex and the bicameral reform.
21. Steven Levitsky, multiple analyses of Peruvian political dynamics in Foreign Affairs, Journal of Democracy, and academic journals 2023–2025; Alberto Vergara, op-ed and academic commentary 2023–2025; Carlos Meléndez and Paula Muñoz, analytical commentary 2023–2025.
22. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Informe sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en el Perú en el Contexto de las Protestas Sociales, May 2023 (carried-forward source from PE-D-03 baseline).
23. [2026-08-29 recency update, search-corroborated] CNN ("Peru's leader José Jerí ousted over 'Chifa-gate' scandal," 17 February 2026), Al Jazeera ("Peru's Congress votes to impeach President Jose Jeri," 17 February 2026), and NPR ("Peru new president," 19 February 2026), on the Jerí removal and Balcázar's election as interim President.
24. [2026-08-29 recency update, search-corroborated] Colombia One ("Peru's Congress Impeaches Dina Boluarte, Installs José Jerí as Interim President," 10 October 2025) and Wikipedia's Impeachment of Dina Boluarte summary of contemporaneous reporting, on the 10 October 2025 vacancia vote.
25. [2026-08-29 recency update, search-corroborated] Al Jazeera (15 October 2025), on the post-removal judicial refusal to bar Boluarte from leaving Peru pending the abuse-of-office and money-laundering investigations.
26. [2026-08-29 recency update, search-corroborated] AS/COA, "Peru's Congress Impeaches Dina Boluarte, Installs José Jerí as Interim President," 10 October 2025.

Related Documents

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